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Preface
The UCL Press FRINGE series presents work related to the themes of the 
UCL FRINGE Centre for the Study of Social and Cultural Complexity.
The FRINGE series is a platform for cross-disciplinary analysis 
and the development of ‘area studies without borders’. ‘FRINGE’ is an 
acronym standing for Fluidity, Resistance, Invisibility, Neutrality, Grey 
zones, and Elusiveness – categories fundamental to the themes that the 
Centres support. The oxymoron in the notion of a ‘FRINGE CENTRE’ 
expresses our interest in (1) the tensions between ‘area studies’ and 
more traditional academic disciplines; and (2) social, political, and cul-
tural trajectories from ‘centres to fringes’ and inversely from ‘fringes to 
centres’.
The series pursues an innovative understanding of the significance 
of fringes: rather than taking ‘fringe areas’ to designate the world’s 
peripheries or non-mainstream subject matters (as in ‘fringe politics’ or 
‘fringe theatre’), we are committed to exploring the patterns of social 
and cultural complexity characteristic of fringes and emerging from the 
areas we research. We aim to develop forms of analysis of those ele-
ments of complexity that are resistant to articulation, visualisation, or 
measurement.
The present volume addresses the challenge of how one might think 
through coherent alternatives to the entrenched conceptual categories of 
‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’, around which discussion of politics and society 
has centred for at least a century. This task remains stubbornly difficult, 
even while those categories become ever less suited to describe novel and 
unsettling political developments across the globe. Starting from analysis 
of the recent history and current dynamics of ‘post-socialist’ Russia and 
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Central and Eastern Europe, the volume confronts the global challenge we 
face in articulating alternatives to capitalism, socialism and threatening 
populist regimes.
Alena Ledeneva and Peter Zusi,
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL
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1Introduction
Peter J. S. Duncan and Elisabeth Schimpfössl
In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down. Two years later, the Soviet Union 
disintegrated. This collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union discredited the idea of socialism for generations to come. It 
was seen as representing the final and irreversible victory of capitalism 
over socialism. This triumphant dominance was barely challenged for 
nearly the next two decades. But then the 2008 crisis hit and threw the 
Western world into a state of turmoil. More than a decade on, things 
are far from being back to ‘normal’; on the contrary, everything has come 
even more apart at the seams. Wars are raging, populists are taking over 
the reins and our ecology is going downhill.
This volume begins with a number of separate studies of some of 
the consequences of the introduction of capitalism into the former Soviet 
Union and China. It continues by examining possible alternatives to the 
existing organisation of the world economy, particularly as posed by 
the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. It further considers alternatives to 
the policies currently pursued domestically and discusses ways of achiev-
ing these changes.
Socialism and capitalism competing
As gloomy and disturbing as the twenty-first century has been so far, it 
would be pretentious to claim that our times are exceptional in their level 
of grimness. In retrospect, we know that the good times were the excep-
tion to the norm, not the other way around. This is particularly true for 
the boom years following the Second World War. Prematurely, many came 
to be convinced that lasting prosperity was from then on the order of the 
day. At the very latest, the 2008 crisis (if not already three-and-a-half 
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decades prior to it) brought home that capitalism means misery for millions 
of people.
The grievances of today have triggered doubts among the young 
generations all over the globe that the world has to be like this. Such senti-
ments have expressed themselves in a variety of social movements, from 
the Arab Spring to the Occupy movement. Alongside these movements, 
ideas have reappeared – many of which are almost as old as the problem 
created by capitalism – among them calls for considering socialism as an 
alternative as outlined most famously by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
In 1848, in their Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels called on 
the working class to unite in order to create a socialist society. This call 
was international. Socialism would only be possible in countries that had 
laid the material basis for abundance under capitalism, they reiterated. 
Seventy years later, Lenin still held the same conviction. Even after he 
had been on the forefront of the first socialist seizure of power in 1917, 
he was adamant that for the revolution in Russia to survive it needed a 
far more advanced Germany or Britain to follow suit.
That a country like Germany might have its own revolution was not 
a far-fetched idea at this moment in time. Millions of people in the bel-
ligerent countries had been radicalised by their wartime experience. 
Whether the men in the trenches or the women in the factories, they 
understood that the fate of their nations depended on them. The ruling 
classes understood this too. The danger of revolution and unrest made 
the latter concede to a number of demands they had so long managed to 
circumvent. In the wake of revolutionary movements, former empires 
became republics and countries all over Europe introduced social reforms, 
such as unemployment insurance, social housing and war disabled relief.
While prior to the war, governments brought themselves to imple-
ment social welfare reforms in order to constrain the influence of social-
democratic parties (most famously, Bismarck with his social welfare 
policies), now many social democratic parties became the closest allies, 
if not pivotal, in undermining and containing the revolutionary craving 
of their often much more militant followers by soothing them with reform 
policies. After these revolting masses were let down by their party once 
too often, they lost their spirit. The 1929 Wall Street Crash and the depres-
sion of the 1930s further disintegrated society. These factors combined 
allowed fascist movements to rise. Decisively for the catastrophes to come 
was that in Germany the conservative right opted for Hitler to save 
their skin.
The Second World War led to yet another radicalisation of working 
people all over Western and Eastern Europe and beyond. The threat of a 
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social revolution was back on the agenda, alarmingly so to the rulers of 
the time. Stalin – who was about to swallow many countries in Eastern 
Europe – would have seen a genuine socialist revolution as a mortal threat 
to his totalitarian regime, while the Western rulers feared an end to their 
economic domination. These fears resulted in an expansion of the wel-
fare state that was unseen in history and never seen again. Governments 
began caring for their citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’. Strength-
ened by full employment and favourable labour legislation, in most West 
European countries trade unions grew in numbers of members and in 
their political and economic influence.
For some time, it looked as if the ‘mixed economy’ of welfare-state 
capitalism had banished unemployment and delivered universal and long-
lasting prosperity. Against this backdrop, it seemed reasonable to many 
working people to demand a fairer share of the cake. By that time, in the 
late 1960s, students also passionately vocalised their impatience with 
rigid hierarchies and dusty social mores. But then in 1973, the price of 
oil quadrupled. This unexpected earthquake shook one Western econ-
omy after the other.
In response to the oil crisis and the subsequent instability of mar-
kets, neo-liberal policies gained dominance. Thatcherism and Reaga-
nomics in the 1980s came to determine not only their countries of origin 
but also influenced developments globally. Parallel to this, trade unions 
lost much of their industrial power. Social welfare was cut back, traditional 
industries closed down, state-owned services privatised and the financial 
markets deregulated. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 further escalated the ideological offensive 
against public ownership and state provision of welfare and services in 
many capitalist countries. Austerity programmes, which had initially 
been launched by conservative governments, were continued by social- 
democratic governments, most notoriously by New Labour in Britain and 
the SPD in Germany, which goes a long way to explain their gradual 
decrease in popularity in the coming decades.
From 1989 into the 1990s, the neo-liberal economic template was 
implemented in most of the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) devised 
programmes for the transition to a market economy, following the same 
mantras of liberalisation and deregulation, macroeconomic stabilisation 
and privatisation. Sometimes even the same advisors travelled from coun-
try to country, bringing what was termed the Washington Consensus first 
to Poland and later to Russia. In Central and Eastern Europe, where a 
legal consciousness was relatively strong, economic and institutional 
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reforms produced economic growth fairly quickly, albeit alongside wid-
ening inequality.1 In the post-Soviet states, the lack of rule of law, the 
prevalence of corruption and strong bureaucratic networks – all factors 
impeding the full implementation of ‘shock therapy’ –  led to economic 
decline, here with even more sharply rising inequality.
In Russia and Ukraine, businessmen with close connections to the 
state created private banks and bought much of the state-owned oil, gas 
and metals assets cheaply, creating a class of ‘oligarchs’. In Russia, from 
2000 onwards, Putin moved against some of these oligarchs to deprive 
them of their influence on the media and to increase the role of the state 
in the ownership and control of the economy, to the benefit of his former 
KGB colleagues, other personal cronies and himself. In most other respects, 
however, Putin has followed the calls of the neo-liberals for low flat taxes 
on incomes; low taxes on corporations; slashing of social spending to be 
replaced by private insurance; freer labour markets achieved by cutting 
back workers’ and trade union rights; allowing the sale of land to indi-
viduals and corporations; raising the pension age; and joining the World 
Trade Organization.2
The increasing role of private enterprise in China and the opening 
up of the country to the world economy led to China replacing Japan as 
the main challenger to US economic dominance in the 1990s. This was 
not affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which had ramifications 
around the world, including in Russia, but hardly affected the neo-liberal 
hegemony. Combining a neo-liberal economic policy with a neocon-
servative belief in the omnipotence of America, the administration of 
George W. Bush led the country into wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and 
Iraq in 2003. Regime change proved easy, but it was much harder to keep 
the newly installed governments in control of their countries. America’s 
world hegemony was severely challenged following these conflicts. The 
subsequent sharp increases in oil and gas prices strengthened not only 
the feudal Arab monarchies but also the Putin regime, giving the Kremlin 
a popular basis of support.
Populism as an alternative?
Despite long decades of capitalism seeming invincible, neo-liberalism suf-
fered its own crisis of credibility. In the aftermath of the 2008 Western 
financial crisis, millions of people lost their jobs or their homes, real wages 
fell and health and social spending was curtailed, as governments resorted 
to austerity policies to reduce their deficits. In the United Kingdom, major 
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banks and financial institutions became insolvent or survived only because 
they were propped up with government funding. Meanwhile, the rich got 
richer year by year – in some parts of the world, astronomically so.3
The political impact of the 2008 crisis varied between different coun-
tries. In the United States, it was a major factor in the defeat of the 
Republicans and the election of the Democrat Barack Obama as the first 
black president in 2008. In Britain, on the other hand, Gordon Brown’s 
pursuit of austerity policies led to Labour’s defeat in 2010 and the elec-
tion of a much more austere Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, 
led by David Cameron. In the eurozone, Angela Merkel’s Germany led 
the trend towards austerity and pressured other states into subscribing to 
it too, which resulted in years of economic stagnation.
Austerity policies from above eventually incited a range of radical 
social and political movements of resistance from below. The year 2011 
began with the flowering of the Arab Spring. In May the ‘indignant citi-
zens’ movements emerged on the squares of Spain and Greece. In the 
autumn, the Occupy movement appeared across the United States and 
the City of London. In December, hundreds of thousands of Russians pro-
tested against fraudulent parliamentary elections. Putin’s response on 
his return to the presidency in May 2012 was to clamp down brutally 
on the opposition and launch a campaign to uphold ‘traditional’ conserva-
tive, religious values, promoting a statist form of Russian nationalism 
and continuing neo-liberal economic policies.4 In most Western countries, 
the protest movements had important political results. The indignant citi-
zens created Podemos in Spain and boosted Syriza in Greece. In 2015, 
Bernie Sanders announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination 
for America’s president as a democratic socialist, and Jeremy Corbyn, the 
far-left candidate, was elected leader of the Labour Party.
One of the most dramatic consequences these developments have 
had is the rise of populism as expressed in Brexit, Trump and the far right 
throughout Europe. In France, where the left is split several ways, the 
right-wing populist Marine le Pen went through to the final round in the 
2017 presidential election, being beaten there by Emmanuel Macron who 
advocated a neo-liberal economic policy. As Jan-Werner Müller argues, 
typically, the populists of our time rage against the elites and the estab-
lishment, even though many stem directly from them. They launch cam-
paigns against elite corruption and ‘treasonous’ trade deals and claim the 
exclusive right to represent the people, among other things by promising 
to return their national sovereignty to them. Further, they declare immi-
grants to be the main source of their people’s ills; for example by equalis-
ing Islam with terrorism, thereby appealing to the chauvinist and racist 
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prejudices of the more backward part of the population. Such hatred often 
goes hand-in-hand with anti-Semitism. Once in power (which is often 
gained with the active support of the traditional conservative right), pop-
ulist governments undermine checks and balances, clamp down on trade 
unions and civil society organisations, and use referenda that allow for 
popular participation in politics as supposed instruments of real democ-
racy. This is often accompanied by some kind of showdown with the 
alleged enemies of the people, whom they accuse of conspiring against 
the nation with the backing of the mainstream media which spread ‘fake 
news’.5
Such a scenario is hardly what Marx and Engels would have wanted 
to see as the consequence of having neo-liberal ideas discredited.
Area studies and global theories
This edited volume is not intended to provide summary overviews of the 
history and essence of global theories revolving around socialism and cap-
italism. Instead, it brings together research studies from the 2010s, 
which deal with capitalism in action against the backdrop of a new inter-
national situation. On the one hand, for more than a quarter of a century 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc are no more; and on the other 
hand, China is more powerful than ever.
The global repercussions of both regions’ trajectories demonstrate 
the still persisting significance of research that is located in the multi-
disciplinary field of area studies. In the English-speaking world, area 
studies has just celebrated its centenary. The University of London created 
the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) in 1915 and the 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 1916. The area studied 
by SSEES – the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – has functioned 
as a laboratory for the experiment of making the transition from cen-
trally planned economies to various forms of capitalism. This also implied 
that boundaries became much more malleable than in the decades prior 
to this. For area studies, this has wide-reaching implications. Such sud-
den geopolitical and ideological remapping (for example, former Eastern 
Bloc countries becoming members of the European Union) has thrown 
into question the traditional separation of the East European area from 
Europe as a whole.
Moreover, global trends often manifest themselves in concrete area 
or country situations. The area studies tradition is to analyse the interac-
tion of the cultural, historical, social, economic, political and ideological 
7introDuCtion
influences on a specific dynamic. One early example of someone taking 
an area studies approach, albeit not using the term, was Karl Marx. He 
developed his theory of the state on the basis of the study of the state in 
France in works such as The Class Struggles in France and The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Many present-day area studies practition-
ers might not see themselves in the Marxist tradition, but not unlike him, 
they have again turned their attention to the global significance of their 
research beyond the confines of their traditional region or country of 
study.6
Our prime geographical focus is nevertheless on those two great 
powers, one in decline, the other rising. We also consider the implica-
tions of these developments for Western societies. The volume covers 
three major areas. Part One revolves around the impact of capitalism on 
countries that had centrally planned economies. Part Two focuses on the 
alternative posed by China’s outstanding economic growth – its domestic 
consequences, and how it is projecting its economic power to challenge 
the current international economic order. Part Three identifies features 
in contemporary society that point towards alternatives that have the 
potential to challenge the existing socio-economic relationships in West-
ern states.
There is a substantial literature on the ‘varieties of capitalism’. Hall 
and Soskice deal exclusively in two models of capitalism. One is the ‘lib-
eral market economy’; that is, the Anglo-American version. The second is 
the ‘coordinated market economy’, more normally known as the mixed 
economy or social-market economy; that is, the version found in Scandi-
navia and Germany.7 Others have added Eastern Europe to this mix.8 In 
another twist, János Kornai views varieties of capitalism by their political 
regimes.9
Similarly, we can talk of ‘varieties of socialism’. The Soviet model of 
central planning and one-party rule was only one of many possibilities. 
Within Eastern Europe, there were experiments with market socialism in 
Hungary and self-management in Yugoslavia. The model of ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’ has taken the role of the market much fur-
ther.10 Within the Marxist tradition, many tendencies reject Leninist con-
cepts of the need for a single ruling party.11 Beyond the Marxists, the 
nineteenth-century concept of cooperative socialism shows resilience in 
the forms of the contemporary cooperative movement and worker-owned 
enterprises such as John Lewis. Many Western socialists favour a plural-
ist system, with a combination of nationalised, municipal, cooperative 
and private business providing support for well-funded public health, 
social, educational and environmental services.
SOCIAL ISM , CAPITALISM AND ALTERNATIVES8
Despite the geographical foci that this volume deals with, it nevertheless 
has global reach. The opening chapter by Ruslan Dzarasov shows how 
contemporary Russian society is a semi-dependent capitalism, depend-
ing on the core capitalist countries for its markets while simultaneously 
exercising hegemonic power regionally. This reinforces the relevance of 
world systems theory, classifying Russia as part of the semi-periphery. 
Here our application of area studies confirms a particular approach to 
global economic relationships.
The last years saw a continuous increase in social inequality. This 
trend was accelerated by the 2008 financial crisis, which hit almost every-
one but the wealthiest. In 2014, a global debate on inequality was initiated 
following the publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century. Piketty argues that capitalism automatically produces extreme 
inequality. He warns that the increasing imbalance in global wealth has 
the potential to cause major instability and to threaten democracy. He 
recommends that the state should intervene to counteract this.12
Two chapters in this volume examine how the rich in Russia have 
accumulated their wealth and how they legitimise it. Catherine Suart dis-
sects the origins of the wealth held by the Muslim business elite in Rus-
sia. She also explores how these oligarchs strive to legitimise their power 
and exercise political influence. Power legitimisation is also the topic 
of the next chapter. Elisabeth Schimpfössl and Timothy Monteath inves-
tigate the philanthropic practices exercised by Russia’s hyper-rich and 
compare them to those of the British elite.13
There is growing interest in the impact on society around the world 
of informal practices. A major contribution towards the study of this is 
The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, published in the UCL Press 
Fringe Series.14 A final chapter in the first part of the present volume 
analyses the impact of neo-liberal reforms on the traditional informal 
structures prevalent in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Cos-
tanza Curro discusses the survival of the birzha, the informal youth net-
works in Georgia.
The principal challenge to Western capitalist dominance of the world 
economy in general and American dominance in particular comes not, as 
yet, from systemic alternatives arising from within the West, but from 
China, the focus of Part Two. This part is opened by a chapter that deals 
with the rise of China’s billionaires and their close relationship with the 
Communist Party officials. Its author, Ion Marandici, finds that higher 
income levels correlate with party membership and education.
Heiko Khoo poses the key question whether China today is capital-
ist or socialist and whether it offers a viable alternative to both Soviet-
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style socialism and to free-market capitalism. He applies the theories and 
definitions of capitalism and socialism developed by the Hungarian reform 
economist János Kornai. Khoo argues that the rise of China challenges 
the hegemony of liberal democracy and the free market which is held to 
underpin it. China’s leader Xi Jinping is the most influential Marxist in 
today’s world, but outside China few people read his writings or speeches, 
and many Western Marxists consider China to be capitalist. Neverthe-
less, the impact of his ideas and actions is decisive in shaping the fate of 
China. Khoo locates Xi’s line today in the tradition of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP), introduced by Lenin in Russia in 1921. According to Khoo, 
Xi’s emphasis on Marxism as China’s guiding ideology is connected to a 
radical campaign against corruption that is designed to strengthen the 
communist party’s popular support and appease social discontent. His 
defence of the central role of public ownership and his outright opposi-
tion to parliamentary democracy indicate that China will remain a com-
munist state for the foreseeable future.
The next chapter on China deals with the country’s role on a global 
scale. Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative seems to pose a challenge to 
Western neo-liberal trading patterns.15 Peter Braga and Stephen Hall ask 
whether the Belt and Road Initiative poses an alternative system, as 
opposed to an alternative communications network. They conclude that 
it does not, but that China will use the project to stimulate changes in the 
global system to its own advantage.
The two chapters in Part Three bring us back to Western Europe 
and North America, where the discrediting of neo-liberalism has led to a 
renewed interest in ideas of a mixed economy. More effective state inter-
vention should both revive growth and reduce inequality.16 Among other 
concepts, Keynesianism is beginning to make a comeback. Writing in 
2018, Robert Skidelsky, the biographer of John Maynard Keynes, is among 
several who have warned that the world economy is heading for another 
crash. He has called for a partial return to Keynesianism with govern-
ments borrowing in order to invest.17 Keynes had argued that, in order to 
avoid recessions, which he saw as endemic in the capitalist system, the 
government should be ready to borrow money and raise the level of aggre-
gate effective demand. In Western Europe between 1945 and 1973, 
Keynesian theory was generally seen as the answer to Marx’s theory of 
inevitable capitalist crisis.
Geoffrey Hosking’s chapter, which focuses on Britain as an example 
but is of global significance, concretely shows the impact of neo-liberal 
policy. He shows that the resulting inequalities have led to a loss of faith 
in the political system and rising right-wing populism. In arguing for a 
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return to Keynesian policies, he points out some of the mistakes made by 
governments in the past, which prevented these policies from working 
properly.
Others have questioned whether a return to Keynesianism is viable 
in the twenty-first century and suggested that it is capitalism itself which 
needs to be replaced, not simply the neo-liberal model. Some have argued 
that capitalism can only continue to exist by taking away democratic 
rights.18 As traditional social democracy adapted itself to neo-liberal ideas 
and policies, its support amongst the working class tended to decline.19 
This was sometimes challenged by new, radical movements on the left 
which occasionally inspired large numbers of young people into political 
activity and in a short time achieved substantial support: for example, 
Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, Jeremy Corbyn in Britain and Bernie 
Sanders in America.20 Pete Duncan’s chapter discusses the successes and 
limitations of these four movements.
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Part i
Capitalism in action
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1
Semi-dependent capitalism
Russia
Ruslan Dzarasov
Modern Russian society can be defined as a semi-dependent form of capital-
ism. This means that on the one hand, it depends heavily on the core capi-
talist countries, while on the other, it aspires to play a regional hegemonic 
role. All contradictions in Russia’s economy, domestic and foreign policy 
stem from this intermediate position in the capitalist world- system.
Creeping Stalinism: The economic foundation 
of post-Soviet society
The roots of the present-day model of capitalism in Russia lie in two major 
factors: (1) degeneration of the Soviet bureaucracy, and (2) the influence 
of global financialised capitalism.
Leon Trotsky in his insightful work The Revolution Betrayed demon-
strated that contrary to Stalin’s proposition, Soviet society was by no means 
socialist. Actually, it was no more than a transitional formation which 
amounted merely to an attempt at constructing socialism. In the absence 
of a victorious world revolution, this society could well revert to capital-
ism. Trotsky also singled out the source of this degeneration, in the special 
position of the ruling bureaucracy: ‘Privileges are worth little if they can-
not be handed on to one’s children by way of inheritance. Therefore, the 
privileged bureaucracy will sooner or later seek to take ownership of the 
enterprises it now manages, to turn them into private property.’1
Cambridge University Professor David Lane speaks of two main 
social groupings which aided in the transition of the Soviet system to capi-
talism: the ‘administrative class’, consisting of the Soviet bureaucracy, and 
SOCIAL ISM , CAPITALISM AND ALTERNATIVES16
the ‘appropriating class’, made up of the intelligentsia who had an interest 
in using markets to benefit from their professional knowledge.2 To these 
two social categories can be added the black-market entrepreneurs who 
had gradually developed behind the ostensibly monolithic façade of the 
Soviet system.3 In the course of Gorbachev’s Perestroika, these groupings 
tacitly formed a powerful pro-capitalist social bloc, which facilitated the 
demise of the Soviet system and its transition to capitalism.
A no less important factor shaping the new social system was the 
unprecedented Western influence on the process of transformation in 
the former Soviet republics. The defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold 
War had compromised the socialist system of values, helping to create a 
situation in which Russian society uncritically adopted a bourgeois sys-
tem of values which presupposed the broad introduction of private prop-
erty. It was against the backdrop of its victory in the Cold War that ruling 
groups in the West, above all in the United States, were able to exert a 
decisive behind-the-scenes influence on the formation of the post-Soviet 
 societies.
This formation was based on the principles of the notorious Wash-
ington Consensus, which underlay the policies pursued by Western (pri-
marily American) financial organisations in their dealings with developing 
countries.4 As the American researcher Janine Wedel argued, the Rus-
sian reforms were mapped out by a few Harvard University experts with 
close links to the US government. They were implemented in Russia by 
the politically dominant group of pro-Western politicians belonging to 
the close coterie of the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin.5
It follows from the above that implementation of the Russian reforms 
saw the desire of Soviet state functionaries to become private-property 
owners merging with the ambition of the Western ruling elite to impose 
their system of values on their historical adversary.
The foundations of the new social system were laid by privatisa-
tion. Its nature can be seen in the materials of an official report by the 
Accounting Chamber of the Russian Federation.6 The report states that 
privatisation was based neither on the selection of particular state assets 
whose effectiveness might have been increased by their transfer to pri-
vate hands, nor on the creation of equal opportunities for all layers of the 
population. As a result, the preconditions were created for countless 
breaches of the law during the privatisation process. In the course of this 
process, an enormous transfer of wealth from the state to the private sec-
tor was carried out. Its scale can be gauged from the fact that the privati-
sations yielded the government less than 5 per cent of the market price of 
the former state enterprises.7 An important dimension of this process was 
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that privatisation further strengthened informal control over the assets 
of the new owners (see more on this below). This was only the continua-
tion of informal control over state enterprises enjoyed by the Soviet 
bureaucracy from Stalin’s time.
Other reform policies had the same thrust. The liberalising of 
prices – that is, their freeing from control by the state – in fact facilitated 
transfer of labour income into private hands through price increases on 
the part of the new owners. To fight inflation, the authorities started the 
so-called financial stabilisation approach, reduced to restrictive mone-
tary policy. The money stock was squeezed at the expense of real wages, 
pensions and social transfer payments. All this resulted in the enormous 
decline in aggregate demand, leading in turn to an equally great decrease 
in gross domestic product (GDP).
To better understand the nature of the post-Soviet social system, 
one should focus on the aims of the new capitalist elite in terms of the 
type of income that they extract from the assets under their control, which 
reflects a particular model of corporate governance established in mod-
ern Russia. It is highly authoritarian in nature, because it is based on a 
high rate of concentration of property rights.8 However, the real concen-
tration of power at Russian enterprises is even greater than is assumed 
by the formal concentration of property rights. The most important fea-
ture of the Russian model of corporate governance is that it is largely 
based on informal control.
Dominant groups controlling Russian productive assets developed 
a sophisticated network of power relations, allowing them to influence 
both the internal and external environment of their enterprises. One 
should call the network of these predominantly informal institutions an 
‘infrastructure of control’. Its external elements typically include a sophis-
ticated chain of offshore firms disguising the real owners of enterprises; 
ties to corrupt state functionaries lobbying for their business interests; and 
protection provided by so-called roofs – state law enforcement agencies, 
private security firms and criminal structures. The main aim of the exter-
nal elements of the infrastructure of control is to protect the ‘property 
rights’ of the established dominant groups against encroachments by 
hostile groups. The internal elements of the infrastructure include top-
down management with a highly centralised decision-making process; 
overgrown departments of monitoring and control; and internal security 
services. These institutions were designed to suppress worker protests 
and opportunist actions by hired employees. The whole infrastructure 
of control ensures reliable control on the part of owners over the finan-
cial flows of their enterprises.9 It follows from the above that the highly 
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authoritarian character of Russian big business assumes extra-economic 
compulsion.
The largely informal character of the Russian model of corporate 
governance has numerous and vital consequences for business strategies, 
social relations and national economic development. It is impossible to 
fix legally informal control over enterprises, and hence it is equally impos-
sible to bequeath it to inheritors. However, informal control can always 
be challenged. Waves of property redistribution between rival groups of 
dominant owners roll regularly across the landscape of Russian big busi-
ness. The majority of these takeovers are hostile in nature and carried 
out with the help of coercion from state organs and/or criminal groups. 
Alternatively, the state can use so-called state corporations to transfer 
property from alien to friendly business groups. This means that owner-
ship and control in Russian business are fundamentally unstable.
One of the most important results of this instability of property rights 
in modern Russia is the shift of the typical corporate strategy to a short-
term time horizon. This determined short-term rent as the predominant 
type of income maximised by the majority of Russian corporations. This 
rent can be quantitatively defined as ‘free cash flow’ net of interest pay-
ments on loans and also dividends of non-controlling shareholders. Rent 
extraction assumes offshore figurehead trading intermediaries. The lat-
ter are usually registered in some offshore jurisdictions with a favourable 
tax regime. Typically, Russian owners do not supply the products of the 
controlled enterprises directly to the domestic market. First, they sell 
goods to their own offshore trading companies at prices lower than the 
market level. Intermediaries later resell the products at market prices. As 
a result, profit is accumulated in the accounts of the trade intermediaries 
and later is transferred to private accounts of the final beneficiaries. Alter-
natively, the latter can establish firms supplying raw materials, parts 
and/or equipment to the controlled enterprises at prices higher than the 
market level. The result is the same. Funds are withdrawn from enter-
prises and transferred to private offshore accounts. This system was espe-
cially evident on the eve of the global financial meltdown of 2008, when 
oil revenues of Russian capitalism were at their highest. According to some 
data, 90 per cent of Russian big business is registered in offshore sites 
and 80 per cent of the deals in Russian securities are carried out through 
the same jurisdictions.10 According to the Russian Central Bank, in the 
period from 1994 to the first quarter of 2018, the net export of private 
capital from Russia amounted to $714 billion.11
The rent type of incomes appropriated by Russian capitalists should 
be distinguished from the entrepreneurial profit dominating economies 
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of the centre. The latter depends on the difference between costs and rev-
enues. The rent in question only partially depends on this factor because 
it is extracted due to control over the firm’s financial flows. The above 
means that sources of this income may be formed at the expense of wages, 
salaries of rank-and-file managers, investment funds, depreciation funds, 
violation of contractual commitments, and tax evasion – sometimes even 
embezzlement of loans and any other kinds of financial flows. Some of 
these sources represent costs rather than revenues. Dependence of this 
short-term rent extraction on the largely informal infrastructure of con-
trol makes this type of income close to Marxian feudal rent, which is 
appropriated by extra-economic coercion. Hence, the rent of Russian cap-
italists should be placed somewhere in between the entrepreneurial profit 
of the centre and the feudal rent of the periphery. The aims of Russian 
firms reflect the semi-peripheral nature of Russian capitalism.
Figure 1.1 shows in generalised form the impact of the transition to 
peripheral (or semi-peripheral) capitalism on the social and economic 
development of the former Soviet republics. All of the former Soviet republics 
lag behind the USSR in terms of both Human Development Index (HDI) 
and per capita GDP rankings, with Estonia being the only exception. (And 
even Estonia is behind the USSR in terms of per capita gross national income 
(GNI) rank.)
Split elite and authoritarian state
Beginning in the mid-2000s, Western analysts started actively discussing 
the return of Russia to the authoritarian path of development and resump-
tion of the Cold War.12 Such a change is usually regarded as a result of 
the personal influence of Vladimir Putin, especially in connection with 
his past KGB experience. In fact, the political system of modern Russia, 
like its foreign policy, is only the natural result of the new social- economic 
system of semi-peripheral capitalism, which replaced the Soviet system.
According to the famous theory of hegemony developed by Antonio 
Gramsci, the mechanism of democracy under capitalism assumes a cer-
tain compromise of the ruling class with subjugated classes and social 
groups. It includes the observation of certain social-economic rights of 
the labouring classes, petty bourgeoisie and intellectual circles.13 This 
service is provided by the social welfare state. It allows the ruling class 
to  present its own interests in society as national interests shared by 
 everyone. An important precondition of this social compromise is forma-
tion of the general class consciousness of capitalists in a given society, 
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which assumes limiting the interests of individual capitalists when they 
contradict the general, whole-class interests. Only with this backdrop 
can a relatively independent (from particular representatives of the rul-
ing class) democratic state appear.14
The modern semi-peripheral capitalism established in Russia is a 
far cry from the preconditions for bourgeois democracy. As mentioned 
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above, its private ownership is based on an infrastructure of control – that 
is, on supra-economic coercion and violence. This type of private prop-
erty, reflecting the joint effect of degeneration of the Soviet system and 
Western influence (see above), became the major institution strengthen-
ing the violation of human rights in modern Russia. First, these are rights 
of hired labour. Distribution of the national income is determined by the 
power of big capital in its coarse form. It implies transfer of part of 
the income created by the labour of the Russian population (and in the 
case of oil revenues, by labour in other countries) to the world financial 
markets. Such a regime is incompatible with a genuine democracy. Indeed, 
under a democratic regime people would not tolerate not only some par-
ticular politicians, but the social system of peripheral capitalism as such. 
Thus, the foundations of the authoritarian political regime are rooted not 
in past experiences of Mr Putin, but in the nature of the new social sys-
tem which was partially inherited from the degeneration of the Soviet 
system and formed under the crucial influence of the West.
As is well known, the radical market reforms of the early 1990s, and 
privatisation in particular, were challenged by the Russian Supreme 
Soviet – the first truly democratically elected parliament in modern Rus-
sian history. This led to an eventual showdown between the parliament 
and President Yeltsin, supported by the West, in October 1993. It was a 
decisive moment for the fate of democracy in modern Russia. For the sake 
of going forward with radical market reforms, the liberal pro- Western 
power elite resorted to shooting up the first legally elected parliament in 
modern Russian history.15 It is worth mentioning that Yeltsin’s edict, which 
disbanded the Supreme Soviet, justified this move by the Supreme Soviet’s 
‘direct resistance to implementation of social and economic reforms’.16 
The parliamentary opposition, while pursuing its own aims, at the same time 
protested against the radical market reforms on  behalf of the wider 
Russian public. Shooting up the parliament removed the last obstacles on 
the way to formation of the new capitalist class –   notorious Russian oli-
garchs – and secured the authoritarian political regime favourable to their 
economic power and corresponding to it. It is exactly the type of pseudo-
democratic power free from the societal control necessary to establish the 
external elements of the infrastructure of control. The shooting up of the 
democratically elected parliament, whatever conservative trends it dem-
onstrated, was an undisguised act of civil war. It was carried out with the 
tacit support of the American administration. The memoirs of Strobe Tal-
bott, the deputy US Secretary of State responsible for policy towards Rus-
sia in the Clinton administration, testify that in the moment of this acute 
crisis the US administration was concerned only with preserving in power 
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Mr Yeltsin, who was making important unilateral concessions in vital stra-
tegic issues.17 Results of this ‘victory’ were fixed in the new authoritarian 
Constitution which cut the rights of the State Duma and the new Russian 
Parliament, and disproportionately extended presidential power.
Mr Putin only applied the mechanism of authoritarianism created 
by his powerful predecessor with the full support of the West. It is 
 important to emphasise that this mechanism itself reflects the objective 
 character of the social-class relations established in the country in post-
Soviet times. More than that, present Russian capitalism has inner fea-
tures which prevent its democratic evolution.
As was shown above, due to the fundamental instability of its con-
trol over assets, Russian big business is oriented towards short-term rent 
rather than long-term growth. This creates obstacles for the process of 
recognition of general interests by the Russian property-owning class. 
That is why such aims as modernisation, social stability, a worthy place 
at the world market and the like are not shared by all business groups. 
The recurring process of redistribution of property rights demonstrates the 
constant ‘war of all against all’ in the milieu of big business.  Essentially, 
Russian oligarchs represent a mechanical aggregation of rival, hostile 
groups. Such a situation prevents the development of the joint class con-
sciousness of the current Russian bourgeois class in a meaningful form. In 
the absence of the joint interests of the ruling class, there is no real place 
for genuine social compromise with other social classes and groups. It 
appears that there are no socio-economic foundations for the hegemony 
of the current Russian bourgeoisie.
There are no preconditions for the formation of a relatively inde-
pendent bourgeois state either. The principle of ‘equidistance of power 
from oligarchs’ proclaimed by Putin is no more than a slogan. A number 
of his cronies joined the Forbes ‘Golden hundred’ of Russians, when 
Mr Putin came to power.18 The external elements of the infrastructure of 
control, ‘roofs’ provided by the state functionaries and lobbyist struc-
tures, mean that in fact they have a double system of responsibilities. 
Ostensibly they are responsible to the state hierarchy, while actually they 
stick to the interests of business groups to which they are linked by infor-
mal networks of power and money relations. External elements of con-
trol are very costly, but they are vital to preserve control over enterprises. 
From this it follows that bribes (which facilitate informal links between 
power and money) are intrinsic to the system and represent part of the 
investment of capital by Russian big business. That is why it is impossible 
to overcome corruption in the society of semi-peripheral capitalism with-
out challenging this social system as such.
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Thus, modern Russia demonstrates an atomised proprietary class 
and fragmented state. Having come into being in the 1990s, it was fol-
lowed by economic decline and plummeting living standards that threat-
ened the disintegration of the very fabric of society. This was saliently 
demonstrated by the ‘parade of sovereignties’ (which means that many 
Russian regions proclaimed their independence from the central power) 
which rolled over Russia in the early 1990s. All this was only a window of 
opportunity for the local elites’ takeover of the former state assets in ‘their’ 
territories. It was this growing vacuum of power which was stopped by 
Mr Putin’s strengthening of his personal power regime.
Putin carried out an administrative reform strengthening control of 
the central government bodies in the hierarchy of power; cancelled elec-
tion of the regional heads, replacing it by direct appointment; increased 
expenditures on the military, secret services and law enforcement agen-
cies; ousted from the country a few powerful oligarchs who challenged 
his personal power, and so on. In the absence of real preconditions for 
bourgeois democracy and any influential social protest movements, Putin’s 
authoritarianism helped to fill the vacuum of power and stopped the anar-
chic disintegration of the country. This explains his popularity among 
the Russian population. However important in their time, these achieve-
ments are only relative and temporary.
One must say that Putin’s reforms left intact the foundations of the 
social system established in Russia after the fall of the Soviet system. The 
US expert on Russia, Marshall Goldman, wittily called modern Russia ‘Pet-
rostate’.19 Indeed, the relative political and social stability of our society 
achieved in the 2000s rested on partial redistribution of oil revenues. It 
was this which allowed a significant increase of expenditures on defence, 
the state apparatus, education and healthcare. Subsidies to some regions, 
which were largely embezzled, bought loyalty of the local elites. How-
ever, these measures do not solve the long-term problems of the inefficient 
social system.
Indeed, the domestic policy of the Russian state is ambiguous and 
contradictory. One of the most salient contradictions in modern Russia is 
the fact that the sharp anti-American rhetoric of the mass media coexists 
with staunchly neo-liberal economic policy based on American recipes. 
Even more than that, government bodies responsible for economic policy 
are headed by pro-American functionaries. Their main instruments of eco-
nomic policy are (a) restrictive monetary policy and (b) a balanced budget 
approach. These are seen as the main preconditions for financial stabilisa-
tion which is expected to facilitate economic growth. Restrictive monetary 
policy is designed to suppress inflation, but it also serves to establish a 
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foreign currency rate favourable for exporters. To prevent appreciation of 
the rouble, the Russian Central Bank buys ‘excess’ foreign currency and 
invests it in the world financial markets (largely in US assets). The budget 
deficit is decreased at the expense of cutting  expenditures on the national 
economy, national defence, education, science and healthcare. Obviously, 
it is a conventional neo-liberal agenda. It was not changed even under the 
conditions of anti-Russian economic  sanctions imposed on the country in 
retaliation for its firm position in the Ukraine crisis (see the next section).
In obvious contradiction to this approach stands the so-called manual 
management of the national economy on the part of the Kremlin group, 
which entails ‘point management’ of the presidential administration. 
The Kremlin group is an influential state body in modern Russia that 
sometimes challenges the government, infringing on its sphere of influ-
ence. A number of Russian oligarchs dependent on the Kremlin act as 
vehicles of the latter’s economic policy. Dependent structures of big busi-
ness are unofficially, but earnestly ‘advised’ to invest in one or another pro-
ject considered important for national economic development by the 
Kremlin administration. This policy corresponds to Putin’s international 
strategy (see below). For instance, under current conditions pro-Kremlin 
oligarchs are guided to create enterprises in the Russian Far East to sup-
ply raw materials and semi-processed products to China. Another impor-
tant vehicle of the Kremlin’s economic policy is represented by ‘state 
corporations’. These bulky and rigid structures represent state holdings 
whose assets were appropriated under strong pressure from the state. 
They are notoriously inefficient but increase the economic influence of 
the Kremlin.
Obviously, ‘manual management’ goes against the conventional prin-
ciples of the neo-liberal approach of the Russian government. Economic 
policy eventually reflects some compromise between two approaches inter-
mediated by Putin. Naturally, this compromise fails to provide any clearly 
articulated long-term strategy of economic or social development of the 
country. The very fact of the deep split in the Russian elite reflects the 
essential properties of semi-peripheral capitalism. They also condition a 
contradictory approach to foreign policy.
Neo-revisionist foreign policy: The clash of capitalisms?
One may single out two groups of the Russian ruling class, who cooper-
ate and compete in shaping Russian domestic and foreign policy. They 
can be defined according to the direction of their integrationist strategy. 
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‘Atlantic integrationists’ are oriented towards strengthening their ties with 
the West. Their opponents can be called ‘Eurasian integrationists’, because 
they try to entrench Russia’s independent stance in the world arena. The 
first group is largely represented by notorious Russian oligarchs, who 
extract their rent in Russia and then invest large parts of it in the West. 
Even when they buy enterprises abroad, these are savings rather than 
investments because their profitability is usually much lower than that of 
their Russian assets. (This does not mean that Russian business is more 
efficient. Big business simply redistributes income in its favour using non-
economic means.) Trying by all means to integrate into the Western rul-
ing elite, these oligarchs are dependent on the West. The second group 
largely consists of oligarchs associated with the so-called Kremlin group. 
Functionaries from law enforcement agencies occupy a prominent posi-
tion in this group. The two orientations of Russian foreign policy are 
only another dimension of the split peculiar to the ruling class of a semi-
peripheral capitalism. Russian foreign policy is determined by behind-
the-scenes collusion and compromise of these two powerful groups. This 
explains its inconsistency and wavering.
Mainstream Western political analysts depict Russian foreign pol-
icy as a revisionist one, attempting to undermine the current world eco-
nomic order. It is substantiated by the fact that it allegedly tries to restore 
the Soviet Union in a new form. In December 2012, then US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton condemned Russia for the alleged attempt ‘to re-
Sovietize the region’ of the former USSR: ‘It’s not going to be called that. 
It’s going to be called customs union, it will be called Eurasian Union and 
all of that,’ she explained. ‘But let’s make no mistake about it. We know 
what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow 
down or prevent it.’20 However, Russian policy is by no means a revisionist 
one. In fact, Putin challenges neither Western domination in the world in 
general, nor US hegemony in particular. He is rather trying to defend 
Russian national interests in the existing framework of the current world 
order. According to Richard Sakwa from Kent University (UK), such a 
strategy, based on an attempt to change the practice of Western domina-
tion rather than undermine it, should be called ‘neo-revisionist’.21
This can be seen from the recent history of Russian foreign policy. 
In his first tenure in power (2000–4) Putin’s policy more or less contin-
ued the ‘Yes’ diplomacy of his predecessor in relations with the West. He 
made a few important unilateral concessions, signing the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START, 2002), which contained conditions unilater-
ally favourable for the United States; closing Russian military bases in 
Vietnam; closing the electronic surveillance centre in Cuba; helping to 
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establish US military bases in Central Asia; and cooperating on Afghani-
stan and in some other issues. In response, the then-new Russian presi-
dent expected that the West would recognise the leading role of Russia in 
the former Soviet space. However, this never happened. What followed 
was seen in Moscow as creeping but persistent strategic encirclement of 
Russia; the most treacherous was considered the expansion of NATO to 
the East despite oral guarantees that this military bloc would never move 
‘an inch’ to the East. Quite important was the US decision to deploy an 
anti-missile defence system in Europe allegedly directed against the men-
ace of North Korean forces, but obviously against Russia. One of the most 
threatening developments to Russian interests was a number of ‘coloured 
revolutions’ organised by the United States in the former Soviet space. 
Against this backdrop, the invitation to join NATO granted to Ukraine 
‘represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would 
have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilise the Rus-
sian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest 
that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Cauca-
sus, the Russian conclusion – publicly stated – was that the United States 
in particular intended to encircle and break Russia’.22
A clear signal that Moscow was reconsidering its policy of unilateral 
concessions was sent to the West by Putin in his famous ‘Munich speech’, 
made at the 43rd Munich Security Conference in 2007. The Russian presi-
dent condemned the US policy of establishing a ‘unipolar world’ and 
reminded the West of its obligations on the non-expansion of NATO.23 
Despite the fact that the speech did not contain any aggressive statements, 
the very claim of Russian leadership to an independent international pol-
icy annoyed the Western political establishment.24 The next year, dra-
matic events in the Caucasus put this new strategy to a severe test.
In August  2008, the pro-American Georgian regime of Mikheil 
Saak’ashvili invaded the breakaway republic of South Ossetia in the South-
ern Caucasus. This had been an autonomous region, while Abkhazia had 
been an autonomous republic in Soviet Georgia. Both proclaimed inde-
pendence and had been attempting to join Russia ever since the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union, on the same moral and judicial grounds by which 
Georgia received its own independence. The military attempt to suppress 
the maverick region followed after tacit support and encouragement on 
the part of the United States, despite unofficial warnings on the part of 
Russia that this would not be tolerated.25 The Russian army quickly inter-
fered, putting an abrupt end to the Georgian adventure and securing 
independence for the two republics. As was observed by the well-informed 
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British Times newspaper, the reasons for this clash were deeper than just 
local ethnic conflict: ‘Oil may not be the cause of the war between Georgia 
and Russia, but it is a central element in the wider geo-strategic picture, 
and a source of incendiary tension that has helped to inflame the area.’26
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an international organi-
sation of regional economic integration formed in 2015 by Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, and joined the same year by 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU proclaims the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and workforce, and conducts a coordinated, 
agreed policy in particular sectors of the economy. Post-Soviet republics 
view the concept of Eurasian integration as a way of mobilising their 
joint resources for modernisation of their countries confronted with 
strong external challenges, defined in terms of both geopolitics and geo-
economics.27 The EAEU population amounts to 183.8 million, its joint 
GDP to $1.8 trillion; industrial production in 2017 was 2.2 per cent of 
world output; and foreign trade with the outside world in 2014 was 
$877.6 billion (3.7 per cent of world exports and 2.3 per cent of world 
imports).28 The world share of EAEU economies is quite modest. Never-
theless, integration has facilitated mutually beneficial economic (espe-
cially trade) relations. Russia is the main driving force behind the EAEU. 
However, while its share in foreign trade of the fellow-members of the 
union is great, their share in Russia’s imports is low.29 This means that 
for Russia, geopolitical aspects of the union are more important than 
economic aspects. Indeed, it is the most important Russian initiative of 
recent years in the former Soviet space.
Even more challenging was the Ukraine crisis, which erupted in late 
2013. This country plays the key role in Mr Putin’s design of the EAEU 
project and in any attempt to restore Russia’s role in the former Soviet 
space. According to a US military expert, Ukraine plays an enormously 
significant role in energy resources transportation to the West and helps 
to prevent the revival of anything like a superpower in the former USSR.30 
This made Ukraine a battleground for the strategic clash of Russia and 
the West long before the Maidan uprising of 2013–14. The United States 
had long exercised their ‘soft power’ in this country, which cost them 
$5 billion, according to the famous confession of the then US Deputy Sec-
retary of State Victoria Nuland.31 The Maidan uprising itself was quite 
justified as an expression of people’s outrage against the corruption and 
gross inefficiency of the country’s leadership. However, it was exploited 
and directed from behind the scenes by the West, mainly by America. Rus-
sian interference was both predictable and justified as defence of Russian 
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interests against Western interference behind the façade of a new col-
oured revolution. Reunification of Crimea was a pre-emptive strike, 
which thwarted the ousting of the Russian navy from its major naval 
base on the Black Sea in Sevastopol.32 However, Russian support of the 
Donbas uprising of the pro-Russian population against the dictatorship 
of the Ukrainian nationalists was limited, since Putin abstained from 
open recognition of the two breakaway republics and from granting 
them full-scale military support.33
The Russian role in the Syrian conflict should be seen in connection 
with the Ukraine crisis. For a long time, Russia was working behind the 
scenes to form the alliance of Iran, Hezbollah and Syria in support of 
the friendly Assad regime.34 However, Russian direct involvement was 
facilitated by the stalemate of the Ukraine crisis. Putin needed some tool 
to divert the US military, economic and political resources from Central 
Europe to some other region more important for American interests. He 
found Syria, saving Assad from destruction and turning back the course 
of the Syrian civil war. Doing this, the Russian president attempted to com-
pel the West to recognise Russia as an indispensable player in the inter-
national arena.
Putin’s foreign policy is quite pragmatic, pursuing economic inter-
ests rather than cherishing imperial dreams. In particular, the abovemen-
tioned ‘manual management’ is used by the Kremlin group in the Russian 
Far East to join the supply chain of Chinese industry. A number of enter-
prises are established in the region to supply raw materials and semi-
processed goods to the industrial heart of China. The problem is that these 
goods are already being supplied to China by Australia, and extraction of 
Australian mineral resources is controlled by powerful Western financial 
groups. The Kremlin suggests a certain share in Russian business in this 
region to these financial groups to placate them and obtain their support 
for the project. An additional dimension of this policy is the Kremlin’s 
hope to enlist the support of powerful segments of the Western elite in 
broader areas of international policy.35 It is the type of scheming perti-
nent to Mr Putin. He would never make such a blunder as poisoning for-
mer KGB defectors by chemical warfare agents or direct interference in 
the US elections. Mr Putin prefers much subtler ways of behind-the-scenes 
influence, which leaves no traces.
However clever and skilful such types of scheming may seem, it can 
promote Russian interests only in the short or at most medium term 
because it fails to address the roots of Russian problems – the deficiencies 
of a semi-peripheral capitalism.
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Conclusion
Summing up the above, one must note that Russian capitalism is a far cry 
from what was dreamed about by the Soviet population on the eve of tran-
sition to the new social system. The image of the new society was appeal-
ing because of its pledge of democracy, economic prosperity and human 
rights. However, radical market reforms produced semi-dependent cap-
italism. Its economy is based on transfer of part of the wealth created by 
the labour of its population to the dominant capitalist countries. It is the 
real condition of access to the capitalist world-system. As a result of this, 
the Russian economy, and economies of all other former Soviet repub-
lics as well, inevitably suffer backwardness, economic inefficiency and 
the mass impoverishment of the population. Big business is based on 
rent-seeking behaviour, undermining the accumulation of capital and 
economic growth. The high rate of exploitation of labour is incompati-
ble with human rights and real democracy. The authoritarian state is the 
only alternative to social chaos. Under conditions of the Great Stagna-
tion,36 the struggle for redistribution of global wealth exacerbates. This 
increases the number of international conflicts in which Russia is involved. 
Under such conditions, inefficient, semi-dependent Russian capitalism is 
unable to defend national interests in the framework of the existing world 
order.
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Diversifying the super-rich
Forbes-listed Russians from a Muslim background
Catherine Suart
Introduction
In September 2015, ahead of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha (Feast of 
Sacrifice), President Putin attended the official inauguration of the recon-
structed Moscow Cathedral Mosque. Alongside the presidents of Turkey 
and the Palestinian Authority stood Dagestan-born businessman Sulei-
man Kerimov (45th on the Russian Forbes rich list),1 who had donated 
over half the mosque’s construction funds “as charity towards Allah”.2 
Such philanthropy was not new to Russia’s business elite,3 but the overt 
association with the mosque and Islamic practices was a rare acknowl-
edgment of Muslim identity among Russia’s hyper-rich. This chapter 
examines how such Muslim identities have shaped and diversified Rus-
sia’s business elite, as ranked by the most credible of the remaining  Russian 
rich lists, published by Forbes Russia in 2016.4 It provides a new reli-
gious framework for exploring the popular topic of wealth generation and 
political influence in the early years of capitalism in Russia, and uses the 
same approach to examine more recent topics of scholarly interest such 
as power legitimisation and philanthropy, as investigated by Elisabeth 
Schimpfössl and Timothy Monteath in chapter 3.5
Of the 200 businessmen and women listed by Forbes Russia in 2016, 
21 had Muslim identities (see Table 2.1). Throughout this chapter, they 
are referred to collectively as the Muslim Business Elite (MBE). The meth-
odology for this identification was based on an inclusivist, sociological 
approach to Muslim identity,6 including both Mosque-goers and those 
raised in ‘Muslim-heritage’ cultures or regions.7 This approach accom-
modates the broad array of ethnic groups that make up Russia’s Muslim 
population, which have largely developed in isolation from one another,8 
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and the secularisation of many Muslim practices during the anti-religious 
campaigns of the Soviet Union. As Dominic Rubin observes in his recent 
travelogue of Russia’s Muslim heartlands, ‘the closer one gets to individ-
uals, the more individual and idiosyncratic “Russian Islam” begins to 
seem’.9 Casting the net in such a way groups together wealthy business-
men such as Vagit Alekperov (9) and Alisher Usmanov (3), who run some 
of Russia’s most strategically important companies, and more regionally 
powerful players such as Airat (126) and Radik Shaimiev (127). While 
other studies of the business elite may categorise these individuals differ-
ently, their unification here allows this study to focus on the dynamics 
between religion and capitalism within as broad a group as possible.
Information pertaining to the religious identities of the Forbes-listed 
individuals was compiled from personal interviews in newspaper, radio 
and television archives,10 according to four research categories: 1) self-
identification; 2) family identification;11 3) religious observances;12 and 4) 
traditional religion of ethnic group. In all, the 21 individuals represent 
nine different ethnic groups traditionally affiliated with Muslim identities: 
Tatar (6), Chechen (3), Ingush (3), Azerbaijani (3), Uzbek (2), Kabardian 
(1), Avar (1), Lezgin (1), Jordanian (1). The strongest of these research 
categories, self-identification, included Chechen businessman Ruslan 
Baisarov (89), Uzbek businessman Alisher Usmanov (3),13 and former 
president of Kabardino-Balkaria Arsen Kanokov (160), who considers 
himself to be a law-abiding (pravovernyi) Muslim and undertakes the Mus-
lim pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj).14
Business as usual
How Russia’s business elite generated their initial wealth has fascinated 
scholars since the fall of the Soviet Union. Those who made their money 
in the murky years of the early 1990s have received particular attention 
in an attempt to unravel the close and complex relationship between busi-
ness, organised crime, and the state. Muslim businessmen and their reli-
gious identities, however, have rarely dominated the debate,15 despite the 
fact that the majority began their commercial activities at the very same 
time and many of them have been open about their initial source of wealth 
in public interviews.16
Foreign trade was one of the principal methods through which 
many of Russia’s business elite entered the commercial world at the 
end of the Soviet period. It was one of the three areas to benefit from 
the 1988 Law on Cooperatives introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, which 
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permitted  private ownership in the services, manufacturing and foreign 
trade sectors through the establishment of cooperatives. No special per-
mission was required to establish a cooperative and it legalised the trading 
of goods which had previously been bought and sold on the black or grey 
markets.17 As a result, from 1988 through the early 1990s, the law enabled 
those with and without privileged access to start making money.18
Over half the MBE made their initial wealth in foreign trade. Low-
value consumer goods such as cigarettes and food were quickly replaced 
in 1991 and 1992 by electrical appliances, computers and other office 
equipment and, in the case of Uzbek businessman Iskander Makhmudov 
(21), larger commodities such as coal and metal. Some of the most suc-
cessful traders were Tatar businessmen Albert Shigabutdinov (132) and 
Rustem Sulteev (131), who established one of the biggest foreign trad-
ing cooperatives in Tatarstan. Others saw trade as a stepping-stone to 
other industries, and for one member of the MBE, the change in commer-
cial activity was explicitly driven by religious beliefs. In an interview 
with Vedomosti in 2003 in which he discussed his early business activi-
ties, Alisher Usmanov (3) stated that he chose to stop trading cigarettes 
because ‘as a Muslim [he] could not sell poison’.19
In the early 1990s, banking and finance also became a growing area 
for private commercial activity following the introduction of the Central 
Bank Law and the new Commercial Banking Law in December  1990, 
marking the beginning of Russia’s market-based financial system.20 These 
laws created a two-tier banking system by separating the Central Bank’s 
operations from commercial banking functions, and allowed for the rela-
tively straightforward establishment of new commercial banks by resi-
dent or foreign entities.21 A number of the MBE took advantage of this 
new banking legislation and shifted their focus from trade to finance in 
the early 1990s. Ingush businessman Mikhail Gutseriev (16) established 
one of the first cooperative banks in Moscow and used it to hold the 
accounts of companies registering in the newly created free economic 
zone of Ingushetia.22 As he boasted in an interview with a Financial Times 
correspondent in 1994, ‘twenty-three billion roubles [more than US 
$10 million at the time] flowed into our accounts today alone. And it’s 
like this every single day’.23 Dagestani businessman Ziyavudin Magome-
dov (93)24 also reported that he made his first ‘serious money’ in finance, 
having traded computers and other electrical appliances while still at 
university from 1988 to 1990. In 1993 he created Interfinance Com-
pany alongside his brother Magomed Magomedov and cousin Akhmed 
Bilalov and began managing internal currency bonds from foreign trade 
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associations, accumulating US $15 million of their own money and US 
$50–$60 million under management by 1994.25
The large privatisation auctions were an area in which the MBE 
made fewer financial gains than their non-Muslim counterparts of the 
mid-1990s in Russia. The main exceptions were the four TAIF sharehold-
ers, who benefitted from the second wave of privatisations in 1994 when 
the Tatar government created Tatar American Investments and Finance 
(TAIF) to hold the government’s stakes in newly privatised assets such as 
Tatneft and Nizhnekamenskneftekhim. Albert Shigabutdinov (132) and 
Rustem Sulteev (131) were given a 14 per cent stake and they now con-
trol the company alongside Airat (126) and Radik Shaimiev (127).
Commercial lobbying
While the TAIF shareholders inevitably benefitted from the lobbying of 
the former President of Tatarstan and father of the Shaimiev brothers, 
Mintimir Shaimiev,26 the remaining MBE do not appear to have turned to 
their home regions for political support and lobbying. Instead, those who 
entered politics to lobby for their commercial interests did so through the 
same route as their non-Muslim counterparts.
The close relationship between business and the state in Russia has 
been cited as one of the defining methods by which the business elite 
made their wealth.27 At the fall of the Soviet Union, lobbying and politi-
cal influence were still highly personalised, and personal political con-
nections were crucial to obtaining favourable decisions.28 This personalised 
interaction between state and enterprise was inherited by the business 
elite in post-Soviet Russia, and remains part of the perceived sistema of 
governance in Russia.29 The business elite started to enter the political 
stage on a personal level after 1994, when their newly-formed business 
and financial groups had grown strong enough to carry sufficient eco-
nomic and political influence.
Of the 21 members of the MBE, six have held high-level political 
positions in post-Soviet Russia (Table 2.2).
Of these positions, the State Duma offered the greatest opportunity 
for businessmen to lobby for their commercial interests, and access to 
Russia’s lower house was rumoured to be frequently facilitated by the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).30 Many of Russia’s business 
elite entered politics this way to lobby for their commercial interests, and 
the MBE were no exception. Ingush businessman Mikhail Gutseriev (16), 
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Table 2.2 Political posts held by members of the Muslim business elite
MBE member Political position
Dates position 
held
Suleiman Kerimov State Duma deputy 1999–2007
Federation Council senator 
(representing the Republic of 
Dagestan)
2008–present
Mikhail Gutseriev State Duma deputy 1995–9
Sait-Salam Gutseriev State Duma deputy 1999–2008
Farkhad Akhmedov Federation Council senator 
(representing the Krasnodar  
Region 2004–7 and the  
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous  
Region 2007–9)
2004–9
Arsen Kanokov State Duma deputy 2003–5
President of the Republic of 
Kabardino-Balkaria
2005–13
Federation Council senator 
(representing the Republic of 
Kabardino-Balkaria)
2013–present
Albert Shigabutdinov State Council member (for the 
Republic of Tatarstan)
2009–14
Source: Author’s own research files.
for example, explicitly stated that he entered politics to further his 
 business interests: ‘I understood that we [. . . ] were getting too big to keep 
on fighting the chinovniks [bureaucrats]. We had to join them.’31 All four 
members of the MBE who were State Duma deputies were elected on the 
LDPR party list, despite the fact that ideologically the LDPR was highly 
racist and suspicious of what it referred to as the ‘Southern  problem’.32
In addition to those who chose politics as a lobbying instrument, 
many businessmen never directly engaged in personal politics. As Rus-
sian scholar Andrei Yakovlev argues, there were in fact many businesses 
which deliberately kept their distance from the state.33 From the 2000s 
onwards, this strategy was adopted by more and more businesses as Putin 
discouraged the business elite from engaging in politics.34 They began to 
promote themselves as ‘self-made’ businessmen to counter the negative 
connotations of the term ‘oligarch’, and many spoke publicly about their 
lack of political activity. In a televised interview, Uzbek trader Iskander 
Makhmudov (21), for example, rejected the term ‘oligarch’, claiming he 
had no connection with the government.35
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Outside the political arena, the business elite also promoted and 
supported their businesses through the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). This business association was arguably at its 
most influential in the aftermath of the August 1998 financial crisis, when 
many of the business elite joined the RUIE in an attempt to coordinate 
the general recovery of the Russian economy. Although significantly weak-
ened under Putin, the RUIE has remained one of the primary lobbies for 
the business elite in Russia, and many of the MBE number among its man-
agement board and continue to engage with its various committees and 
councils. Vagit Alekperov (9) was one of the first high-profile members of 
the association’s management board in September 2000 and has remained 
an active member since, alongside four other members of the MBE: Alisher 
Usmanov (3), Mikhail Gutseriev (16), Aras Agalarov (55) and Ziyavudin 
Magomedov (93).
The MBE have engaged far less actively with the recently established 
Association of Muslim Businessmen of the Russian Federation (AMBRF), 
founded in 2014 to represent and promote the commercial interests of 
Muslim businessmen in Russia and abroad. Unlike the Russian Jewish 
Congress (RJC), which was founded by a number of the Jewish business 
elite in 1996 to promote Jewish interests in Russia and which continues 
to be actively supported by these elite, the AMBRF currently has very lim-
ited interaction with members of the MBE.
Lobbying from within
Conversely, the MBE appear to have embraced one of the key modus oper-
andi of Russia’s business and political elite in the post-Soviet space by 
lobbying for their commercial interests using those who know them best: 
family.
A third of the MBE have more than one family member on the Forbes 
Russia list: the Gutserievs (Mikhail (16), Sait-Salam (48) and their nephew 
Mikhail Shishkhanov (46)), the Shaimievs (Radik (127) and Airat (126)) 
and the Bazhaevs (Musa (156) and Deni (155)). In Forbes Russia’s 2017 
calculation of the 10 wealthiest families in Russia, all three families were 
included, alongside Ziyavudin Magomedov (93) and his brother Mago-
med.36 The combined wealth of these four families was estimated by 
Forbes to be US $15.3 billion, greater than the combined wealth of the 
remaining six families (US $12.7 billion).
The majority of the MBE also involve their immediate family mem-
bers in key (board-level) management positions, and the proportion of 
children brought in to run part of their businesses is high.37 Notably, 
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Suleiman Kerimov’s (45) son Said runs much of his business activities to 
enable him to continue his role on the Federation Council, and Aras Agal-
arov’s (55) son Emin is Executive Vice President of Crocus Group. Female 
relatives have also been well-represented: Vagit Alekperov’s (9) sister 
Nelli Alekperova is President of the Lukoil charity fund; Radik Shaimiev’s 
(127) daughter Kamila was on the management board of TAIF, a deci-
sion that Kamila reports had been made by the family;38 and Rustem Sult-
eev’s (131) daughter Diana is on the management board of another of his 
commercial interests, the Bank Avers. This contrasts with many other 
companies represented on the Forbes Russia list, where family members 
less frequently hold such senior positions.39
The importance of family for Muslims in business has been widely 
covered by scholars in the field. Rodney Wilson observed that there is a 
reluctance among Muslim businessmen to see family businesses moving 
to external shareholders.40 Indeed, Mikhail Gutseriev (16) has asserted 
that his business empire is a ‘brotherhood’ in which all assets, regardless 
of who acquired them, are divided between himself, his nephew Mikhail 
Shishkhanov (46) and brother Sait-Salam Gutseriev (48), with 51 per cent, 
24.5 per cent and 24.5 per cent respectively.41 More recently, this has also 
included his son Said. Although Mikhail Gutseriev (16) does not acknowl-
edge any Muslim influence in this structure, there is a similarity with the 
Islamic principle of musharakah. Literally meaning sharing, in the con-
text of business musharakah refers to a joint enterprise in which partners 
(or parties) to the enterprise share profits and losses, regardless of the 
amount invested.
Giving back
In addition to understanding how Russia’s business elite generated their 
initial wealth, scholars are increasingly examining how these business-
men spend it, a subject which has fascinated Western and Russian tab-
loid journalists since their glitzy displays of wealth in the early 1990s. 
Elisabeth Schimpfössl, in her research on Russia’s social upper class, 
demonstrates that the rise of philanthropy is an important component 
in their current quest for ‘culturedness’,42 and like their non-Muslim 
counter parts, the MBE are active in their philanthropic activities, both 
through corporate social responsibility programmes and personal foun-
dations.43
Philanthropy among the Russian business elite is typically focussed 
on a wide range of social initiatives – most prominently children, sport, 
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culture, education and healthcare44 – and a number of the MBE follow 
this model of charitable giving, such as Mikhail Gutseriev’s (16) charita-
ble foundation SAFMAR. Patriotism also plays an important role in the 
engagement in (and promotion of) these initiatives, and many of the 
more public acts of philanthropy directly or indirectly benefit the Russian 
state. In 2007, for example, one of the most philanthropic members 
of the MBE, Alisher Usmanov (3), bought all 450 lots at a Sotheby’s Rus-
sian auction and donated them to Konstantinovsky Palace outside Saint 
Petersburg.45
A number of the MBE have expanded this national patriotism to a 
form of regional patriotism, which has not been evident in their business 
investments. This regional commitment to social development is most 
clearly illustrated in Dagestan and Chechnya, where the Dagestani busi-
nessman Suleiman Kerimov (45) and, until shortly after his arrest, his 
fellow Dagestani Ziyavudin Magomedov (93), and the Chechens Ruslan 
Baisarov (89) and Musa Bazhaev (156), invest considerable funds for 
social projects in the regions.46 As well as supporting a number of chari-
ties in Dagestan, Suleiman Kerimov (45) also supports charities promot-
ing his ethnic clan, the Lezgins, and the Lezgin language.47
Whereas the business elite on the whole has remained somewhat 
conservative in its vocal support of religious organisations, many chan-
nel their support through charitable donations, in particular to the reno-
vation of churches and other religious buildings.48 This is particularly 
visible among the MBE. Over half of the MBE have supported religious 
causes as part of their philanthropic activities and 11 have supported the 
construction of mosques. Philanthropy is considered a central tenet of 
many religions, and Islam is no exception. Many Muslims regard charity 
as a form of worship and, according to traditional conceptions of Islam, it 
is one of the five pillars of the faith.
The most active member of the MBE in his charitable support of 
religious and specifically Muslim organisations and institutions is Sulei-
man Kerimov (45), through his charitable foundation, The Suleiman Keri-
mov Foundation.49 In addition to buildings, the Suleiman Kerimov 
Foundation supports a number of different Muslim celebrations and reli-
gious festivals, sponsoring thousands of Dagestani pilgrims to travel to 
Mecca for Hajj each year. In 2011 a similar trip for inhabitants of the 
republic of Kabardino-Balkaria was organised and sponsored by the 
republic’s former president, Arsen Kanokov (160). These events are similar 
to the activities of the RJC, which since 2012 has been organising pilgrim-
ages to Israel to celebrate Passover.50 Unlike the Hajj pilgrimages, however, 
members of the Jewish business elite, including Mikhail  Fridman (2) 
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and Andrei Rappaport (67), regularly take part in the pilgrimage, spend-
ing three days in the desert in the run-up to Passover.51
Very few of the MBE, however, direct their religious philanthropic 
activities just at Muslim causes, and the majority, including Suleiman Ker-
imov (45), Ziyavudin Magomedov (93) and Arsen Kanokov (160), have also 
supported institutions of other religious denominations. Mikhail Guts-
eriev (16) has supported Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism and Buddhism, as 
well as Islam. This coincides with the central goals of Mikhail Gutseriev’s 
(16) principal charitable foundation, SAFMAR, promoting the revival of 
spiritual values to achieve ‘a constructive dialogue between [. . . ] tradi-
tional confessions in Russia’.52 This is in contrast to many of the Jewish 
business elite, such as the heads of the financial investment conglomerate, 
the Alfa Group, whose charitable activities in the area of religion solely 
focus on the support of Jewish causes and activities.
Other MBE highlight religious tolerance and diversity in Russia as 
the purpose of their religious charitable activities. Former president of 
the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, Arsen Kanokov (160), revealed in 
an interview with Anna Politkovskaya in 2005 that he wanted to pro-
mote religious tolerance in the republic by constructing Russian Ortho-
dox churches and Muslim mosques in close proximity.53 Vagit Alekperov 
(9) has also used the construction of religious buildings to promote peace-
ful interaction between religious groups in areas where his company 
LUKoil operates,54 and Iskander Makhmudov’s (21) metals and mining 
company UGMK details ‘spiritual revival’ as one of the principal goals of 
its corporate social responsibility.
Conclusion
It is within this last area of investigation – philanthropy – that we begin to 
see both marked similarities in the engagement of the MBE and clear dis-
tinctions with their non-Muslim counterparts. Over half the MBE support 
Muslim organisations, most frequently by financing mosques but also by 
supporting Hajj pilgrimages and Muslim festivals, and in recent years such 
donations have received growing support from local and federal authori-
ties. Unlike their Jewish counterparts, the MBE’s engagement with other 
religions shows an acute awareness of the historical and current chal-
lenges associated with a minority religion such as Islam in Russia, and a 
desire to improve its reputation and standing in the country.
Public acknowledgements of the influence of Islam on the MBE’s busi-
ness activities remain rare; only the Uzbek businessman Alisher Usmanov 
43DivErSifying thE SuPEr-riCh
(3) has reported that he had stopped trading cigarettes, a haram sub-
stance, in the 1990s because he was a Muslim. More indirect manifesta-
tions, however, appear in a range of areas, including the propensity for 
close family members to occupy senior management positions within the 
MBE’s businesses and the similarity between the profit-sharing structures of 
Mikhail Gutseriev (16) and the Muslim business practices of musharakah.
Suleiman Kerimov’s (45) sponsorship of the Moscow Cathedral 
Mosque not only improved his relationship with the Kremlin,55 it strength-
ened his association with Russia’s Muslim authorities, and following his 
arrest in France in November 2017 on charges of tax evasion, these author-
ities spoke out in his support. Political influence has often been sought by 
the business elite to promote their business interests and secure patron-
age from the state, but the support of both the federal and Muslim author-
ities in response to this act of religious philanthropy shows a level of 
engagement with the Muslim business community previously absent in 
Russia’s early years of capitalism.
The intermittent influence of Muslim identities identified within this 
chapter highlights the importance of the study of religion in the context 
of Russia’s business elite and their interaction with the capitalist dynam-
ics of the country. One-third of the MBE identified during this research 
have been on the Forbes Russia rich list since it was launched in 2005, 
having survived numerous financial crises and regime changes since they 
first entered business in the early 1990s. They form part of what Alena 
Ledeneva describes as Russia’s sistema, and the prominence and influ-
ence of these MBE on the business and political landscape of Russia will 
likely continue, if not grow, as Putin elevates Islam alongside Russian 
Orthodoxy as one of the country’s central religions and seeks to maintain 
close control over Russia’s ethnically Muslim regions.
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3
The culture of elite philanthropy
Russia and the United Kingdom compared
Timothy Monteath and Elisabeth Schimpfössl
This chapter explores the philanthropic practices of Russian and British 
wealthy elites. The two differ significantly, from the context of their for-
mation to their contemporary characteristics, yet, they also show impor-
tant parallels: both countries have experienced ever-increasing and by 
now extreme inequality of wealth. A large proportion of this wealth is 
being concentrated in the hands of a small group of hyper-rich individu-
als. Both countries’ economies have been stagnating in recent years. This 
has resulted in a politics of austerity, hastening the states’ retreat from 
the provision of social infrastructure.
These parallels form the background against which we examine the 
two elites’ philanthropic giving. Following a brief introduction to the his-
tory of first, the Russian, then the British hyper-rich and their formation, 
we set out to identify the major distinctions in their philanthropy and 
explore possible reasons and explanations for similarities and differences. 
We conclude with a discussion on what these practices might mean for 
society at large.
Concept and literature
As the importance of philanthropy has grown in recent decades, so too 
has the research into who is giving and why. An increasingly dominant 
stream of research within philanthropy studies has focused on the practical 
question of how to improve the methods and impact of charity endeav-
ours. Philanthrocapitalists have been the most vocal advocates of effec-
tivity in charity.1 The basic ideology behind any such approaches conceives 
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wealth as a blessing: without wealthy people, so the argument goes, there 
cannot be any large-scale charitable initiatives.
A number of experts have challenged such logics, in particularly 
those of philanthrocapitalism, which they see as directly reinforcing social 
inequality.2 Their criticisms split broadly into two lines of argument. First, 
in many countries, charities and foundations receive tax relief and other 
forms of fiscal incentives. While on a small scale, initiatives of this kind 
might appear harmless, and even desirable, on a large scale and over the 
long term, such policies mean large losses of tax revenues to the treasury. 
This, together with money being distributed by the hyper-wealthy accord-
ing to their whims, has detrimental effects on democracy. Wealthy indi-
viduals end up not only having a disproportionately larger say in the 
distribution of societal goods, but in fact they are subsidised by the tax-
payer in doing so.3 Second, critics argue that the dynamics of philanthropy 
reinforce social inequality, rather than supporting those in need. This 
argument was forcefully presented in a 1990 study by Teresa Odendahl, 
who claimed that the rich primarily fund their own by directing their giv-
ing to organisations of particular interest to themselves, such as the edu-
cational institutions they graduated from.4 Odendahl’s findings were 
subsequently substantiated by many other academics in a variety of con-
texts, among them Rob Reich, who found that private schools and public 
schools in wealthy areas receive far greater philanthropic support than 
similar schools in poor areas.5
Not unlike Odendahl and her successors, we seek to engage with 
philanthropy through the wider social context through which elite giving 
occurs; that is, we approach the topic through the study of elites. As a 
subfield of research into philanthropy, elite philanthropy studies have 
mostly focused on the United States, which reflects both the global distri-
bution of wealth and the importance of philanthropy among wealthy 
Americans. Examples for scholars following this tradition are Francie 
Ostrower and Diana E. Kendall, who investigated philanthropy in the con-
text of power relations, the legitimisation of privileges, the cementation of 
social dominance and wealth transfer across generations.6 Paul Schervish 
has devoted his work to contemplating the more philosophical aspects of 
giving among the wealthy and how conceptions of mortality inform the 
motives and aims of philanthropists.7
Following these approaches, we scrutinise the giving of the top busi-
ness elites within two national and cultural settings. Scholars research-
ing philanthropy in Britain are scattered all over the country, often in 
business schools or in third-sector organisations.8 As for Russia, research 
into philanthropy is nascent. With its rise in the 2000s and early 2010s, 
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when Russia saw an extraordinary growth in elite philanthropy – partly 
thanks to the oil boom, partly forced by the Kremlin and Putin’s call for 
‘social responsibility’ – a small cohort of researchers, mostly based in think 
tanks and charity organisations, started documenting and researching 
rich people’s giving.9
Methodology and empirical data
Our sample of philanthropists is drawn from the top 257 entries listed in 
the 2017 The Sunday Times rich list and the 200 richest individuals fea-
tured by Forbes Russia in 2017.10 Collectively, these individuals own an 
estimated £500 billion and $459 billion respectively, with a minimum 
personal wealth of £500 million.
Studying the hyper-wealthy presents a number of methodological 
challenges. First, many of them are both highly visible and shrouded in 
mystery. An overall picture of their wealth can be easy to estimate, but the 
details are usually stubbornly elusive, with much of their fortunes dissolv-
ing into offshore tax havens and highly complex financial arrangements.11 
Researchers are thus reliant on the annual rich lists produced by media 
organisations, among them The Sunday Times and Forbes.12 Rich list esti-
mates are based on openly available information of publicly traded compa-
nies and include company holdings, land and property, significant artworks 
and other similar assets.13 Alongside money held offshore, much inherited 
wealth remains hidden. It is near impossible to identify wealth accumu-
lated in the past and over generations, as shown by research into the estates 
of deceased hyper-rich individuals.14 Nevertheless, although the estimates 
produced by Forbes and The Sunday Times are by no means definitive, ‘at 
least they exist’, argues Thomas Piketty, and ‘it would be absurd and coun-
terproductive’ to ignore these estimates and the overall trends they depict.15
In our data collection, we draw upon the template that Breeze and 
Lloyd employed in their 2013 study.16 We replaced a small number of 
their categories with some considered in The Sunday Times giving list. 
‘Instances’ of giving, defined as either a major one-off public act of giving 
or continued financial support of a specific cause or charity, form the 
smallest research entity. Most of these instances are recorded in the pub-
lic realm. We also include personal, but publicly accessible involvement 
with registered charities. Ignoring the exact amount given in each spe-
cific case obviously distorts the results towards frequency of donations to 
the detriment of the amount given. It nevertheless allows us to generate 
an overall snapshot of the areas the wealthy prioritise.
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Specialisation versus oligarchization?
The most glaring difference between the two elites is the number of causes 
they give to. Our data showed that British philanthropists tend to special-
ise their activities on a small number of causes, whereas their Russian 
peers give strikingly widely. That is, the majority of the UK-based philan-
thropists confine their energy to a small number of concerns. They aver-
age three causes, with one of them standing out as their major effort and 
the others being additional pet projects. In contrast to that, rich Russians’ 
donations are spread over nearly six different causes, without necessarily 
having one cause they focus on most.
This striking difference might have an explanation which goes well 
beyond the immanent tastes and preferences of wealthy philanthropists 
in both countries. We suggest that these diverse patterns could poten-
tially indicate that wealthy Russians perpetuate a tendency to oligarchi-
zation in their giving, while the (much older and more established) 
British elite has long undergone a process of differentiation and speciali-
sation.
oligarchization: russia’s richest 200
Many of Russia’s billionaires today rose to riches during the privatisation 
that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Those who did so 
and managed to seize large-scale industrial assets, which were formerly 
in state ownership, soon became known as the oligarchs. Their biggest 
political coup was to organise then-President Boris Yeltsin’s re-election in 
1996.17
Their grip on political power declined with the rise of Putin in the 
new century. Meanwhile, their overarching might being shattered, many 
of these oligarchs, as well as up-and-coming entrepreneurs, saw their per-
sonal wealth grow to astronomical levels, primarily thanks to rapidly ris-
ing oil prices. Soon into his rule, Putin ensured that these individuals 
committed to sustain Russia’s infrastructure, which had shrunk dramati-
cally after a decade of severe neglect. Under the slogan of ‘social responsi-
bility’, Russia’s super-wealthy were enlisted to contribute to state-approved 
projects, mostly in welfare and education. Philanthropic activities that ran 
counter to the Kremlin’s interests were hamstrung. The most drastic repri-
mand was received by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, whose independent choices 
are said to have been one of the triggers leading to his imprisonment in 
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2003. This so-called Khodorkovsky Affair taught the rest a long-lasting les-
son as to what it takes to remain in Putin’s good books.
Philanthropic giving grew steadily throughout the 2000s. The 2008 
global financial crisis did not slow this trend down significantly, and the 
wealthy’s philanthropic spending shot up even more in the 2010s.18 By 
far not all of this generosity was down to political pressure; it was also 
due to a growing desire among the hyper-rich to improve their image and 
shake off a reputation for being ruthless and selfish.19
The first oligarch to set up his own foundation was Vladimir Pota-
nin in 1999. Since then many others have followed, and today there are 
about 40 private foundations in Russia. This urge to set up foundations 
was initially down to the underdevelopment of Russian non-governmen-
tal organisations (NGOs), which were little trusted and deemed corrupt 
and hence unsuitable to be tasked with acting as intermediaries. Even 
though this has changed since, many philanthropists still reject the idea 
of outsourcing the operational side of their charity to intermediary char-
ity organisations.20
In particular, since the economic crisis in December 2014, large pri-
vately run foundations have gained new meaning. A drop in oil prices 
and a stark devaluation of the rouble left regional budgets empty and 
people without jobs. In many regions, whole towns depend on one single 
business empire. In some regions, foundations attached to businesses have 
tried to absorb the harm done to the local population following their own 
recent downsizing and layoffs, without, however, increasing their 
budget.21 Concerns about the local population are only motivated by those 
business leaders’ desire to preserve social peace; they are also triggered 
by a paternalism that is deeply anchored in Russian history. Serfdom was 
only abolished in Russian in 1861, comparatively late. A mentality of obe-
dience and subordination among the peasantry, which made up over 
80 per cent of the population, survived into the early twentieth century 
and returned during Soviet rule. Even the most ruthless business leader 
tends to have a certain understanding of history and suspects that the 
Russian people’s obedience might in the long run rely on some minimum 
of care from above.
The role big foundations play in many Russian regions emerges in 
our data through a large percentage of causes classified as ‘community 
giving’. Almost 20 per cent among Russia’s richest 200 give to local causes, 
compared to just under 9 per cent among their UK counterparts. The over-
arching role of these foundations goes a long way to explain the wide 
range of causes over which the hyper-wealthy spread their philanthropic 
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giving. To make sense, however, of why many of these foundations do 
not limit their activities to social care but often cover a whole range of 
cultural projects (15 per cent support the community arts) requires look-
ing back into Soviet times.22
Philanthropy informed by the Soviet and post-Soviet past
Some individuals who run foundations have come to fancy themselves as 
moral leaders. One of their typical role models is the late nineteenth- 
century intelligentsia and their quest to enlighten the Russian people. 
Part and parcel of such re-enactments is to organise cultural projects 
and engage ordinary people in the foundation’s fundraising to raise their 
civic understanding. Other endeavours simply aim at keeping the youth 
off the street.23
Odd, maybe even cynical, as such motives might seem, they are eas-
ily explained by the social backgrounds many wealthy Russians were 
born into – the Soviet intelligentsia – that is, professionals engaged in the 
cultural and educational sectors as well as academically trained medics, 
technicians and engineers. Reviving the Soviet intelligentsia values their 
parents held dear allows today’s rich to construct a self-identity that has 
anchoring in the past.24 Highlighting Soviet intelligentsia background 
is less (self-) betrayal than it might seem at first. Rather, it illustrates a shift 
from an emphasis on supposedly being self-made to one foregrounding 
a cultured upbringing, bookishness, the arts, high morals and a strong 
work ethos.
Family backgrounds in the Soviet intelligentsia also partly explain 
why science research greatly enjoys support among the richest 200 Rus-
sians. Fourteen per cent of them fund science projects or fellowships, com-
pared to only 3.5 per cent of their British peers. Another explanation for 
such a priority is that many of Russia’s hyper-rich started their profes-
sional careers in Soviet science or engineering; many hold doctorates in 
these fields. This stands in sharp contrast to the UK hyper-rich. Among 
them, previous science careers are extremely rare; even educational tra-
jectories beyond master’s level are atypical. This might partly explain why 
UK philanthropists prioritise medical research (nearly 9 per cent). Such 
giving is often motivated by personal experience or incidents in one’s fam-
ily. In Russia, medical research is supported by only 1.5 per cent of the 
200 richest Russians. These low numbers might stem from the reality that 
rich Russians do not use the health system in Russia, especially if seri-
ously ill, but get treated abroad, which disperses their gratitude and health 
concerns over the globe.
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Intelligentsia roots might also form one explanation as to why 
24 per cent of the 200 richest give to religious causes, compared to only 
6.6 per cent in the United Kingdom. Some intelligentsia circles in the 
Soviet Union were close to the religious underground, who tended to 
harbour anti-Soviet sentiments. The general religious revival since the 
1990s, which is strongly connected to Russian national identity, may be 
another factor. Some cynically trace rich people’s strong support for reli-
gion back to the ‘unholy’ methods by which many had accumulated their 
wealth; helping the church should wash away their sins. Especially the 
construction of churches has attracted a lot of rich people’s money. Curi-
ous here is that, when people make donations to the renovation or con-
struction of churches, their own faith might well be secondary. The 
Russian Orthodox Church receives donations from across the denomina-
tions, including Jews, Muslims and atheists.25
The most distinctive difference between Russian and British rich is 
the former’s overwhelming support for children. Thirty-nine per cent of 
the 200 richest Russians give money to projects targeting children in one 
form or the other, compared to only 10 per cent among the richest 
257  people in Britain. That makes ‘children’ the category leading by a 
large distance from art philanthropy, the second most popular cause at 
31 per cent. In comparison, ‘children’ did not even make it into the first 
five of the causes supported by the UK-based rich.
This overwhelming concern about children, and only them, takes 
us back to the 1990s, when some of today’s billionaires found themselves 
among the winners of the economic transformation. When asking rich 
Russians why they support children and not adults, one can often hear 
that this is because they consider children as the only trustworthy group 
in society. The distrust towards all the rest is a result of 70 years of Soviet 
rule, followed by the 1990s, which brought social cohesion to a break-
down, sharply raised the crime and mortality rates among new busi-
nessmen and pushed millions into poverty. Apart from that, support for 
children is seen as an investment in the future – unless the children are 
disabled. Despite the Russian Orthodox teaching to perform good deeds 
for the sake of passive alms takers,26 there is a clear priority among 
wealthy Russians to promote the strong, healthy and gifted over the weak 
and feeble.
Specialisation: the british elite
As Breeze points out, the United Kingdom sees herself as the birth-
place of contemporary philanthropy, emerging from a strong tradition of 
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 charitable giving that developed over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury.27 Long predating the appearance of modern cultural attitudes were 
the legal structures that form the foundation of charities as we know them 
today. They were taking shape already in the sixth century AD with the 
common law tradition that allowed for early educational and religious 
institutions to be formed.28 By the late seventeenth century, the structure 
of the trust calcified into its modern legal form. This structure ensures 
that gifts may be left in perpetuity by distinguishing between a gift giver, 
the beneficiary of a gift and a trust who manages a gift on their behalf.29 
This legal framework underpins the structure of charities today, and con-
tinues to be of crucial importance to their functioning; for example, by 
placing the ultimate responsibility for all of a charity’s actions into the 
hands of its board of trustees.30
In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during the Indus-
trial Revolution, practices of charity (as described by Breeze) began to 
take hold and became deeply rooted in culture and society. Charity was 
transformed from individual acts of kindness into recognisable and organ-
ised movements. This development was not limited to giving by the 
wealthy but took place across all levels of the social hierarchy.31 The means 
through which this occurred showed significant variation, from religious 
missions sponsored by churches to worker-organised ‘friendly societies’. 
While many of these organisations’ activities have been far broader than 
a strict charitable remit, it was through their common benevolent pur-
pose that a new societal norm of charitable giving began to take shape.32
Those who owed their fortunes and elevated social positions to the 
toil of others were often particularly attuned to the damage that was being 
done in the heat of the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, many of today’s 
leading charitable organisations in the United Kingdom, such as the Rown-
tree Foundation and the Peabody Trust, owe their origins to the fortunes 
of late nineteenth-century philanthropists.33 Strong religious fervour was 
a motivating factor for many such philanthropists, with industrialists like 
George Cadbury or Titus Salt seeking to alter the lives of their workers 
not only through charity, but through the creation of new ‘utopian’ towns 
in which their workers could live – a form of philanthropic giving ante-
cedent to the corporate social responsibility of today.34 Tellingly, how-
ever, while these towns remain, their purpose has long been dismantled 
by the asset-stripping capitalism which Britain pioneered.35
The great levelling of the world wars ended the ‘golden age’ of phi-
lanthropy, when monumental personal fortunes foundered, and the 
political landscape shifted towards the nationalisation of societal goods. 
In this climate, charity and charitable organisations did not become obso-
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lete, but their relevance and influence declined. In the words of historian 
David Owen, they turned into ‘junior partners in the welfare firm’.36 Fol-
lowing the post-war consensus, the surviving charitable sector sought to 
transform itself to fit with the times and needs of a new era. As a result, 
by the early 1970s, when Britain emerged from the exceptional politi-
cal and economic circumstances that followed the Second World War, 
the charitable sector had been transformed from Victorian values to a 
new system that favoured self-help, specialist conditions, lobbying and 
secularisation.37
The eruption of financial capital in the 1980s truly revived the func-
tion of philanthropy as a significant source of prestige for the elite. The 
financial deregulation of the Big Bang of 1986, and the neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies that enabled it, allowed unrestrained fortunes to again be 
made on a tremendous scale and at a prodigious rate. With this dynamic, 
a new breed of philanthropists was created who eschewed the paternal-
ism of previous Victorian benefactors to focus on the utility of their giv-
ing (either to themselves, or the recipients). Their ethos was in tune with 
the new values and standards of a rapidly professionalising and secular-
ising charitable sector.
The landscape of who occupied the richest echelons of British soci-
ety had also begun to change. A more international and commercially 
mobile elite emerged. Yet, far from fulfilling the meritocratic promises of 
the new neo-liberal ideology, the fortunes made following the Big Bang 
tended to be made by those who already possessed the necessary capital, 
both economic and cultural, to capture the value unlocked by this new 
economic environment.38 In other words, those at the pinnacle of this new 
hyper-wealthy elite were mostly drawn from the upper strata of society, 
which, while having shed the strict hierarchical posturing of their Victo-
rian counterparts, place their family wealth and educational background 
far above the majority of British society.39
british philanthropists today
The explosion of wealth unlocked in this process is evident in the sources 
of wealth in our sample of the UK’s hyper-wealthy. Among these 200 indi-
viduals, 18 per cent have primarily made their fortunes through finance, a 
percentage far higher than in any other industry.40 When property trading 
and holdings are taken into account as a source of wealth, this number 
increases to 41 per cent of our sample – a figure that demonstrates the 
importance of real estate as a driver of wealth inequality and the role of 
financialisation in swelling its value.41 Despite the new fortunes that have 
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arisen in the United Kingdom in the last 30 years, little difference has been 
observed in the patterns of giving between ‘emerging’ and ‘established’ 
philanthropists.42
Britain’s long tradition of giving, its economic clout and large num-
ber of multimillionaires, is reflected in the amount that elite philan-
thropists give. In 2014, donations made in the United Kingdom of over 
£1 million totalled £1.56 billion, compared to $405 million in Russia.43 
As mentioned earlier, British philanthropists are highly specialised in their 
giving, on average supporting only three causes, while their Russian coun-
terparts give to nearly twice as many. This specialisation can be explained 
by at least four features that distinguish the UK elites from Russia’s: First, 
many donors have distinctive corporate business backgrounds and pri-
oritise ‘effective’ giving over a broader range of paternalistic support. Sec-
ond, especially for the large proportion of philanthropists who have 
made their money in the financial sector, their motivations for giving 
remain detached from their primary moneymaking. Third, these factors 
are highly compatible with the long-established tradition of donating to 
intermediary organisations. The charity sector in the United Kingdom is 
highly developed, and charity organisations, NGOs and think tanks enjoy 
a great level of trust and support among the wealthy.44 Last but not least, 
the UK welfare system is still highly functional, which relieves wealthy 
donors of many social ‘obligations’ and allows them to pursue their pet 
projects.
The giving of UK philanthropists is noticeably more international-
ised than that of Russia. In our UK sample, 10 per cent were actively 
involved in international aid and development efforts in the global south, 
compared to only 1 per cent of the Russian rich (all three of whom are 
exiles in London) who gave to projects outside of Russia. Among UK phi-
lanthropists, development aid concerns are on a par with giving towards 
children, which stands in stark contrast to the overwhelming support 
given to the young by Russian philanthropists. The internationalism of 
British donors is reflective of Britain’s long history of international busi-
ness and philanthropy beyond its own borders, much of which remains 
entangled with its colonial history.45 A similar pattern is evident in sup-
port for civil society organisations that are focused on human rights and 
social justice issues, to which 7 per cent of our British sample gave. (Of 
the 3.5 per cent of Russians who gave to causes that fell under the same 
category, their focus was strongly linked to their own backgrounds and 
biographies.46)
In a number of areas in which UK philanthropists are particularly 
active, their giving is skewed away from the needs and concerns of the 
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most unfortunate. One area in which this is particularly evident is in giv-
ing to educational causes. In both our Russian and British sample, educa-
tion is one of the most popular causes, standing at 27.5 per cent and 25 per 
cent respectively. What is remarkable in the United Kingdom, however, 
is that the vast majority of such donations flows into higher education. 
Indeed, in 2015 Coutts reported that higher education institutions had 
received 65 significant donations in the preceding year, totalling £485 
million. By comparison, all other forms of non-university education 
received only nine such donations, amounting to a total of £27 million.47 
The size of these donations and their discrepancy with philanthropy 
towards other forms of education demonstrate the power and prestige of 
elite universities and their alumni networks. Furthermore, many of these 
donations do not directly impact the educational remit of universities but 
are instead channelled towards capital works projects or research insti-
tutes, which can bear the name of the donor.48
A similar pattern of philanthropy targeting elite institutions can be 
seen in the arts. Compared to the 34 per cent of our Russian sample, only 
14 per cent of our UK philanthropists were involved in providing signifi-
cant support to the arts sector. The greatest difference between the two 
countries is in the type of art being supported. In the United Kingdom, 
the vast majority of arts philanthropy is focused on a small number of 
elite art institutions, many of them centred in London. Their involvement 
in the arts is primarily private collecting rather than charitable giving.49 
Although Russia’s rich display similar preferences, many foundations run 
by the wealthy have community art projects included in their set of social 
care projects, which account for almost half of their philanthropy in this 
sector. In contrast, in the UK, ‘community art’ was a category of philan-
thropy which we found not to be relevant.
Conclusion
Elite philanthropy was questioned most forcefully and explicitly by 
Odendahl in her 1990s study on American elites, who exposed their 
donations for education and art institutions as benefitting primarily their 
own and thus reproducing social inequality rather than fighting it. Scath-
ing as this verdict might sound, none of it is down to ‘character’ or ‘per-
sonality’. Piketty warns of our almost automated quest to identify the 
‘good’ rich and attack the bad ones.50 Such attempts to separate the 
wheat from the chaff simply obscure a system that generates the glaring 
inequalities we see today and, in our case, the need for charity in the first 
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place as well as the fact that the ability to provide help is in the hands of 
a small minority.
The most glaring difference between the giving of the richest 
200 people on the Forbes Russia list and the richest 257 UK-based indi-
viduals and families as listed by The Sunday Times is clearly not grounded 
in personality, but in each country’s respective economic and social history. 
British philanthropists’ giving is specialised, which mirrors an economic 
structure that is highly developed, diversified and differentiated. In con-
trast, the natural-resources-dependent Russian economy is dominated by 
conglomerates, the portfolios of which cover a wide range of business 
activities. Many owners reign over their empires like mini-tsars. Having 
appeared during the course of Britain’s industrialisation, charity organi-
sations have acted as intermediaries between benefactors and benefi-
ciaries since Victorian times. Russia’s nascent civil society sector is still 
underdeveloped, little trusted and widely ignored by wealthy benefac-
tors, who prefer running their own foundations and keeping them under 
tight control. Britain’s hyper-rich are globalised in several senses of the 
word: in their composition, corporate activities, and history – both their 
colonial history and their involvement in world markets. In contrast, 
although highly dependent on exports and global finances, Russia’s phi-
lanthropists are ideologically inward-looking. Their paternalistic attitudes 
to the people are based on reciprocity and compliance, something which 
is deeply ingrained in Orthodox traditions and stems from Byzantine ideas 
of almsgiving.
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Between the public and the private
Socialism, capitalism and street socialisation 
in Georgia
Costanza Curro
Introduction: Everyday practices  
and the public/private divide
This chapter investigates street hangouts known as birzha (‘stock exchange’ 
in Russian). Birzha is a form of male street socialisation which has been 
prominent in Georgia since Soviet times. Birzha is made up of young men 
sitting, chatting, drinking, exchanging items and securing various deals 
at street corners or other open spaces in urban neighbourhoods (although, 
as we shall see, the phenomenon has rural origins). Birzha is a ‘school of 
the street’1 at which young men learn the foundational principles of Geor-
gian manhood, but it is also deemed to be the initial step into a potential 
criminal career.2
This practice outlived the fall of socialism and navigated the trou-
bled 1990s and the years following the 2003 Rose Revolution. At each of 
these recent historical stages, birzha has adapted to and counteracted dif-
ferent moral, social, political and economic orders. In different ways, 
these orders saw street hangouts as an eyesore in the framework of 
attempted modernisation projects from the top down – whether from a 
socialist or neo-liberal capitalist perspective.
Drawing upon research conducted in Georgia in 2008–2009, 2014 
and 2017, as well as on the analyses by Georgian and international media 
and of relevant literature from social and political science, this chapter 
investigates transformations of birzha against such dramatically chang-
ing backgrounds. This analysis casts a light on the resilience and response 
of everyday practices embedded in specific moral, cultural and social 
grounds to different political and economic regimes, focusing in particu-
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lar on the rise of neo-liberalism in the region as a purportedly successful 
doctrine to fix the flaws of post-communist societies.
My research identifies birzha as an ambivalent practice between the 
public and the private spheres. Following Lofland’s reference to the Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language’s defini-
tion of ‘public space’, I understand the ‘public’ as what is ‘accessible or 
visible to all members of the community’.3 This definition does not apply 
only to physical, but also to social spaces, as well as to practices, institu-
tions and resources. By contrast, the ‘private’ is accessible to and useable 
by only certain individuals and groups (for example, the family and the 
house as private space par excellence), and under certain conditions (such 
as payments for private education or private healthcare).
The ambivalent position of birzha between the public and the pri-
vate realms is empirically illustrated by three instances. First, birzha hang-
outs flourish between the public streets of the neighbourhoods and the 
private space of the house. Second, mainstream political narratives 
throughout Georgia’s recent history (in particular, since the 2003 Rose 
Revolution) have associated the informal networks of ‘private’ friendship 
and comradeship created at birzha with crime and corruption, which, 
especially during the 1990s ‘transition’ to market capitalism, had a strong 
grip on the public sphere of politics and economics.4 Finally, private rela-
tionships of trust, reciprocity and mutual responsibility underpinning 
birzha have worked as a fundamental form of psychological, social and 
material support amidst political and economic hardship, making up for 
public institutions’ inability to cater for citizens’ needs.5
The political narratives that underpinned the Rose Revolution and 
its aftermath considered the years between the fall of socialism and the 
political and social upheaval which brought Mikheil Saak’ashvili to power 
to be a flawed transition to capitalism and democracy. A system which 
was corrupt under communist rule outlived the demise of the Soviet 
Union, reproducing the same dynamics and often endorsing the same 
people who had served the previous regime. Greedy private interests 
encroached on public institutions and prevented the efficient delivery of 
public goods and services to the population. For ‘real’ change to take place 
and boost the country’s ‘modernisation’, a thorough process of reforms 
needed to wipe out all the poisonous legacies of socialism and its imme-
diate aftermath. Inspired by Western neo-liberalism, these reforms 
attempted to establish clear boundaries between the public and the pri-
vate and targeted not only politics and economics, but also people’s cul-
tural and moral values, as well as everyday practices in which Georgian 
citizens engaged. While favouring private initiative and minimising the 
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role of the state in economic affairs, the post-revolutionary government 
aimed to make public institutions transparent and accountable, and 
strengthened the rule of law and the image of the state as the main source 
of authority and order.6
In this context, birzha was out of place for two main reasons. First, 
street hangouts of young men lying about, drinking and engaging in dubi-
ous deals were at odds with the image of a clean and safe place and a 
rapidly modernising society, which the government wanted to transmit 
to its own citizens as well as to foreign observers, donors and policymak-
ers. Second, practices providing informal support for people’s everyday 
life would no longer be needed with efficient public institutions and a 
secured private sphere in which a market economy could flourish. A strong 
rule of law and a lively and flexible economy would create order and 
wealth for the ultimate benefit of all citizens.7
However, the bold neo-liberal reforms which the government imple-
mented to modernise the country, and the authoritarian stance which 
social practices at odds with this project were dealt with, dismantled social 
security across society and undermined citizens’ trust in the post-revolu-
tionary political institutions’ actual democratic and transparent nature. 
Deep inconsistencies at the heart of the government’s modernisation pro-
ject became increasingly apparent, eventually leading to the defeat of 
Saak’ashvili and his United National Movement (Ertiani Natsionaluri 
Modzraoba, or ENM) in the 2012 and 2013 elections.
After an overview of my research methods, this chapter presents 
birzha in its historical, cultural, spatial and social dimensions. I highlight 
the ambivalence of this practice as a fundamental institution for young 
male Georgians coming of age, but also as a semi-criminal phenomenon. I 
also analyse the blurred boundaries between public and private physical, 
social and political spaces along which birzha develops. Second, birzha is 
investigated in its ambivalent relationship with the cultural, social, political 
and economic order of the socialist era and the 1990s. The Soviet regime 
officially condemned birzha as a practice at odds with its principles. Yet, 
particularly in its late years, the system tolerated private practices and 
networks which catered for citizens’ needs vis-à-vis a public sphere char-
acterised by endemic shortage and political authoritarianism. In the 1990s, 
organised crime and corruption took over public institutions, while sheer 
poverty and civil and ethnic conflict ravaged the country. In this context, 
birzha played a vital role in the neighbourhood’s life to facilitate informal 
access to goods and services, which the official system failed to provide. 
However, birzha was also ‘part of the problem’ inasmuch as links between 
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street hangouts and the criminal world, which paralysed political and 
economic institutions and plagued society with violence, were apparent.
Third, the chapter discusses the post–Rose Revolution modernisa-
tion project and its attempts to establish clear-cut boundaries between the 
public and the private as an essential source of transparency, order and 
prosperity. This project identified birzha as opposed to the idea of law-
abiding and hard-working citizens (and youth in particular) which the 
post-revolutionary political elites had in mind. Confident in its own popu-
larity, the government dealt with birzha in an arbitrary way, targeting 
street hangouts with extreme harshness. However, failure to improve the 
life conditions of a large part of the population, and the oppressive nature 
that citizens increasingly ascribed to the government’s attitudes  and 
actions, alienated people’s support from Saak’ashvili’s leadership, uncov-
ering contradictions in the post-revolutionary modernisation  project.
In the conclusion, I highlight the resilience of birzha in today’s Geor-
gia, which indicates that the implementation of bold neo-liberal reforms, 
coupled with the arbitrary use of power against unwanted individuals 
and practices as a way to modernise the country, did not deliver the 
expected results. In a morally, culturally, socially, politically and economi-
cally fragmented context, many Georgian citizens still rely on ties devel-
oped through everyday practices to access material and non-material 
goods. These ties are often endowed with higher trust and respect than 
official institutions, which have largely failed to empower many people in 
their economic well-being and democratic participation, providing just a 
partial alternative with respect to the previous systems.
Researching birzha
My interest in birzha began in a fortuitous way. I was doing research in 
Tbilisi in 2008 and 2009 on a different topic and was being hosted by a 
family which lived in a residential neighbourhood on the outskirts of the 
capital, mostly made up of middle- and low-income households. I noticed 
that teenagers and young men hanging out in the streets were a perma-
nent feature of that and other areas of Tbilisi. Residents referred to such 
gatherings, which seemed inseparable from the neighbourhood’s physi-
cal and social landscape, as birzha. Regardless of people’s various degrees 
of involvement in street life, knowledge of street norms was widespread 
among the neighbourhood’s inhabitants. Stories and gossip about events 
concerning the local birzha circulated widely among locals.
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Ordinary residents’ acquaintance with birzha was essential for the 
outcomes of my research. ‘Second-hand’ information was provided by peo-
ple detached from birzha in time and space, such as older men recalling 
their youthful experiences or mothers and wives worried about men wast-
ing time in the street. Thanks to these respondents, I could partly coun-
terbalance the limits imposed by the almost exclusively male access to 
birzha. Moreover, due to the status of birzha as a phenomenon more or 
less close to the criminal world, many of my friends and acquaintances 
warned me to stay away from ‘those issues’. Birzha was considered, if not 
a dangerous business, at least a despicable reality with which respectable 
people (especially if female and a foreigner) should not get mixed up in. 
The association of birzha with semi-legal and illegal activities also meant 
that birzha members tended to be suspicious of a stranger’s interest in 
their street community and therefore not keen to disclose information.
The analysis presented here is based on three main methods: (par-
tial) observation of birzha as a feature of several of Tbilisi’s neighbour-
hoods; perceptions and definitions collected in conversations with young 
male friends and acquaintances (aged 16 to 27), who were more or less 
closely related to birzha, but did not necessarily think of themselves as 
being part of it; narratives of birzha provided by outsiders (and, in some 
cases, former insiders), such as older men and women of all ages.
Birzha: Moral values and social norms of Georgian 
street communities
Birzha refers to groups of male teenagers or young men who meet regu-
larly in urban open spaces such as squares, courtyards and playgrounds. 
The Russian word literally means ‘stock exchange’. In Georgian, birzha is 
used colloquially; in the Dictionary of Georgian Slang, the term is defined 
as an ‘open-pit gathering of idle youth’.8 The reference to the financial 
world may sound ironic as generally participants are economically inac-
tive (students or unemployed). However, birzha is where valuable 
exchange of social capital takes place.
Another meaning of birzha from nineteenth-century Russian slang 
denotes a place where people line up in hope for a temporary job.9 Simi-
larly, ethnographies of the post-Soviet space (in this case Lithuania) indi-
cate that a group of men waiting in the street for informal short-term 
employment is called a ‘darbo birzha’, the formal Lithuanian term for 
‘unemployment agency’.10 The little literature available on the topic 
describes birzha as a pervasive phenomenon among urban male youth, 
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a pivotal stage in the process of identification within local communities, 
as well as a potential initial step into a criminal career.11
In the context of Georgia, the understanding of birzha is disputed. 
According to several participants, birzha is neither exclusively male and 
juvenile nor peculiarly urban but is widely considered to be a phenome-
non of rural origins, which was successfully urbanised. Literary sources 
point to the pre-Soviet institution of adoptive brotherhood (modzmeoba), 
in which spiritual kinship serves as the basis for social and political alle-
giances between Caucasian highlanders.12
Today, birzha is visible in the streets and squares in urban neigh-
bourhoods, ubani in Georgian (sometimes also referred to as kvartali, 
from the Russian kvartal). Birzha spreads across the urban space, pene-
trating liminal areas. In the urban landscape, liminal spaces or ‘inter-
stices’13 are zones that ‘are essentially away from a “public gaze” [sic] 
whilst simultaneously situated within a public space’.14 Liminal spaces 
occupy a ‘minoritarian’ position with respect to other spaces that are 
‘either more institutionalized, and therefore economically and legally 
powerful, or endowed with a stronger identity, and therefore more rec-
ognizable or typical’.15 Yet, liminality produces identities, practices, norms 
and power relations in its own right.
In the neighbourhoods of Tbilisi, variously sized groups of men 
populate the thresholds between house and street, between family and 
state: street corners, playgrounds, stairways, courtyards, block gates, 
cellars and basements. As a phenomenon pervasive in spaces which 
are neither public nor private, birzha lives in the tension between the pri-
vate realm of domesticity and close relationships and the public sphere 
of the state and other official institutions. As will be discussed below, the 
moral, cultural, social, political and economic structure of birzha has 
generated practices that have represented an alternative, and often an 
opposition, to Georgia’s official system at various stages of the country’s 
recent  history.16
Birzha is defined as the principal school for masculinity, which marks 
an essential stage in the transition from teenager to manhood.17 For males, 
membership in birzha comes as a birth right, regardless of ethnicity, reli-
gion or socio-economic status.18 Inclusion is conditional on compliance 
with street norms, whose pivotal points are honour, honesty, manly atti-
tudes and respect for the elderly, and which are predicated on a rigid 
hierarchy of identities and roles. The fundamental authority in the bir-
zha hierarchy is the dzveli bich’i (‘old boy’), a young man aiming for a 
career in the criminal world.19 His key features are an utter disregard for 
official rules and authorities, mastery of street norms, proneness to using 
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violence to solve conflicts, and prison experience. Dzveli bich’i status is 
regarded as the first level of a criminal hierarchy which culminates in the 
figure of the ‘thief-in-law’, k’anonieri kurdi, a semi-mythical kind of ban-
dit that has its origins in Stalin’s labour camps and developed in various 
forms across the Soviet Union.20
In my research, I came across flexible meanings of birzha, which 
transcend the narrow reference to semi-criminal street gangs. In the 
perspective of several of my participants, birzha partially overlapped 
with dzmak’atsoba.21 Dzmak’atsoba is a stronger and manlier relationship 
than the neutral ‘friendship’, megobroba, and refers to the link with a 
dzmak’atsi – from dzma (‘brother’) and k’atsi (‘man’). In the words of 
Giorgi (42, profession unknown), a dzmak’atsi is ‘more than a friend, more 
than a brother’. The strongest kind of dzmak’atsoba is with your ‘friend 
from childhood’ (bashvobis dzmak’atsi), and according to Giorgi, ‘it’s a 
friendship that should last forever, and it’s really sad if you lose this mate’. 
A dzmak’atsi is someone to whom ‘you can entrust your mother, your sis-
ter and your wife’. But if the mutual loyalty is betrayed, even such an 
important friend can become the most despised foe. In Giorgi’s view, 
‘when a dzmak’atsi lets you down and betrays your trust, he ought to be 
killed. In my life I have learned that almost nobody is worthy of being 
called dzmak’atsi’.
As Giorgi’s words indicate, trust is pivotal to personal ties within 
birzha, and to relationships between dzmak’atsi in general. These rela-
tionships oblige one to be totally honest with other birzha members, take 
responsibility for oneself and face the consequences of breaking street 
laws. Severe violations include deceiving or betraying birzha members, 
especially collaborating with the police or other state institutions; ver-
bally offending or physically attacking another birzha member or some-
body close to him (particularly a female member of his family); and letting 
down a dzmak’atsi and failing to respect older residents of the neigh-
bourhood (whether or not affiliated to birzha). Yet, solidarity between 
dzmak’atsi is also intertwined with (sometimes physical) competitiveness 
between birzhas from different neighbourhoods and even members of the 
same birzha. Success in enhancing one’s position among peers is linked 
to cunning behaviour, proneness to risks, mastery of street laws and strong 
ties with influential dzveli bich’i or the neighbourhood’s elderly.
Relationships in the street are regulated by reciprocity. Birzha is 
informed by ongoing exchanges of material and non-material items. The 
term indicates multi-directional giving and taking, and business deals, 
both small and large, take place in the street. Sharing is a common fea-
ture: members of the street community are expected to circulate ciga-
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rettes, clothes and other belongings among peers. Since birzha mostly 
consist of young people, who usually do not own much, sharing is of high 
importance. Those who are better off than others (even if only temporar-
ily, because they have found a short-term job or have taken a loan or 
received a gift from friends or family) make their resources available to 
the group.
Money can be used to purchase drinks and food, to pay for a taxi for 
a trip out of town, to feast in a restaurant or to go out to clubs or bars. In 
Tbilisi, a widespread custom is to buy fresh beer directly from the local 
brewery on the banks of the river Mt’k’vari and treat fellow birzha mem-
bers to it, together with dry smoked fish and rye bread. One can often 
spot groups of men drinking beer on the brewery’s premises, sitting on 
the pavement or on the parapet by the riverside. Others take large plastic 
bottles full of beer back to their neighbourhoods and share it with friends 
while sitting outdoors.
Birzha is a fundamental institution for young Georgian men to cre-
ate close relationships with their peers across their neighbourhoods. These 
relationships are based on mutual trust, total dedication and honesty 
towards street communities, and a willingness to share goods, feelings 
and experiences with other birzha members. Streets and squares of Geor-
gian cities and towns are the stage for equitable exchanges, through 
which young people come of age sharing moral, cultural and social val-
ues. However, while the exclusive and often hierarchical structure of bir-
zha establishes strong ties within street communities, it cuts out other 
members of society. Furthermore, the more or less tight links between 
birzha and organised crime throughout recent Georgian history have con-
tributed to create an image of street communities – variously emphasised 
by political authorities and partially resonating across the population – as 
idle and lost youths who encroach on public space for their murky and 
selfish business. The following section discusses the key features of the 
ambivalent relation between birzha and the official system in the Soviet 
era and throughout the 1990s.
Birzha under socialism and in the 1990s
In Soviet and post-Soviet times up to the Rose Revolution, birzha occu-
pied the ‘grey zones’ between public and private social and physical 
spaces.22 The Soviet-type social and political structure envisages ‘the realm 
of officialdom’ on the one hand, including the ruling elite, apparat and 
nomenklatura, and ‘the domestic realm of family and friendship’ on the 
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other hand, resting upon kinship ties, intimacy networks and shared value 
commitments. Yet, in between there is a ‘ “social realm” encompassing the 
enormous and complex domain developing between the top level of the 
Party-state and family and friends networks – that is, the domain of work, 
routine administration, and “official” associational life’.23 Only on the sur-
face is this intermediate space organised through ideological, merito-
cratic or authoritarian principles; its core structure develops ‘along lines 
of bargaining, reciprocal favours, mutual dependencies, networks of con-
nections, dissimulation, circumvention of regulations and procedures’.24 
Although emerging from the private space of family and friend relation-
ships, this ‘private-public realm’ or ‘second public’25 is at the same time 
clearly separated from the official public.
In socialist systems, the public sphere largely overlapped with the 
state, and only activities controlled by the authorities were allowed pub-
licly.26 In this context, the grey zones between public and private inhab-
ited by birzha formed a niche relatively free of the system’s regimentation. 
Birzha was an alternative form of youth association to those promoted by 
Soviet authorities, such as the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol.27 In 
contrast to public images of socialist youth as the most active part of the 
population in realising the collective goals of Soviet society, birzha val-
ued loyalty to personal ties more highly than loyalty to the state and the 
Party. Images of hard-working and healthy Soviet youth clashed with the 
perceived inactivity and debauchery of birzha members.
In Soviet cityscapes, ‘open “public” spaces [were] perceived as some-
thing alien and belonging to the state, not to the inhabitants’, turning an 
ideal ‘everyone’s space’ into ‘no one’s space’.28 Birzha catered for a differ-
ent kind of collective interaction in urban spaces, as a way in which ‘ordi-
nary residents appropriated public places beyond the mainstream 
paradigms and master narratives of the city image’.29 By carving out social 
and physical grey zones partially spared from state control, birzha cre-
ated spaces for those young men to whom socialist symbolic and material 
power was alien.30 However, while ideologically stigmatised by official 
authorities, birzha was hardly subject to actual repression from the Soviet 
state. The latter (especially in its later years) in fact tolerated informal 
networks and practices grounded in grey zones between the public and 
the private, inasmuch as citizens’ access to informal means ‘enabled the 
system to function and made it tolerable’.31
When the Soviet Union came to an end, in Georgia the public sphere 
of politics and the economy was taken over by the private interests of 
organised criminal groups or paramilitary squads. They infiltrated and 
paralysed the state, which prevented public institutions from fulfilling 
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their basic functions.32 Corruption became pervasive in all aspects of pub-
lic life, from politics and business to education, from the police to the 
health system. The blurred lines between public and private encouraged 
the abuse of public resources for the benefit of private interests.33 While 
pointing out the greed of corrupt politicians and businessmen as a major 
cause of the country’s miserable conditions, citizens themselves often 
resorted to petty bribery as the easiest, and sometimes the only possible 
way to secure essential goods and services.34
The physical and social public space was ravaged by violence and 
decay.35 In a neighbourhood life of struggle and sharing, birzha had a 
prominent role. It facilitated access to goods and services which the short-
comings of official institutions otherwise made unattainable, moving 
easily within and across boundaries and merging the public with the pri-
vate. In addition, birzha was a way for young men to cultivate ideas and 
practices of masculinity in a context in which unemployment, heavy drink-
ing, criminality and drug addiction severely challenged men’s ability to 
live up to the traditional male role of breadwinner and wise and honour-
able member of the community.36 On the one hand, many young men 
referred to being part of birzha in the 1990s and circumventing official 
rules as a form of protest against the system.37 On the other hand, birzha 
was linked to the criminal world, which had considerable political and 
economic power. As a result, in several citizens’ perspectives birzha stood 
out more as an expression of, rather than a form of, resistance to corrup-
tion and violence.38
Clearing grey zones: Birzha after the Rose Revolution
Following the political narratives that surrounded the Rose Revolution, 
the system which developed out of the Soviet regime in the 1990s was 
democratic and capitalist in theory, but in fact offered no real alternative 
to what went before. Corruption and the prominent influence of organ-
ised crime in the political and economic sphere prevented the creation of 
accountable public institutions and a lively public realm in which citizens 
could participate. The development of secure private property and busi-
ness, which would boost a market economy, was also hampered.
The post-revolutionary political leadership, which ruled the coun-
try from 2003 to 2012, envisaged the ‘transition’ from socialism to capi-
talism and democracy as a movement from backwardness to modernity. 
Transparency, as the opposite of the corrupt ‘private use of public good’,39 
was the banner under which the government implemented reforms which 
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aimed to get rid of ambivalent grey zones in politics, economics and the 
law. Following core neo-liberal principles, a vast process of privatisation 
and deregulation went hand in hand with a radical restructuring of pub-
lic institutions and services, such as the police and local authorities.40
The modern and transparent society framed by post-revolutionary 
political narratives stood in opposition to the blurred boundaries inform-
ing citizens’ relationship with the state and the rule of law. These narra-
tives depicted the Georgian population as pervaded by a ‘culture of 
informality’, which supposedly affected all social mechanisms. People’s 
habit of circumventing formal rules to ‘get things done’ was not a by- 
product of institutional inefficiencies, but a way of thinking that had cor-
rupted citizens’ moral principles. In an interview with the German 
filmmaker Stefan Tolz in 2013, Saak’ashvili attacked his people’s way of 
relating to official rules, stressing that dramatic changes at the institu-
tional level must go hand in hand with a radical transformation of the 
population’s moral and cultural ground:
But everybody has to pay [taxes], it’s [not] something that has ever 
been heard of here. Or when everybody had to put seatbelts on, 
unheard of in our part of the world. Or nobody could take bribes, 
you know, very unusual. And you know when you ask people say, 
even today when we did opinion polls and you ask people: What is 
a crime? People say: ‘Oh killing somebody is a crime, raping is a 
crime, not paying taxes not really a crime, I mean just taking bribes, 
oh well, he has to feed his family, right? This official, he took like 
500 euros, so what a big deal.’ People were saying that in opinion 
polls. Overcoming that I guess, that takes a couple of generations.41
Many studies of both Soviet and 1990s Georgia discuss citizens’ aliena-
tion from political institutions as a crucial factor in determining the 
spread of practices that circumvent official norms.42 It is argued that 
‘state laws have been avoided not only because they were bad but because 
the population could manage better without them’.43 The Rose Revolu-
tion, as depicted in collective narratives, political analyses and media cov-
erage, was expected to reverse this trend, and ‘perhaps for the first time 
in Georgia’s modern history, establish the congruity of private and public 
well-being’.44
In the communist era, the mistrust which informed the relation-
ship between state and citizens stemmed from the perception of public 
institutions as the expression of a hostile power. In the 1990s, the public 
sphere of the state, rather than representing the ‘common good’, was seen 
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by citizens as the arena in which greedy officials fought for their private 
interests, neglecting the miserable conditions of a large part of the popu-
lation. The Rose Revolution pledged to make the public realm, embodied 
by state institutions, finally accountable.
The modern public and private, which represented a radical alter-
native to the socialist system and its poisonous legacies, were to be inhab-
ited by modern individuals. The ideal citizens of post-revolutionary 
Georgia were patriotic but also cosmopolitan, independent, ambitious and 
law-abiding. People’s everyday practices mattered for defining social pro-
files that fitted, or did not fit, the country’s radical renovation. Social 
practices had to conform to modernisation narratives, embodying trust 
in institutions, respect for the law, an ambitious way of thinking and an 
efficient lifestyle.45 Most importantly, people’s practices were expected to 
stick to the clear-cut division between the public and the private.
For a number of reasons, the post-revolutionary government iden-
tified birzha as one of the main targets of its modernisation project. First, 
birzha was a blatant expression of the despised features of the past: petty 
crime, over-drinking, drug use and inactivity. Second, birzha and the crim-
inal world competed with the state for moral, social, political, legal and 
economic authority – especially among the youth, whom the government 
had placed at the forefront of the modernisation project.46 An indication 
of the popularity of street life and the criminal world among young peo-
ple is the fact that 25 per cent of Georgian schoolchildren interviewed in 
1993 declared that they wanted to be thieves-in-law when they grew up.47
Third, young men who hung out in public spaces, getting drunk, 
talking loudly and negotiating dubious deals, spoiled the image of 
cleanness and safety which the government wanted external observers 
and visitors to see. Birzha embodied liminal use of public spaces, tran-
scending the divide between the public and the private which the politi-
cal leadership aimed to establish as a fundamental sign of the country’s 
modernity.
The zero-tolerance approach taken by the government aimed to 
remove undesirable practices, of which birzha was a paradigmatic expres-
sion, and those who engaged in them from the city’s physical and cul-
tural landscape. In his 2006 address to parliament, Saak’ashvili referred 
to the tough policies being implemented against petty crime as aiming to 
‘clean our streets of this rubbish’.48 The Georgian Criminal Code was 
reformed to include harsher sanctions against petty theft and minor drug-
related offences.49 During Saak’ashvili’s rule, many of my young male 
research participants were worried about the increasing presence of police 
patrols (p’at’ruli) in the streets.50 Some people avoided going out at night, 
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even to the local shop. This behaviour was motivated by the belief that 
young males hanging out after a certain hour in certain areas were suspi-
cious. Data confirm the government’s repressive stance against people 
and practices considered unsuitable to the modernisation project. The 
harsh sanctions imposed for petty crime during Saak’ashvili’s presidency 
led to the prison population becoming one of the highest per capita in 
the world.51
Conclusion: Everyday practices as the alternative?
The political order brought about by the Rose Revolution presented itself 
as the only real alternative to the flaws of the communist system, which 
had endured the fall of the Soviet Union and had precipitated the country 
into poverty, crime and conflict throughout the 1990s. Post- revolutionary 
political narratives identified the blurred boundaries between the public 
and the private as an essential feature of these flaws and the main hin-
drance to the country’s modernisation. Transparency and order were the 
foundational pillars not only of a projected modern society, politics and 
economics, but also of modern citizens’ moral and cultural ground.
A large part of the population, however, questioned the means by 
which the government tried to modernise society. Many of my partici-
pants were disappointed by the developments of the Rose Revolution not 
only because of the lack of improvement in people’s socio-economic con-
ditions but also because they perceived state authority as an arbitrary 
power which made it dangerous to walk in the streets of the neighbour-
hood after dusk, discuss politics in public, or go to a protest rally.52 The 
growing inequality brought into place by swift privatisation and deregu-
lation53 went hand in hand with the severe violation of democratic and 
civil liberties, regardless of the post-revolutionary government’s official 
rhetoric. This increasingly alienated citizens’ trust in post-revolutionary 
political elites and in the implementation of political and economic mod-
els which these elites believed to be the only viable alternative to the 
backwardness and lawlessness inherited from socialism and its aftermath.
Theoretical analyses and empirical contributions on everyday prac-
tices in post-socialism systems have called into question the fading away 
of these practices as a form of support resulting from the development of 
free market and democratic rights, which would provide a political and 
economic environment able to cater for the needs of all citizens. Instead, 
these studies have pointed out that, in spite of optimistic expectations, 
‘shock therapies’ and subsequent economic policies implemented after 
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the fall of socialism did not bring about immediate development and well-
being for everyone, but in most cases had a devastating effect on the 
already precarious lives of millions of people. In such contexts, although 
changing to adapt to different circumstances, everyday practices have 
maintained their role as a means of psychological, social, political and 
economic support amidst growing inequality and uncertainty.54
Reforms implemented by the post-revolutionary government aimed 
to efface the ambivalence between the public and the private and intro-
duce respect for the law, meritocracy, ambition and transparency as foun-
dational values of modern Georgian society. Sanctions and repression 
targeted those individuals and social phenomena which did not fit this 
project. Yet, the post-revolutionary government’s vision of the end of ‘tran-
sition’ as the demise of grey zones in favour of clear-cut distinctions 
proved to be inconsistent. Indeed, at the end of Saak’ashvili’s rule in 2012, 
groups of young men hanging out at birzha had become a less conspicu-
ous feature across the cityscape. Yet, the harsh policies implemented by 
the government against birzha did not have a long-term effect, and trans-
formations in the prominence and visibility of street communities are 
more closely connected to increased social and geographical mobility 
among young people.55 In the years following the United National Move-
ment’s electoral defeat in 2012, birzha has proved to be a resilient prac-
tice among many young men coming of age. This happens in spite of 
enduring hostility from the political authorities and the ambivalent sta-
tus of birzhas within their own neighbourhoods, in which they are met by 
residents’ tolerance mixed with suspicion.56
Birzha’s ability to adapt to and outlive different social, political and 
economic orders indicates that projects of top-down reform of a society 
have overlooked the importance and strength of everyday practices 
embedded in relationships of trust, reciprocity and solidarity. These prac-
tices develop from ties cultivated in the private sphere of the house, the 
neighbourhood, and the circle of friends and colleagues, but are also par-
allel and complementary to public institutions, catering for needs which 
the official system is unable, or unwilling, to fulfil. The case of post–Rose 
Revolution Georgia, while grounded in its own specifics, provides grounds 
for comparison with other countries in the post-socialist space which have 
experienced the rise of neo-liberalism and the importation of Western 
political and economic models as the best available options for moving 
forward from socialist legacies. As the analysis of birzha vis-à-vis the offi-
cial system indicates, this approach has significant flaws, which call into 
question the suitability of such political and economic models for the reali-
ties to which they have been applied. The top-down implementation of 
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several post-socialist reforms has often disregarded the role of embed-
ded practices and relationships as fundamental cultural, social, political 
and economic alternatives to the official system. This obliviousness has 
contributed to create the fragmentation and marginalisation that differ-
ent social and political contexts across the region experience today.
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Making it in China
The determinants of economic success 
in a socialist market system
Ion Marandici
China’s politicians like to emphasise that they are building a socialist 
 market economy based on the ideology of socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics. Unlike other post-communist transitions to capitalism, China’s 
radical economic transformations during the neo-liberal era did not 
 generate a large pool of economic losers. On the contrary, over the last 
three decades, seven hundred million Chinese escaped poverty. Yet at the 
same time, China’s impressive economic growth has been associated 
with the rise of a wealthy elite, which gradually is being co-opted by the 
party-state. Relying on elite-level and survey data, this study goes beyond 
socio-demographic characteristics and investigates whether party mem-
bership, education, beliefs in upward mobility and support for an inter-
ventionist state correlate with income levels. The final section discusses 
the implications of the observed trends for the future of the Chinese eco-
nomic model.
From planned economy to socialist market economy
Xi Jinping is the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
and President and ‘core leader’ of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
In October 2017, in front of the delegates of the XIX Party Congress, Xi 
gave an important speech entitled ‘Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era’. Soon thereafter, the phrase ‘Xi Jinping 
Thought’ was incorporated into the party and state constitutions, an hon-
our reserved so far only to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In his long 
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speech, Xi promised to uphold socialism with Chinese characteristics in 
order to finish the country’s ‘socialist modernization and national rejuve-
nation’ by 2050.1 The phrase ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ was 
coined by Deng Xiaoping three decades ago. Even though current offi-
cials mention it as the essential goal of the party-state, it is difficult to 
pinpoint its precise meaning. So far, the expression seems to refer to the 
transition of the Chinese planned economy to a socialist market econ-
omy, a hybrid system blending market and command economy elements.
During the last seven decades, China underwent two systemic trans-
formations. From 1949 to 1976, under Mao’s leadership, it largely fol-
lowed the Soviet model of development. It collectivised agriculture, 
created its own heavy industry, eliminated private enterprises, controlled 
prices and monopolised foreign trade and state banking. These are clas-
sic command economy policies borrowed from the Soviet Union. After 
the Sino-Soviet split, China embarked on a course of gradual rapproche-
ment with the United States. The stagnation of the early 1970s prompted 
some party officials to voice pro-market views, running against the pre-
vailing statist ideology. Rejected by Mao, those market-friendly commu-
nists were quickly side-lined for their attempts to push the country onto 
the capitalist path.
After Mao’s death, the reformers, including Deng Xiaoping, advanced 
to top positions in the party. Deng initiated the policy of reform and opening 
up (gaige kaifang), which remains the foundation of China’s transition to 
market. The experiment of the special economic zones, though successful, 
generated fears among the ideological hardliners, who thought that the 
Middle Kingdom was moving toward capitalism. To defend his policy pro-
posals against Maoist critiques, in 1982 Deng  highlighted the need to 
adapt Western development models to local conditions:
In carrying out our modernization program, we must proceed from 
Chinese realities. Both in revolution and in construction, we should 
also learn from foreign countries and draw on their experience, but 
mechanical application of foreign experience and copying of for-
eign models will get us nowhere. We have had many lessons in this 
respect. We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the 
concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our own and build a social-
ism with Chinese characteristics.2
In 1983, Deng went even further suggesting that ‘some people in 
rural areas and cities should be allowed to get rich before others’.3 Later 
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on, at the XIV Party Congress, the party leaders officially endorsed the 
project of a socialist market economy. More recently, former CPC General 
Secretary Hu Jintao outlined in a key party congress speech that public 
ownership and the guiding role of the party in building a moderately pros-
perous society (xiaokang shehui) by 2020 remain two of the central ele-
ments of the existing economic system.4
Yet the evolution of China’s socialist market economy remains a big 
unknown. It would be hazardous to speculate on its sustainability solely 
by deciphering the official party line. Within the development paradigm 
adopted by the party, the state will continue to play the major role in 
steering domestic economic transformation through five-year plans. Pro-
ductivity gains and large-scale capital investment, combined with the 
propensity of Chinese households to save, have produced high rates of eco-
nomic growth. In 2012, the private sector was responsible for 70 per cent 
of the country’s manufacturing output and 80 per cent of the jobs in urban 
areas.5 So far, China’s state-led development resembles the late-modern-
isation success stories of the ‘four Asian tigers’ – Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan. During the next decade, the Chinese econ-
omy might slow down as the country abandons export-led growth and 
embraces a model of growth based on domestic consumption. Currently, 
China seems far from the chronic economic stagnation plaguing the 
command economies before their demise. As such, the idea that a com-
munist-led China achieved economic growth without relying signifi-
cantly on foreign direct investment and without dismantling the state, 
challenges the Washington consensus – the neo-liberal orthodoxy popu-
lar until recently among policymakers in some of the former Communist 
countries.6
When compared to other post-communist transitions, China’s road 
to market differs in two respects. First, in some of the former communist 
countries, transitions to market have generated an anti-market backlash 
exploited by adept political entrepreneurs. By contrast, marketisation 
enjoys popular support in China. Some scholars characterised this phe-
nomenon as “reforms without losers.”7 According to World Bank data, in 
1990, 756 million Chinese (66 per cent of the population) lived on less 
than US $1.90/day (i.e., below the international poverty line).8 A quar-
ter of a century later, using the same benchmark, the same data show 
that only 10 million Chinese (0.7 per cent of the population) were poor. 
Indeed, the state has enacted economic reforms allowing more than 
700 million individuals to escape poverty. In doing so, it has profoundly 
altered the fabric of society and created a pro-market constituency.
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Second, China’s leaders adopted a dual-track approach, developing 
labour-intensive sectors and supporting exports, while protecting ineffi-
cient sectors from international competition. Such an approach enabled 
the political elites to harvest the fruits of trade liberalisation and avoid 
massive layoffs. In 1998, preparing its WTO accession, China was con-
strained to launch deeper market reforms. But even then, the state exited 
competitive sectors and privatised the smaller state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), while keeping the large ones under its control (zhua da fang xiao). 
As a result of this increase in efficiency, higher revenues allowed the state 
to compensate the groups negatively impacted by economic reforms. That 
is why the Chinese political elites could pursue further marketisation with-
out having to fear an anti-market backlash.
The future of the market in China depends to a large extent on the 
level of acceptance it enjoys in society. Among elites, there is a solid con-
sensus on the necessity to continue reforms. But the cosy relationship 
between the indigenous capitalists and state officials amidst rising income 
disparities led some scholars to expect an outburst of social unrest. 
Whyte rejects such expectations as unrealistic and demonstrates that 
‘China’s social volcano of potential anger at growing distributive injus-
tice was clearly still dormant in 2009.’9 Survey data from 2012 confirm 
that 75 per cent of Chinese support market reforms despite the growing 
 inequality.10
Nevertheless, the transition to market did breed dissatisfaction. 
Some intellectuals criticised the continuing privatisation of state prop-
erty and the conspicuous consumption prevalent among the wealthy 
elites. Cui Zhiyuan, Gan Yang, Wang Shaoguang and Wang Hui formed 
the New Left (xin zuopai), a loose group calling for alternative models of 
development that would mitigate the negative side effects of the pro- 
market policies.11 Likewise, discontent with reforms is simmering among 
those who religiously revere Mao Zedong. When Mao Yushi, a liberal econ-
omist, published an article criticising Mao’s economic policies, diehard 
Maoists requested that state authorities put him on trial.12 Despite such 
scattered pockets of discontent, popular support in favour of further mar-
ketisation remains strong.
The rise of the billionaires
Economic growth has been accompanied by the rise in wealth and income 
inequality. So that by now, the concentration of wealth in China has 
reached levels comparable to those in advanced capitalist countries. 
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In  2016, the country’s official Gini coefficient of 0.47 stood above the 
coefficients of the former Communist states.13 Moreover, for several 
years, income inequality in China remained higher than in the United 
States. Since 2008, as a result of governmental efforts, income inequality 
has slightly declined, but it still surpasses the levels observed in most of 
the developed countries.
The newly emerged billionaires situated at the top of the wealth 
distribution benefitted most from the economic transformations. Two 
organisations – Hurun and Forbes – identify and rank the Chinese mag-
nates. As shown in figure 5.1, their estimates diverge. Compared to Forbes, 
Hurun counts annually more Chinese billionaires. Despite some discrep-
ancies, both graphs illustrate an unmistakable trend – the rapid rise of a 
national wealthy elite. In 2015, according to Hurun, more billionaires 
lived in China than in the United States.14
In the new context, private wealth may turn into a power resource. 
As certain individuals become extremely wealthy, they acquire more 
autonomy from the state and may use their resources to gain influence 
over regional officials. So far, the wealthy elites seem content to play the 
role of “allies of the state” rather than act as agents of change.15 But as 
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Beijing continues to promote governors based in part on their economic 
performance, regional officials realise that the billionaires in their prov-
inces are indispensable for the achievement of economic growth and the 
preservation of their power positions within the party-state.
Over the last three decades, the relationship between the party-
state and entrepreneurs evolved from suspicion to co-optation. The 
1989 Tiananmen protests constituted a watershed moment in this 
regard. Some entrepreneurs provided food and transportation for dem-
onstrators, thus irritating the party hardliners. Consequently, from 
1989 to 2002, entrepreneurs were banned from joining the party. More-
over, pro-privatisation advocates such as Zhao Ziyang, the General 
 Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), were accused of over-
empathising with the student protesters and lost their influence within 
the party. Interestingly enough, in 1991 the conservative faction was 
discussing the idea of establishing direct party ownership of state assets 
in order to prevent the formation of rival power centres.16 After a three-
year hiatus, Deng’s Southern Tour weakened the conservatives led by 
Chen Yun and market reforms accelerated again.17 In retrospect, it is 
noteworthy that the anti-market reaction after Tiananmen temporarily 
slowed down the transition to market, but did not lead to a wholesale 
reversal of reforms.
As the importance of the private sector grew, the mood in the party 
changed. To achieve a broader representation of societal interests, the 
party began courting and co-opting successful entrepreneurs. In 2002, 
the then CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin formulated the doctrine of 
Three Represents, which encouraged the new social actors, among them 
businesspeople, to join the party.18 Five years later, 5 per cent of all party 
members were private entrepreneurs.19 In 2013, out of 85 million mem-
bers, 25 million were farmers, herders and fishers; 20 million were 
 management staff and technicians working in enterprises; 7 million 
were workers; and 7 million were state and party officials.20 The adop-
tion of  the Three Represents opened the doors of the CPC to the newly 
emerged billionaires, allowing the wealthy elites to gain representation 
in the party.
CPC’s party-building strategy trailed the growth of the private sector 
as well. Non-public enterprises are required by law to set up party com-
mittees and cells. While the law has been in place for more than two dec-
ades, its strict implementation began a decade ago.21 In 2012, a party official 
triumphantly announced that ‘party units have been established in about 
983,000 private enterprises, including 47,000 foreign-funded compa-
nies’.22 Official data from 2017 show that the party has embedded itself in 
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1.88 million non-public enterprises and in 93 per cent of all SOEs.23 It fol-
lows then that the party has penetrated more than 10 per cent of all pri-
vate enterprises. This pragmatic party-building strategy allowed CPC to 
establish its permanent presence in the private sector.
State institutions co-opt billionaires, too. Some of them become 
members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), others join state- sponsored 
business associations. In 2008, 17 billionaires joined the NPC, while in 
2013, the figure nearly doubled.24 I reviewed the biographies of the top 
100 wealthiest individuals identified by Hurun in 2015 and found out 
that 58 per cent held politically important offices in the past. So far, most 
of them are recruited by provincial people’s congresses and regional party 
officials via invitation.25 Overall, the selection process lacks transparency 
as it is not entirely clear what criteria are used to pick the future NPC and 
CPPCC delegates.
The two parallel processes – the co-optation of the wealthy elites by 
the party and the de facto colonisation of the private sector with party 
cells – point to the growing interdependence of the political and wealthy 
elites. However, despite the CPC efforts, China’s wealthy do not feel secure. 
In 2013, 60 per cent of high-net-worth individuals were seriously think-
ing about investment migration.26 For now, in the absence of an inherit-
ance tax in China, billionaires can easily transfer wealth to their children. 
The fuerdai, the second generation of wealthy Chinese, compete with their 
parents’ generation in attracting media attention to their consumerist 
excesses at home and abroad.
To survive, socialism with Chinese characteristics needs more fru-
gality. Besides the offspring of the wealthy elites, party cadres at higher 
levels engage in conspicuous status-confirming behaviour. CPC is not 
interested in the transformation of the party and state officials into a new 
class of mandarins. In 2012, Xi promoted the ‘eight-point regulation’, a 
nervous effort to subject the behaviour of the party cadres to a set of 
thrift and integrity rules. The guidelines ban spending on luxury goods, 
impose stricter standards on the use of public funds, specify limits on 
travel expenses, prompt officials to organise modest banquets, prohibit 
the construction of extravagant government buildings and control the 
frequency of public appearances of the nomenklatura.27 By  October 2017, 
the party recorded a total of 193,168 thrift violations and reprimanded 
145,059 officials for disregarding the policy.28 While the crackdown on 
conspicuous consumption will not stem the tide of consumerism sweep-
ing nowadays across China, it might moderately improve the public’s 
perception of party officials.
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Does it pay to be a party member?
It is unclear whether the rising income inequality will perpetuate itself 
and block social mobility in the future. Hence, an intriguing aspect of 
China’s economic transition concerns the determinants of income at the 
household level. Are demographic characteristics, political affiliation, and 
certain beliefs linked to higher income groups?
Previous studies have identified a variety of income predictors. 
Xin proved that party membership has a minor, but positive impact on 
household wealth.29 Xie and Jin demonstrate that employment with 
the party-state exerts a positive effect on household wealth.30 Besides 
political ties, education might figure as a determinant of income.31 Tra-
ditionally, parents in China put a high premium on education, regarding 
it as a contributing factor to social mobility. Western university degrees 
are preferred over domestic ones. High-ranking officials send their off-
spring to American and European universities. For example, President Xi 
Jinping’s daughter studied at Harvard. The son of Wen Jiabao, China’s 
former head of government, and other princelings graduated from 
universities in the West. Upon the careful analysis of party careers, a 
recent study found out that the CPC promotes educated individuals to 
higher party positions.32
To further explore whether party affiliation and education influence 
economic success in the general population, I used statistical techniques 
to analyse survey data recently published by the Pew Research Center.33 
Table 5.1 displays the frequencies for each variable used in the analysis 
(see Appendix).
Since household income may be regarded as an important indicator 
of economic success, it figured as the dependent variable in this brief study. 
Respondents placed their household income within one of the following 
five brackets: ‘less than 10,000 yuan’ (14.4 per cent), ‘10,001–15,000 yuan’ 
(4.9 per cent), ‘15,001–30,000 yuan’ (25.9 per cent), ‘30,001–50,000 
yuan’ (14.7 per cent) and ‘50,001 and up’ (36.2 per cent).34
Party membership and education figure as the main independent 
variables. Both party membership and education should be positively cor-
related with household income. Roughly 6 per cent of the respondents 
self-identified as party members, which corresponds to the percentage of 
party members in the overall population. Likewise, the level of education 
among respondents falls within one of the following seven categories: 
‘below primary school’, ‘primary school’, ‘junior school’, ‘high school’, ‘col-
lege’, ‘Bachelor’s’ and ‘Master’s’. Overall, 17 per cent of those interviewed 
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received an undergraduate or graduate degree. To test whether other vari-
ables have an impact on household income, four demographic control 
variables were included in the analysis – gender, residence, region (‘east-
ern’, ‘central’ and ‘western’), and ethnicity (Han and non-Han).35
Besides demographic characteristics, I was interested to test whether 
expectations about the role of the state in society are linked to income 
levels. To capture the preferences of the population regarding state inter-
vention, survey respondents were asked the following question: What is 
more important in Chinese society: that everyone be free to pursue their 
life’s goals without interference from the state or that the state plays an 
active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need? Thirty-
five per cent of the respondents prefer a less intrusive state (that is, free-
dom from state intervention), while 49 per cent opt for a stronger state 
providing for people in need (that is, equality). Even though most Chi-
nese prefer state-sponsored redistribution and protection, one-third of 
the respondents opted for freedom from state intervention.
Beliefs in upward mobility may be associated with household income 
levels. To measure the belief in upward mobility, interviewees were asked 
the following question: How easy or difficult is it in China for a young 
person to get a better job and to become wealthier than his or her parents 
were  –  very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult or very difficult? 
Fifty-seven per cent of respondents stated optimistically that it is easy/
somewhat easy to get a job and become wealthier than their parents.36
To test whether party membership, education, and mobility and stat-
ist beliefs predict household income levels, an ordered probit regression 
was implemented using STATA. I started the analysis with a baseline 
model and then entered additional variables of interest, as well as an inter-
action term. Table 5.2 (see Appendix) displays detailed estimates of the 
effects of each of the variables on income levels. Age, education, resi-
dence, region, party membership, belief in upward mobility, and the inter-
action term between party affiliation and orientation towards the state 
predict household income.37
To ease the interpretation of results, I plot in figure 5.2 the average 
marginal effects and predictive margins of the relevant predictors across 
the five income levels. Age has a negative effect on income, which is par-
ticularly notable at incomes above 30,000 yuan (figure 5.2A). By contrast, 
education has a positive effect on income (figure 5.2B). Specifically, edu-
cation best predicts incomes above 50,000 yuan. Similarly, the chances to 
reach the upper income brackets are higher in cities and towns compared 
to villages. Given the existing literature on the urban-rural income gap, this 
finding is hardly surprising. Furthermore, in line with previous studies, 
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Fig. 5.2  The average marginal effects for age and education and the 
predictive margins for party affiliation across age groups. Source: 
Author’s interviews.
regions matter as well. Compared to respondents situated in the Eastern 
region, those in the less developed Western and Central parts of the coun-
try are less likely to move up to higher income brackets.
Party membership has a significant and differentiated impact on 
income level. The odds ratio of 0.8 in Model 1 and Model 2 reveals that 
non-members compared to party members are 20 per cent less likely to 
have higher incomes. However, the predictive margins in figure 5.2D point 
to the non-linear effect of party membership across different income lev-
els. While party membership seems clearly to be a bonus for households 
with incomes over 50,000 yuan, it has a slight negative impact on those 
in the first (below 10,000) and third income brackets (15,000–30,000). 
No effect can be observed in the case of the second (large X) and fourth 
income group (squares).
To track how the effect of party membership changes with age, 
I  have plotted the predictive margins of party membership on income 
across age groups in Figure 5.2C. For those in the highest income bracket, 
the bonus effect of party membership diminishes with age. By contrast, 
we observe a small increase in the impact of party membership on indi-
viduals in the first (under 10,000 yuan) and third income groups 
(15,000–30,000 yuan) over time.
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The beliefs in upward mobility correlate incompletely with income 
levels. Such beliefs have no impact on the second and fourth income 
groups. On the other hand, the upper-income individuals think that it is 
relatively easy to climb up the economic ladder. Still, we cannot assert with 
certainty the direction of causality. It is not clear whether strong beliefs in 
upward mobility help these individuals reach the highest income bracket, or 
whether such beliefs are acquired after their income increases. When it comes 
to attitudes toward state intervention, the interaction term in Model 4 (see 
table 5.2) between party membership and state intervention is significant 
beyond the 5 per cent level. Those in the lower income brackets who are 
unaffiliated with the party expect the state to protect those in need. Inter-
estingly enough, this group exhibits stronger support for an interventionist 
welfare state compared to party members in the same income bracket.
Next, I was interested in exploring the relationship between social 
mobility beliefs and perceptions of economic change at the individual 
level. Intuitively, one would expect that the losers in the economic transi-
tion should hold weak beliefs in upward mobility. I ran a cross-tabulation to 
explore this conjecture (see figure 5.3). To capture individual perceptions 
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of economic change, survey participants were asked whether their finan-
cial situation has improved or deteriorated over the last five years. The 
majority of respondents mentioned that, compared to 2007, their financial 
situation was better in 2012. Sixty-two per cent of those who were better 
off stated that it was easier to find a job and get wealthy than during their 
parents’ time. Surprisingly, 70 per cent of those who were worse off in 
2012 believed that it was easy or somewhat easy to get wealthier than their 
parents. Thirty-seven per cent of those whose situation improved and 
29 per cent of those worse off found it very difficult or somewhat difficult 
to get wealthy in China. If anything, compared to losers (that is, individuals 
whose economic situation deteriorated), the winners were slightly less 
confident that finding a job was easier than during their parents’ time. 
Unexpectedly, we found that optimistic beliefs in intergenerational mobil-
ity remain resilient even when individuals face economic hardship.
Implications for the future of the China model
State-sponsored capitalism in China today is stuck midway between a 
command economy and a market system. The five-year plans, the guid-
ing role of the CPC, the state-controlled banking sector, the dominance 
of the large state-owned corporations, all remind us of the traditional 
command economy. On the other hand, the rise of billionaires, the priva-
tisation reforms, the growing private sector, the conspicuous consump-
tion of Western luxury goods, the hard-budget constraints for small and 
medium enterprises, the support of free trade in an era of increasing 
American protectionism, and the heavy investments in US treasury bonds, 
all feature as novel elements of the socialist market system. So far, this 
mixed economy has produced high levels of economic growth as well as 
sharp wealth disparities.
Four implications can be drawn from this exploration of China’s 
un equal economic growth. First, it is important to call attention to the flex-
ibility of the CPC in the absence of real political liberalisation. It has slowly 
but surely adapted to the new economic environment. Knowing that pri-
vate entrepreneurs complain about unfair competition from state-owned 
enterprises, key businesspeople from the private sector were invited to 
connect with the party-state. The party even began setting up cells within 
the leading domestic and foreign private companies. However, it is not 
the emergence of the private sector per se, but the conspicuous consump-
tion patterns pervasive among the wealthy elites and party cadres that 
raise the greatest problem for the CPC. In the long run, despite the party-
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state’s incontestable success in reducing poverty, consumerist excesses 
among political and economic elites might give rise to the perception that 
the existing socio-economic inequalities are unfair. To counteract this by-
product of economic growth, CPC’s frugality campaign aims at aligning 
the behaviour of party officials with the egalitarian ethos of the official 
ideology.
Second, the relationship between politicians and capitalists is one 
of asymmetrical interdependence. The new wealthy elites and the party-
state are already bound together by a dense web of institutional and 
structural ties. More than half of the 100 wealthiest Chinese occupy or 
have occupied a public office, among them Jack Ma, the wealthiest Chi-
nese and founder of Alibaba. Crucially, they are co-opted to public posi-
tions after, rather than before, they become wealthy. There are only several 
cases in which party-state officials became billionaires after ‘plunging into 
the sea’ of commerce (xiahai). In their relationship with the party-state, 
the wealthy elites enjoy a privileged position. While the party-state may 
use coercion and engage in selective nationalisation, it largely depends 
on the wealthy elites to achieve economic growth, maintain high employ-
ment levels, ensure political stability and expand the country’s global 
reach. With the nomenklatura firmly in power, China’s insecure capital-
ists are nudged to expand and invest globally. Some of them hedge their 
bets and acquire a second citizenship, but in the long run, this inter-
dependent relationship between the party-state and the extremely rich 
will inevitably consolidate into one of the cornerstones of the Chinese 
economic model.
Third, despite the existence of corrupt practices, the Chinese sys-
tem incorporates meritocratic elements. The preceding statistical analy-
sis has revealed that education, among other factors, functions as the 
strongest predictor of income. Undoubtedly, guanxi (that is, informal net-
works), as numerous scholars have pointed out, play an important role in 
Chinese society. Still, education stands out as more important than party 
affiliation as a determinant of income. The crucial ramification of this 
finding is that in the midst of radical economic transformations, the party-
state successfully shaped an environment in which income is at least par-
tially a function of education. In other words, the existing system tends 
to reward highly educated individuals.
Finally, these findings have to be interpreted in light of Xi’s Chinese 
Dream initiative (Zhongguo meng) and the larger theme of national reju-
venation (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing). Leaving aside their ideological 
content, both initiatives aim at instilling pride in China’s economic 
accomplishments, always contrasted with the ‘hundred years of national 
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 humiliation’. It is not clear whether the population has bought into the 
promise of the Chinese Dream, an expression conjuring up the middle-
class American Dream. In this sense, it is remarkable that most Chinese 
hold robust, optimistic beliefs in upward mobility. The strong beliefs in 
upward mobility remain resilient even when an individual experiences a 
deterioration of her economic situation. Most Chinese perceive sufficient 
opportunities for upward mobility within the current hybrid system. 
Despite unequal growth, most of the population supports the mixed 
economy, while continuing to hold durable statist beliefs. At the same 
time, the resilient optimistic beliefs regarding upward mobility in the 
context of rising wealth and income inequality may simply be a matter of 
perception. Americans, for instance, hold extremely strong beliefs in the 
meritocracy of their economic system in spite of its low social mobility 
when compared to other Western economies. Further research would 
need to elucidate how the strong beliefs in upward mobility among China’s 
population contribute to the stability of the current economic and politi-
cal system. Until then, such perceptions should be cautiously interpreted 
as indicators of an optimistic popular mood prevailing inside the Middle 
Kingdom during its rapid economic rise.
Appendix
Table 5.1 Frequencies of the independent and dependent variables
Weighted N Percent
Dependent 
Variable
Household annual 
income
Less than 10,000 yuan 319 12.0
10,001 to 15,000 yuan 134 5.0
15,001 to 30,000 yuan 721 27.1
30,001 to 50,000 yuan 413 15.5
50,001 and up 1071 40.3
Total 2658 100.0
Factor Gender Female 1349 50.8
Male 1309 49.2
Total 2658 100.0
CPC member No 2504 94.2
Yes 154 5.8
Total 2658 100.0
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Table 5.1 (continued)
Weighted N Percent
Ethnicity Han 2543 95.7
Non-Han 115 4.3
Total 2658 100.0
Region East 1473 55.4
Centre 608 22.9
West 577 21.7
Total 2658 100.0
Belief in Upward 
Mobility
Somewhat easy 1272 47.9
Somewhat difficult 823 31.0
Very easy 368 13.8
Very difficult 195 7.3
Total 2658 100.0
 Residence City 1080 40.6
Town 469 17.6
Rural location 1109 41.7
Total 2658 100.0
 State Intervention Nobody in need 1550 58.3
Freedom to pursue  
life’s goals without 
interference
1108 41.7
Total 2658 100.0
Covariates Age (Range) 18–86 2658 100.0
Education Below primary school 112 4.2
Primary school 388 14.6
Junior school 835 31.4
High school 872 32.8
College 305 11.5
Bachelor’s degree 140 5.3
Master’s degree 6 .2
Total 2658 100
Source: Author’s interviews.
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The revival of Marxism in China
Could it herald a Communist Reformation?
Heiko Khoo
Introduction
Since 1979, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has presided over a 
system that generated the most dramatic economic development and 
improvement in living standards in history. The CPC uses state planning 
through its command over publicly owned enterprises and banks to attain 
its objectives.1 However, capitalist exploitation and grotesque levels of 
inequality coexist with the Party’s exclusive rule. Recently, the CPC gen-
eral secretary and China’s president, Xi Jinping, reemphasised the criti-
cal role of socialist, Marxist and communist ideas to the party’s policies, 
projects and perspectives.
In this chapter, I will use two influential theories of socialism to 
examine China’s system – first, that of the Soviet economist Evgeny Preo-
brazhensky; and second, that of the Hungarian economist János Kornai.
My own definition of socialism conforms to Preobrazhensky’s, which 
is based on classical Marxist theory. This holds that a socialist economy 
will be more advanced, and its political system will be more democratic, 
than any capitalist system. Public ownership will dominate the economy 
and the management, administration and planning system will operate 
under the democratic control of the workforce and wider society. I also 
accept Leon Trotsky’s Marxist critique of the Soviet Union, which offers a 
coherent and logical explanation as to why the Soviet system became 
bureaucratic and dictatorial.
According to this theoretical tradition, those states which self- 
identified as socialist never were. Rather they were systems undergoing 
transition from backward capitalism to socialism. This approach to the 
transition to a socialist economy underpinned Preobrazhensky’s analysis 
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of the Soviet Union under the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s. 
He envisaged a prolonged period in which a socialist government, through 
its monopolistic command over the largest and most important state enter-
prises and banks, gradually accumulates resources from the private sec-
tor economy and lays the material basis for a socialist economy. 
Preobrazhensky called this process original socialist accumulation. His 
theoretical framework also considered how class conflicts help to shape 
the direction in which society moves. This long view of socialist transfor-
mation allows for the possibility that either capitalism or socialism will 
eventually triumph. I believe that this perspective can be used to capture 
the fundamental features of China’s state-led development and explains 
how it incorporates and exploits capitalist features.
However, both Trotsky and Preobrazhensky were killed, yet the 
bureaucratic and dictatorial system in the Soviet Union remained firmly 
in command and acquired new features, which they never observed. 
Furthermore, after 1945, similar regimes took power in China, Eastern 
Europe and some other countries. These governments self-defined as 
socialist and were also identified as socialist in mainstream Western 
thought.
The second definition of socialism that I use is that developed by 
János Kornai. His comprehensive analysis of ‘real-existing socialist’ states 
studies the basic characteristics of those systems and their variants, and 
it includes all those states which appeared in the twentieth century. This 
provides a range of invaluable tools with which to interpret and forecast 
events in contemporary China. Indeed, in the 1980s, Kornai’s influence 
towered above that of any other contemporary foreign economist in Chi-
nese debates about economic reform. Chinese economists and senior 
leaders keenly studied his analysis of the relationship between shortage, 
investment hunger, and soft budget constraints. He proposed that the 
eradication of shortage would follow from expanding market competi-
tion. His policy suggestions sought to facilitate moves towards a more 
efficient economic system.2
However, when Kornai’s magnum opus The Socialist System3 was first 
published in 1992, the drama of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the col-
lapse of the socialist bloc overshadowed this sophisticated and compre-
hensive investigation into the causes of its failure. Hence, it was largely 
ignored despite being highly praised by experts in the field.4
I employ Kornai’s definitions of socialism in most of this chapter. 
This is despite my own inclination to define ‘real-existing socialist’  systems 
as ‘bureaucratic socialism’, as distinct from a possible democratic form of 
socialism. This is because by using Kornai’s definition of  socialism to study 
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China, it is possible to identify common features and trends that appeared 
in other socialist states.
I reject Kornai’s recent contention that China no longer fits within 
his definition of socialism and that it is now a capitalist system. I argue 
instead that his neglected concepts of the ‘revolutionary transitional era’ 
and of ‘self-management’ under socialism should be used to understand 
the way that social unrest affects and influences the CPC and its ideologi-
cal orientation.
During the New Economic Policy in the 1920s, Preobrazhensky 
developed his theory of original socialist accumulation.5 This provides a 
Marxist method with which to assess how systemic contradictions appear 
in conflicts between economic forms and social classes. I will use these 
insights to reflect on China today.
China’s rapid economic development is synonymous with the growth 
of the working class. I examine the research of Yu Jianrong, who studies 
outbursts of workers and peasants’ unrest, in order to consider how this 
might influence the balance of forces inside the CPC. I suggest that Xi 
Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign and his revival of the centrality of 
Marxist ideology is a manifestation of this process. Thus, in contrast to 
the assumption that Marxism is a zombie philosophy in China, I believe 
that the ossification of Marxist ideas and the corruption of power may 
eventually provoke something akin to a communist Reformation; and that 
the CPC leadership is dusting off its claim to Marxist credentials in order 
to avoid such an outcome.
Systems analysis and development economics
Joseph Stiglitz and Justin Yifu Lin6 both worked at the leadership level of 
the World Bank and engaged in detailed discussions with China’s top poli-
cymakers. They elevated growth, equitable development and govern-
ment policies above neo-liberal economic prescriptions. They rejected the 
big-bang Soviet and East European transition, in which the rapid anchor-
ing of property rights was regarded as the decisive benchmark for pro-
gress, in favour of the gradualist evolution of markets and incentives as 
the precondition for successful market transition.
For Yifu Lin, exploiting comparative advantage (in capital, labour 
and other resources) necessitates the promotion of corresponding poli-
cies. The typical pattern of investment in heavy industry by socialist states 
(where capital is scarce) is regarded as a wasteful and costly policy that, 
by defying comparative advantage, negatively distorts the entire econ-
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omy. Stiglitz and Yifu Lin tend to avoid explicitly employing socialist or 
capitalist labels to categorise China’s system. Instead, their emphasis is 
on policy measures designed to produce development. Stiglitz believes 
that China’s system reveals the significance of government policy, and 
indeed of fuzzy property relations in developmental economics, and in 
economic policy formulation more generally. Stiglitz says:
For me, the central questions posed by development are systemic: 
How can we change the organization of society (including the organ-
ization of the economy) in ways that increase its openness to new 
ideas and that facilitate the change leading to increases in the well-
being of most citizens? And what can we, as developmental practi-
tioners, do to promote the change in societal organization in that 
direction? These are questions of the kind that used to be asked by 
those engaged in the analysis of comparative economic systems. But 
that sub-discipline focused on comparing socialist, communist, and 
market economies, and with the fall of the Iron Curtain, interest in 
the sub-discipline waned. I am suggesting that key to understand-
ing development is in fact an analysis of comparative economic 
systems, with particular focus on the development context of what 
kind of economic system(s), institutions, and policies most pro-
mote  the societal change that leads to sustained and inclusive 
development.7
Kornai and Preobrazhensky’s theories of socialism
I approach the study of China by utilising a comparative analysis focus-
ing on socialism as a means to investigate its contemporary social system 
and developmental dynamics. I employ two theories of socialism, which 
I regard as relevant and complementary. The first is that of Janos 
 Kornai – whose theory of socialism is highly respected in academia and 
has been deeply influential inside China. The second is Preobrazhensky’s 
Marxist development theory elaborated in the 1920s, which is concerned 
with economic development during the transition between capitalism 
and socialism.
Preobrazhensky’s ideas were closely aligned with Leon Trotsky’s. 
Both believed that the backwardness of the Soviet Union precluded the 
establishment of a socialist economy and society, unless there was an inter-
national socialist transformation. Thus, the Soviet Union was a treated as a 
society in transition between backward capitalism and  socialism. Leon 
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Trotsky’s Marxist critique of the Soviet system under Stalin stands out as 
the earliest and most penetrating explanation of the contradictory rela-
tionship between Marxism and the ideology and practice of the ruling 
communist party and its bureaucratic state. Trotsky saw this ideology as a 
falsification of Marxism used to justify the dictatorial power of a bureau-
cratic caste ruling over the working class in the name of socialism.8
Kornai is probably the most pre-eminent theorist and critic of real-
existing socialist systems alive today. His definition of socialism begins 
where Trotsky’s theory ends. Thus, he views the bureaucratic system 
established in the Soviet Union under Stalin as the basic archetype of 
socialism which, after 1953, was supplemented by reform socialism. How-
ever, unlike Trotsky and Preobrazhensky, Kornai’s research examines the 
full life cycle of those socialist states that appeared in the twentieth cen-
tury. So, whilst I concur with Trotsky’s challenge to the socialist defini-
tion of the Soviet system, nevertheless I employ Kornai’s concepts of 
socialism in this chapter, which differentiates between the dynamics of 
capitalism and socialism in the real systems that have held power in many 
countries over the last one hundred years.
Nowadays, Kornai regards socialism as a failed experiment and 
attributes the success of China’s system to its having become capitalist. 
I believe that his assessment of China as a capitalist system is inconsist-
ent and incorrect, and that his general theory of socialism provides a far 
superior method for anyone trying to understand China today. Further-
more, I maintain that if Preobrazhensky’s theory of socialist development 
is combined with Kornai’s theory, this reinforces and expands on Kor-
nai’s original analysis of the dynamics of socialist political economy. 
I also suggest that two of Kornai’s neglected socialist concepts – the ‘revo-
lutionary transitional era’ and ‘self-management’  –  hold contemporary 
vitality and relevance for understanding social unrest, class conflicts, 
and ideological contradictions in contemporary China.
Kornai’s pioneering method of analysis isolates the fundamental fea-
tures of such socialist states and identifies how and why the existence of 
these core features automatically produces and reproduces the system.
Kornai isolates three primary features that distinguish capitalism 
from socialism.
Under socialism:
 1. Rule of a communist state and ideology
 2. The dominance of public ownership
 3. The dominance of bureaucratic economic coordination
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Under capitalism:
 1. State and political power is not hostile to private property
 2. Private ownership dominates
 3. Market-mediated coordination of economic activity dominates
I argue that Kornai’s socialist theory still provides a powerful lens 
with which to examine China’s system, and that the image of China that 
emerges bears an uncanny resemblance to his core textbook examples of 
reform socialism. In addition, his neglected concepts of the revolutionary-
transitional era and self-management merit close attention in this study.
Kornai’s method of contrasting the basic characteristics of social-
ism and capitalism is rooted in Karl Marx’s thought, and I argue that there 
are important similarities with the method employed by the Soviet econ-
omist Preobrazhensky. Both Kornai and Preobrazhensky analysed how 
contradictory pressures from both capitalist and socialist economic laws 
operate in a backward socialist economy.
Karl Marx as Xi Jinping’s guide
Xi Jinping’s speech to commemorate the 200th anniversary of Karl Marx’s 
birth was broadcast to the world on live television. In the speech, Xi 
claimed that Marxism is the guiding force of the CPC, which is the true 
inheritor of socialist, Marxist and communist thought, as adapted and 
implemented in a Chinese context. He provided multiple examples of how 
the study of Marxism should help Communists to propagate ideas and 
policies in line with China’s Two-Century Goals.9
In China’s system, what those at the top say is by no means an arbi-
trary cacophony of noise. Speeches by China’s leaders are prepared long 
in advance and are the product of an intense process of discussion, debate, 
argument and compromise. This is how the Politburo hammers out its 
common line, which tens of millions of party members are expected to 
study and propagate to the wider public. Ideas emanating from the top 
determine the ideology and shape the policy framework for government 
planning and implementation. Documents and speeches by the leader-
ship affect the exercise of power in a way unknown in Western political 
systems. The party controls nearly every organisation that wields power 
and influence in society and guides the country’s bureaucratic system of 
administration and governance.
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Before Xi Jinping became general secretary of the party in 2012 and 
president of the republic in 2013, the consensus view in Western sinol-
ogy and economics was that China was moving towards the elimination 
of Marxism and socialism from party ideology.10 However, in his speech 
on Marx, President Xi boldly restated that Communists must be inspired 
and guided by the vision of communism11 – which is supposed to be a 
society where material abundance satisfies everyone’s needs; exploita-
tion ends, the state begins to wither away, and money ceases to be the 
medium of economic coordination. Of course, you cannot judge some-
one by what they say about themselves, but it is nevertheless important 
to understand why they say it. Is this renewed focus on Marx merely a 
ritual, or does it tell us something about how the CPC’s ideology relates 
to class relations today?
The recent repression of Marxist-inspired students at Peking Uni-
versity for standing up for workers’ rights appears to confirm that the 
CPC is opposed to elementary Marxist beliefs, critical analysis and inde-
pendent workers’ organisations.12 However, in all real-existing socialist 
states13 critical Marxists were repressed, as were those attempting to form 
independent organisations.
The CPC leadership responds to Marxist critics as if they constitute 
a direct challenge to official doctrines and practices; advocates of liberal 
democratic values are not treated as a similar threat to their authority. 
Thus, Martin Luther’s challenge to the Catholic Church comes to mind as 
an apposite comparison.
The dominant assumption in economics is that the dynamism of an 
economy comes overwhelmingly from its private sector. In relation to 
China, this means that socialised and publicly owned sectors are treated 
as if they are a drag on efficiency. Therefore, investigation into the posi-
tive contribution that comes from state intervention, public ownership, 
socialistic planning policies and coordination mechanisms has been side-
lined or ignored.
The CPC leadership regards Marxism as an ideology whose social-
ist and communist objectives are broadly supported by party members, 
and by the poor and the working classes. Indeed, China’s rulers claim 
that only Marxism can guide the party and appease its most important 
constituency of discontents.
In China, party and state involvement in society is ubiquitous. Pol-
icy is made through long-term plans that structure the CPC’s relation-
ship to the economy. The party dominates and controls every social 
organisation – from women’s groups, to youth groups, trade unions, the 
churches, and so forth, as well as the entire state apparatus. However, 
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private economic enterprises are permitted to function relatively inde-
pendently.
When the CPC mobilises the bureaucracy to implement its policy 
and planning decisions, it draws on vast entities and networks in the econ-
omy and society to attain its objectives and goals. Private capitalists and 
party officials often collaborate through mutually beneficial nepotistic net-
works. But, whenever it is deemed expedient, the party curtails the free-
dom of private economic actors.
China’s economic stimulus programme after the 2008 financial crash 
stands out as a model of crisis containment. A massive investment pro-
gramme was launched to overcome the negative impact of the world cri-
sis of capitalism. The expanding influence of the state versus the private 
economy has been well documented over the last 10 years.14 It is mani-
fest in two key factors. The first is the banking system, which channels 
the majority of corporate and individual savings into state investment to 
implement government policies. The second is the increased role for state 
enterprises and other public sector bodies. They draw on state funds to 
fulfil objectives defined in five-year plans and other state priorities.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative constitutes the largest international 
investment programme by any country since the Marshall Plan after World 
War II, which was a geopolitical strategic investment by the United States 
of America designed to contain the threat of communism. With Belt and 
Road, Xi Jinping has shifted Chinese foreign policy from a gradual rise 
without rocking the boat – promoted by Deng Xiaoping after 1979 – to a 
new stage, where China shows off its prowess, power and strength to the 
world.
Change towards a more democratic system, accompanied by the rule 
of law, constitutionalism, and a free-market economy, remains the end-
game of most capitalist visions for China’s transition. However, 40 years 
since China’s reform began, Maoist remnants are still said to haunt the 
present. This idea, that socialist historical legacies are hindering China’s 
development is a rather weak argument, as the reform era (1979–2018) 
has lasted 10 years longer than the Maoist era (1949–78). Yet the Com-
munist Party remains firmly in power, public ownership continues to pre-
dominate, and economic planning steers the macro-economy despite the 
widespread presence of capitalist economic and social relations.
In China, the term planned economy refers to Mao Zedong’s regime 
after the 1950s. However, surely a planned economy must be judged 
by the degree to which its macro-level economic and social development 
plans are actually realised? Encouraging private investment and foreign 
direct investment in joint ventures generated China’s present mix of 
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 state-private ownership in large enterprises, as well as its macro-level 
plan-market relations. Moves away from ubiquitous state ownership did 
not result in the dominance of private ownership; and China’s new plan-
ning system actually became more effective under the new constellation 
of ownership forms and the liberalisation of most prices.
The inability to find close analogies that capture the dynamics of 
the Chinese economy has perplexed analysts from a wide spectrum of 
theoretical perspectives. Many who regard China as capitalist advocate 
more profound and accelerated pro-market changes.15 For example, the 
prominent US sinologist David Shambaugh argues that China must expe-
rience significant instability and decline before it can reboot and flourish, 
based on a much more open system.16 However, despite multiple predic-
tions of the collapse of China, it failed to materialise either in 1989, or 
after the Great Recession of 2008–9.
Kornai’s theories of socialism and capitalism 
in relation to China
Kornai identifies socialism with two primary archetypes: classical and 
reform socialism. Classical socialism is based on a planned and national-
ised economy combined with a totalitarian political regime – such as Sta-
lin’s Russia from the 1930s until 1953. This kind of government brooks 
no dissent and severely restricts market-based activity and private own-
ership. Kornai’s second type is reform socialism, which is generally pre-
sented as a disintegrating system. It is the sort of regime that existed under 
Mikhail Gorbachev in the period from 1986 to 1991. There is greater intel-
lectual and economic freedom and openness in political discourse. How-
ever, exclusive rule by the party, public ownership of the commanding 
heights of the economy, and bureaucratic coordination continue. Under 
reform socialism in Hungary and Poland from the 1960s to the 1980s, a 
significant private sector coexisted with the three foundations of the 
socialist system. Kornai shows that a loss of faith in Marxist-Leninist ide-
ology under reform socialism eventually heralds the dissolution of com-
munist parties and states, in advance of a revolutionary change of system 
to capitalism.17
The revolutionary transitional era is a third type of socialism in Kor-
nai’s schema, which he regards as a transient state. It is a period when 
enthusiasm for the revolution is at its peak. Sacrifice, commitment and 
faith help to mobilise the energy of the masses, and this enables the revo-
lutionary government to establish its authority and forge a new society. 
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This is the type of system that existed in the first years of the Russian 
Revolution. At times it operates as ‘self-management’. However, after the 
revolutionary awakening and seizure of state power, emphasis shifts to 
the more mundane tasks of development, economic growth and techni-
cal progress. The need to resolve questions of everyday life leads to stabi-
lisation and bureaucratisation as mass participation in revolutionary 
politics slackens off. The ossification and consolidation of bureaucratic 
power transforms the revolutionary transitional era into a system of 
reform socialism or classical socialism.
Nonetheless, Kornai’s sequencing of socialism does not follow a 
purely linear path from the revolutionary transitional era to a classical 
system, and then from reform socialism to systemic collapse. For exam-
ple, Kornai regards the Cultural Revolution in China (1966–76) as a vari-
ant of the revolutionary transitional system. Mao Zedong unleashed this 
movement, which challenged bureaucratic authority and power, after the 
classical system was already consolidated.18
It is Kornai’s current view that although the primary characteristic 
of socialism – communist party rule and Marxist-Leninist ideology – main-
tains its dominant position in China, the internal corruption of the party 
and its association and affinity with private business make it a de facto 
agent of capitalism.
In adopting this stance, Kornai modifies his proposition that exclu-
sive communist party rule and Marxist ideology is the first structural 
precondition of socialism.19 He now argues that the two basic eco-
nomic factors – the predominance of public ownership and bureaucratic 
planning – define socialism, provided the ruling power acts in a hostile 
way towards capitalism. Capitalism, by contrast, is based on private own-
ership and market coordination guided by price signals, where the ruling 
power is not hostile to capitalist property. Marxist ideology and the CPC’s 
dictatorship have therefore declined in importance in Kornai’s schema. 
The centrality of ideology is replaced by a more amorphous concept – the 
degree of hostility from the ruling political power towards capitalism.
Kornai attempts to extend his method of systemic analysis to 
study capitalism in his book Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Econ-
omy: Two Essays on the Nature of Capitalism.20 This book complements 
his work on socialism. He describes capitalism as a surplus economy, 
endowed with unique creative forces.21 However, Kornai’s closest Chi-
nese colleague, Xu Chenggang, has carried out a systematic review of 
this book, using Kornai’s new arguments to analyse China today.22 But 
Xu is forced to  conclude that although China has a surplus economy, 
the commanding heights remain in state hands; and society is still 
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dominated by a  communist party-led system based on state ownership. 
Nevertheless, Xu believes that China operates a market economy with 
major distortions imposed by the state sector; for example, the state 
banking sector lends overwhelmingly to state entities rather than to the 
private sector.
Xu concludes that although China has a surplus economy, it is one 
that operates in a system of ‘state capitalism’, similar to that established 
by Lenin’s NEP in the 1920s. Indeed, Xu notes that in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping based his original concept of reform and open-
ing on the Soviet NEP. However, Lenin’s concept of state capitalism dur-
ing the NEP referred to the use of capitalist methods to revive the economy 
and strengthen the efficiency and quality of public sector enterprises. The 
NEP was designed to help overcome backwardness vis-à-vis world capi-
talism, and to establish genuine socialist enterprises on a higher techni-
cal foundation.
China, the Soviet NEP and Preobrazhensky’s theory 
of original socialist accumulation
Kornai defines the period of state capitalism during the NEP as the first 
prototype of socialism and not as a type of capitalism.23 During the NEP, 
state capitalism was not regarded as the restoration of capitalism but as a 
means to exploit capitalist methods to defend, foster, and advance the 
socialist economy. In the NEP, the state sector guided economic progress 
in order to sustain the alliance between the workers, the party, and the 
majority of peasants, whilst simultaneously stimulating economic activ-
ity through the market.
At the time of the NEP, the main problem identified by critical Marx-
ists like Preobrazhensky, organised in the Left Opposition,24 was that the 
tiny urban working class would be swamped by the interests of rich peas-
ants, market traders and middlemen. They skimmed off part of the sur-
plus and operated as economic actors driven by profit-seeking activity. 
These activities spontaneously shaped and influenced the direction of 
investment in the economy. The Left Opposition feared that a counter-
revolution serving capitalist interests would be supported by the right 
wing of the party.
Alongside the emergence of capitalist forces during the NEP, the 
particular interests of bureaucratic agencies of the party and state also 
grew in scope and influence. As Kornai explains, as a general rule, bureau-
cratic power constantly seeks its self-expansion, and where there is no 
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organic system of control over this expansion process, the phenomena of 
unconstrained ‘investment hunger’ in a planned economy appears, which 
eventually produces a shortage economy.25
Reflecting the pressure of such bureaucratic interests, Stalin brought 
an end to the NEP in 1928. Private capital and the peasantry were 
repressed and the economy and agriculture were socialised and subordi-
nated to state planning.26
Preobrazhensky, the leading economist of the Left Opposition, envis-
aged a long-term battle between two economic systems in a socialist 
state. In his view, advanced socialism should function according to uni-
versal planning principles. However, where the public economy is not 
developed or sophisticated enough to ensure that socialist planning is 
effective, planning principles must try to control and channel capitalist 
laws. Where the capitalist ‘law of value’ predominates, the economy is 
organised around the pursuit of profit, which spontaneously reproduces 
capitalist social relations. The state economy exploits its monopoly over 
the commanding heights of the economy and banking to unify the power 
of its industries and promote development according to plan. This requires 
the accumulation and transfer of resources from capitalist and petty capi-
talist entities into the hands of the state.
Preobrazhensky’s theory of original socialist accumulation elabo-
rates a Marxist method to guide the economic transformation from back-
ward capitalism to socialism.27 He defines the process of transition to 
socialism as the epoch of original socialist accumulation, which he expected 
to last for decades. In this period, planning must be used to carefully steer 
the economy and society to catch up with, and eventually overtake, capi-
talist ownership forms and market coordination. The state economy 
reveals its superiority and strength once a sufficient level of economic 
competence and development is attained. In the era of original socialist 
accumulation, the socialist state must ameliorate, amend and contain the 
impact of the law of value, to achieve party and state objectives. Success-
ful economic policy enables the state to introduce socialist measures 
such as higher wages, better conditions, social services, healthcare provi-
sion, and so on.
‘Never forget the class struggle!’28
Yu Jianrong is probably the most influential scholar monitoring social 
unrest in China today. He works at the Social Problems Research Centre 
of the Rural Development Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of 
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Social Sciences. His analysis, published in 2007, shows how protests in 
China affect the party and state.
The CPC’s historical ideology and legitimacy declares that the ‘work-
ers are the ruling class’ and ‘peasants are allies’ (of the ruling class). 
Yet, the capitalists’ status has been raised far more in the past dec-
ades of reform. The nation is entering a stage of being a well-off 
society while hundreds of millions of peasants and workers cannot 
make ends meet. This gap between reality and professed ideology 
will inevitably shake the political root of the CPC’s ideology and 
stability of its rule. Avoiding the escalation of social conflict will 
require, at a minimum, a better protection of the fundamental rights 
and interests of all citizens, particularly workers and peasants.29
Yu’s research into social struggles in modern China has identified 
several features of mounting worker discontent: the sudden and sponta-
neous nature of disputes, disbelief in official responses, distrust of local 
authorities, and faith in the national government.30 Protests generally con-
centrate on rights specified in the law. Modern means of communication 
have enabled militancy to be energetically channelled into exposing dis-
crepancies between the arbitrary exercise of local power and the positive 
legal rights of the poor. The subaltern classes have discovered powerful 
methods of unifying their actions and strengthening their morale, whilst 
avoiding the repressive measures traditionally associated with dissidence 
and rebellion.31
Resistance to privatisation and the restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises came to a head in the late 1990s, when overt workers’ unrest 
by state employees often drew on Maoist ideology and slogans. These 
protests slowed down privatisation, ‘convincing the state to hold on to a 
significant number of large enterprises’.32
Radical changes in labour contracts and welfare rights increased 
the power of employers and shifted welfare provision outside of factory 
walls by means of contributory insurance plans. New labour laws were 
largely ignored by private and foreign enterprises, which provided most 
of the new employment opportunities in urban areas. Labour unrest in 
the mid-1990s often took the form of ‘short-sit ins outside local labour 
offices aimed at provoking government officials into ordering capitalists 
to obey labour laws’.33
Legal measures to address grievances have become a focal point for 
workers’ unrest. Claims and disputes taken to arbitration rose dramati-
cally throughout the last 20 years, both for individual and collective 
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cases.34 This has been particularly evident in high-growth regions. Work-
ers and state bodies treat arbitration seriously. In the event of local 
 officials conspiring with employers, workers commonly resort to collec-
tive action to secure the active intervention of higher-level government 
 agencies.35
Yu reports that workers at the Tonghua Iron and Steel Company 
went on strike against a takeover bid by the privately owned Jianlong 
Steel Holding Company in 2009.
On July  24, 2009 Tonghua Iron and Steel had a strike [during 
which] the general manager was killed. Afterwards, [workers] in 
old state-owned enterprises in many places came up with slogans. 
One of them was ‘When the Tonghua Big Boss is doing [bad] 
things, what should one do about it?’ This scared a lot of bosses at 
state-owned factories that were being restructured so much that 
they didn’t show up for work. Why? They were afraid of being 
killed.36
Surprisingly perhaps, popular opinion was not opposed to the kill-
ing of the boss. The incident was widely seen as indicative of proletarian 
anger and popular resentment. One consequence of the strike was that 
the Jilin State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) cancelled the privatisation. Zhang Wangcheng, a professor of 
the China Labour Studies Centre at Beijing Normal University, blamed 
the trade union for the failure to pre-empt the unrest and reduce ten-
sions.37 A month later the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)38 
published a statement that privatisations are illegal unless agreed by the 
workers’ congress.39 The objective of expanding the presence of the ACFTU 
and the legal role of the Staff and Workers’ Representative Councils 
(SWRCs) as official organs of democratic management is to create pres-
sure release valves to contain unrest within the existing system of power.
Yu Jianrong’s research reveals that it tends to be people with inter-
nal knowledge and experience of the system that act as the force galva-
nising and expressing social unrest:
The foundations for a mass social movement in China may already 
be laid as there are indications that workers, peasants and the 
lower class of intellectuals are forging a common identity. Up to 
this point, workers and peasants have not yet merged into one 
coherent social group, even though they share a common social 
status and interests. The formation of their common identity and 
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goals may require an outside group that can act as the bond to 
bring workers and  peasants together. This group could be the 
20 million demobilized and retired soldiers living in rural China, 
which possesses the social capital, organizational, networking and 
mobilization capabilities to be the bridge between workers and 
peasants.
They have already been prominently contributing to peasants’ 
movements to reduce tax burdens and protect land rights. In some 
southern regions, demobilized and retired soldiers have launched 
movements to mobilize both workers and peasants. For example, in 
some regions in Hunan Province, demobilized and retired soldiers 
built a 100,000-person ‘anti-corruption brigade’ that was mainly 
comprised of laid-off workers, poor peasants and lower class intel-
lectuals. In fact, corruption may be the one factor that could bring 
workers and peasants together since both see this as the root cause 
of their current predicament and misery. In all past and current 
social conflicts that involve a combination of workers and peasants, 
their demands have universally held up anti-corruption [sic] as the 
common enemy.40
For his part, Kornai regards the corruption of China’s officials as a 
repugnant but positive factor, because the enrichment of cadres has helped 
to avert a direct conflict between capitalist interests and state bureau-
crats, who might otherwise have provoked a civil war.41 The sweeping 
anti-corruption campaign initiated by Xi Jinping is a response to the type 
of pressure described above. In recent years, the wages of state-owned 
enterprise directors were slashed and they bear no relationship to the 
global standards of remuneration for the CEOs of comparable enterprises 
internationally, or to remuneration in private enterprises in China.42 By 
taking the initiative at the top, Xi seeks to neutralise the potential for 
militant struggles that might otherwise escalate into a broader revolu-
tionary movement.
The social stratum that Yu regards as the key agent of change is 
mainly composed of disgruntled system insiders, rather than random 
angry people. And their focus is on defending the rights of the social 
classes that the party’s communist ideology claims to represent. I believe 
that this provides a coherent explanation for why Xi Jinping is dusting off 
the party’s Marxist ideology, as this serves to pre-empt and neutralise 
opposition forces that may be supported by broad layers of the urban and 
rural masses.
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Self-management as a recurrent socialist tendency
Kornai rejects the very possibility of socialism existing in combination 
with democracy.43 And he claims that this conclusion is based entirely on 
a ‘positive’ analysis, which only evaluates real-existing socialist systems 
established in the twentieth century. However, when discussing the early 
history of the Soviet Union, he notes: ‘The revolutionaries really did elect 
representatives to the bodies of the revolutionary political movements. 
In many places and for some time after the revolution had been won, the 
bodies of the new state power were chosen in real elections . . .’ a process 
that Kornai dismisses because it ‘proved to be temporary’.44
Despite the temporary nature of early Soviet systems of democratic 
control, the basic aspirations and impulses behind this assumed a more 
enduring form, which Kornai labels self-management. He defines self- 
management as a trend inspired by purely socialist ideologies that chal-
lenge bureaucratic and statist power.
According to Kornai, self-management held sway in Yugoslavia from 
1949 until the early 1990s. He regards this as a sub-variant of reform 
socialism. Self-management modifies the two core economic mechanisms 
in Kornai’s theory of socialism: public ownership and bureaucratic 
co ordination. Property rights that transfer power over enterprises from 
the managers to the workers replace public ownership; and the workers 
can dispose of the firm’s residual income. The coordination mechanisms 
of the economy are based on democratic self-governing principles rather 
than bureaucratic decisions.
This concept of self-management encompasses a diverse and broad 
historical trend. It can emerge where controls over the workers under 
classical or reform socialism weaken. The workforce is able to exercise 
considerable power over its managers. This tendency also appeared at 
the initial stage of socialist revolutions –  for example, during the Paris 
Commune, the Russian Revolution, and movements based on workers’ 
councils. However, self-management tendencies can emerge at any stage 
in the life cycle of socialist systems and reappear even after socialism has 
disappeared.45
As far as Kornai is concerned, self-management has a negative 
impact on socialist systems because it undermines economic efficiency. 
He distinguishes between market-driven decisions, which involve the hard 
budget constraint – where profit-seeking activity seeks to minimise costs; 
and the opposite tendency – the soft-budget constraint – where workers’ 
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interests are elevated above profits. Under the soft-budget constraint, 
managers come under pressure to improve the conditions of the work-
force and increase living standards. Labour discipline becomes lax and 
managers often champion the interests of their specific workplace, com-
munity and city. Part of the bureaucracy responds to this pressure by lob-
bying on behalf of the workers to secure concessions from their superiors, 
in order to maintain stability and social peace.
Kornai regards the soft-budget constraint as a general tendency in 
socialist countries, generated by the system-specific relation of forces 
inside the workplaces. Self-management, the state system in Yugoslavia, 
also appeared in a number of phases of social and political unrest in ways 
that challenged the leading role of the communist party itself; for exam-
ple, Hungary in 1956. This does not gain sufficient attention in Kornai’s 
analysis of the socialist system. Nevertheless, he shows that there is no 
universal or linear process in relation to the emergence of socialist types. 
However, the tendency towards self-management, or to some form of mass 
participatory democracy in socialist systems, appeared and reappeared 
in many of the political and social movements that challenged the ruling 
parties or leading factions within them.
Indeed, given that social unrest within socialist systems has a ten-
dency to appear as self-management, this concept sheds light on the char-
acter of workers’ struggles in China today and on the balance of forces in 
Chinese society. For example, in the process of reforming state enterprises 
during the 1980s and 1990s, lip service was paid to the democratic man-
agement rights of the workers as defined in the constitution. Under arti-
cles 16 and 17, state-owned and collective enterprises ‘practice democratic 
management through congresses of workers and staff and in other ways 
in accordance with the law’.46 During the restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises, conflicts often focused on staff and workers’ representative 
councils,47 which are legally entitled to veto and control management.48 
These legal rights are not simply remnants from the past. For example, it 
was in 2010 that the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress adopted com-
prehensive regulations seeking to extend the workers’ congress system 
throughout all Shanghai enterprises, regardless of ownership type.49
Conclusion
China’s extraordinary rate of socio-economic development is almost uni-
versally attributed to the increasing influence of the private sector, 
whereas the state sector of the economy is seen as the main fetter on its 
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future development. I adopt an alternative theoretical stance, which holds 
that China’s success is based on exploiting the advantages of public own-
ership to harness national resources and channel private sector activity 
to achieve state planning objectives. The state sector of the economy oper-
ates under the political and bureaucratic command of the CPC. This per-
mits the mobilisation of resources in ways that capitalism is unable to. 
I maintain that China’s system displays the main characteristics and many 
of the nuanced features of Kornai’s analysis of socialist systems, particu-
larly reform socialism.
Kornai’s analysis of ‘real-existing’ socialist systems in the twentieth 
century provides a comprehensive and penetrating analysis that focuses 
on the contradictions and dynamics generated by the Soviet model. His 
model of classical socialism is synonymous with the system established 
under Stalin in the 1930s. Its basic features were emulated in many coun-
tries that took an indigenous path to socialism, but the longevity of Kor-
nai’s analysis is undermined by excluding the very possibility of any other 
forms of socialism, or of new combinations of previous socialist types.
I maintain that the NEP-type policies pursued by the CPC over the 
last 40 years created a system where capitalist tendencies are contained 
by the bureaucracy whose main fear is mass unrest. And whilst China fits 
Kornai’s socialist models, as Xu Chenggang explains, the present balance 
of socialist and capitalist economic forces more closely resembles the 
Soviet NEP. This system was studied by Preobrazhensky, who elaborated 
the theory of original socialist accumulation in which socialist and capital-
ist economic and social forces engage in a long-term struggle for dominance 
in a post-revolutionary developing socialist economy.
Preobrazhensky regarded the conflict between ownership and coor-
dination forms during the NEP as a manifestation of class struggle, in a 
period where the economic and social foundations of socialism were being 
established. In China today, the struggles of the workers and poor peas-
ants revolve around issues that put the CPC under pressure to meet their 
demands. The party regards social unrest as a mortal danger, and the 
trend is for workers’ demands to be partially or fully met. The party adopts 
state plans that are designed to satisfy the growing wants of an ever-
expanding urban working class, and it tries to contain unrest within offi-
cial channels.
Simultaneously, Xi Jinping’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign 
seeks to pacify public anger at undeserved enrichment. Although grow-
ing inequality in wealth and power is mirrored inside the CPC and the 
state bureaucracy, this also means that the interests of lower level cadres 
are often aligned with the interests of the workers and peasants. By 
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 drawing on the repertoire of Marxist ideology, Xi is reasserting the par-
ty’s claim to represent the interests of the working class and the peasants. 
However, if the conflicts generated by reform socialism give rise to mass 
social unrest, and this finds expression in self-management tendencies, 
the contradictions in Chinese society may spark the communist equiva-
lent of the European Reformation.
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bureaucracy, and to report the election results to the said bureaucracy for approval.
  Cited in Anita Chan and Xiaoyang Zhu, ‘Staff and Workers’ Representative Congress: An Insti-
tutionalized Channel for Expression of Employees’ Interests?’, Chinese Sociology & Anthropol-
ogy 37 (2005): 12.
 48 Stephen Philion, Workers’ Democracy in China’s Transition from State Socialism (New York: 
Routledge, 2009); Xiaoyang Zhu and Anita Chan ‘Staff and Workers’ Representative  
Congress’.
 49 ‘Regulations of the Shanghai Municipality on the Workers Congress’, accessed 13 December 
2017, gh . eastday . com / renda / node5902 / node5908 / node6573 / u1a1729811 . html.
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China’s emerging liberal partnership 
order and Russian and US responses
Evidence from the Belt and Road Initiative 
in Eurasia
Peter Braga and Stephen G. F. Hall
Why should we expect the Chinese to act any differently than the US 
did?
John J. Mearsheimer
My good men! How long must our great Russia bow and cringe before 
China?! Just as we bowed before foul America during the Time of Trou-
bles, so now we crawl hunchbacked before the Celestial Kingdom.
Vladimir Sorokin, Day of the Oprichnik
Reforming and perfecting the existing international system does not 
mean starting over. It means pushing it to develop in a more just and 
rational direction.
Chinese President Xi Jinping
Introduction
There is unease among neighbouring and Western states about what a 
rising China – its gaining political and economic strength – will mean for 
the world. There is fear among these states, expressed by international 
relations theorist John J. Mearsheimer quoted above,1 that a rising China 
will become the same sort of domineering world power as the United 
States. This concern is starkly illustrated in Vladimir Sorokin’s fictional 
dystopia, Day of the Oprichnik.2 In the novel, Russia is not so much a 
nation, but a transit and resource extraction space for goods flowing west-
ward from China.
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The current international system is often described as a liberal 
hegemonic order, sponsored and protected by the United States.3 A lib-
eral order is open and loosely rules based. The ideal is for international 
relations to reflect such liberal traits as openness, multilateralism, human 
rights, democracy, market economics, economic and security coopera-
tion, respect for state sovereignty, and so on.4 This order is also hegem-
onic, or unipolar rather than multipolar, because it is maintained by a 
single, dominant state – the United States. This state sets clear rules and 
a hierarchical order according to its own vision for the world.5
Nonetheless, pressure is growing for a reordering of this system. 
Ambitious international collective action projects, such as the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) – a Chinese-led infrastructure mega-project, which 
aims to coordinate maritime shipping lanes (the road) with overland tran-
sit infrastructure (the belt) from Asia to Europe – appear to be shifting 
the axis of global agenda setting from Washington to Beijing. There is 
intense debate among academics and public intellectuals on the fate of 
the liberal hegemonic order.6
But what alternative to this international order does China seek to 
build? And what can be said about the reactions of major powers, such as 
the United States and Russia, to a changing international system? This 
chapter argues that tentative answers to these questions can be found in 
Russia’s and the United States’ reactions to China’s growing presence in 
Eurasia. Eurasia is the combination of the two continents of Europe and 
Asia, including (but not limited to) Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Pakistan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The answer to the first question briefly summarises academic debates 
on China’s rise. It supports the view, contrary to hawkish interpretations of 
China’s gain in influence, that China seeks to build an international order 
that closely resembles the current system, but with a greater emphasis 
on multipolarity, sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs. 
Scholar Wu Xinbo has called this a liberal partnership international order.7 
China’s system of diplomatic partnerships with Eurasian countries partici-
pating in the BRI serves as evidence for this hypothesis.
The answer to the second question argues that Russia seeks to main-
tain its status as a great power within a reordered international system. 
Its Greater Eurasia Project is a clear indication of this opportunistic strat-
egy. Additionally, the United States’ response to Chinese pressures upon 
the liberal hegemonic order has become increasingly incoherent. In the 
late 1990s and 2000s, its strategy fluctuated between engagement and 
containment. In recent years, it has leaned closer towards containment. 
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But the Trump administration has thrown this response into disarray. This 
chaos is reflected in the United States’ lack of a BRI policy and in its patchy 
support for partners in Eurasia.
Debating China’s rise
There is lively scholarly debate on China’s rise and its impact for the con-
temporary international order. To begin with, the international order 
itself is a concept fundamental to both (neo)realist and (neo)institution-
alist theory. Both camps see states as unitary actors, believe there is no 
overarching authority to enforce rules between them, and conclude states 
are forced to structure an international order among themselves.8 There-
fore, debates on the international order occur often within or between 
these two camps of theory.
For realist scholars, China’s rise tends to be associated with the loom-
ing threat of war. Issues of power transition and polarity are their main 
concerns.9 Some analysts fear that the transition from a US-led, unipolar 
international system to a multipolar or bipolar one, or to a possible future 
where China is the sole hegemon, will not be peaceful.10 They are con-
cerned the United States might attempt to balance against China’s increas-
ing strength, which will result in a military conflict; they worry about a 
Thucydides trap11 between China and the United States.12 Other realists 
argue that the structural conditions for a Thucydides trap are not pres-
ent, so conflict is unlikely.13
Institutionalist scholars focus on the principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures of the international system. They are con-
cerned for the international order’s ‘liberal traits’ of democracy, human 
rights, free markets, and economic and security cooperation.14 In gen-
eral, institutionalist views on China’s rise can be divided into three groups. 
The first group argues that China will continue to integrate into an 
expanded and somewhat rearranged liberal order.15 China’s growing inter-
connectedness to the current system means its own interests will increas-
ingly align with those of the other members of the existing liberal order.16 
The next group argues that China’s continued rise resembles a negotia-
tion.17 While China will aim to preserve the aspects of the system that 
made it rich, it will also seek to adapt parts of the current liberal order to 
better suit its needs. However, the liberal order will also adapt to China. 
The stakeholders of the current system will seek to protect their inter-
ests, while at the same time including China, which is also an important 
member. The third group takes a gloomier view. While China will not 
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seek to overthrow the existing order, it will push for major changes to 
rules and norms, which are at the heart of contemporary liberal order.18 
This will not end global cooperation between states but the features of 
multilateral governance – such as conditions for democracy and human 
rights – may simply be different or absent.19
Chinese academia tends to be concerned with how best to suit 
domestic development needs to the current international order.20 One 
group of academics argues that China should directly engage in altering 
the liberal order to suit these needs. A second group advocates returning 
to a low profile in world affairs, much like during the Deng Xiaoping 
era.21 The third ‘mainstream view’ is where China makes efforts to con-
tinue its peaceful ‘harmonious rise’, but also works towards incremental 
changes.22
The alternative: A liberal partnership order
This chapter argues that China seeks to maintain some elements of the 
liberal order, while changing others to better suit its needs. The third epi-
graph that opens this chapter, quoting Chinese president Xi Jinping, 
expresses this argument.
The alternative system China aims to build is a liberal partnership 
order. Wu Xinbo outlines its features.23 China wishes to preserve liberal 
economic elements and dilute the hegemonic requirements of the cur-
rent US-led order. It wants a ‘relatively more equal political order and a 
cooperative security order’.24 Or, in other words, it wants a multipolar 
system without a sole dominant power. The ideal is for issues of global 
collective security to be decided among the order’s leading members – via 
an institution such as the United Nations.25 This order also accommo-
dates greater ‘political diversity’26 and means that all political regime 
types are equal – democratic or non-democratic. Issues of human rights 
and regime type are a nation’s internal, sovereign affairs. Any interven-
tions or conditions on such issues count as interference in a nation’s sov-
ereignty. Political diversity and non-interference are exemplified in the 
regional security organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO),27 which requires ‘mutual respect of sovereignty, independ-
ence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, 
non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs . . .  [and] equality of 
all member States’.28 Adherence to human rights or democracy are not 
requirements for participation – unlike NATO, for example, which was 
founded upon principles of democracy.29 Thus the ‘partnership’ element 
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of this order emphasises international cooperation based on shared eco-
nomic and security goals.
Wu argues that Chinese partnership diplomacy is evidence of 
China’s efforts to gradually implement an alternative order in the inter-
national system.30 Partnership diplomacy is a system of symbolic part-
nerships, which the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) assigns to 
countries to signal the level of bilateral relations they have with China. 
Since the early 1990s, China gradually developed this approach to 
diplomacy according to the same principles of the liberal partnership 
order – open markets, free investment flows, respect for sovereignty, and 
non-interference in domestic affairs.31 Scholars argue that partnership 
diplomacy is an effort to shape an international order more in accord-
ance with China’s own long-term interests.32 Partnership diplomacy began 
when Chinese policymakers sought a way to develop relations with for-
eign countries without the binding conditions of formal alliances. It is an 
approach to relations that seeks to maximise opportunities and reduce 
risks. Now, practically every country China interacts with has an official 
MFA partnership.33
It is just now that a proto-liberal partnership order has emerged. 
Partnership diplomacy was developed over more than two decades in tan-
dem with China’s rise. Although there have been years of booming, high-
level economic growth, only recently has China dramatically increased 
its international profile, with projects such as the BRI. To be clear, since 
the early 2000s China has actively encouraged its state-owned enterprises 
to increase investments overseas.34 By contrast, the BRI is a collective 
action project, which requires multiple foreign partners for success. Rather 
than individual enterprises pursuing profits abroad, the BRI requires many 
participants to coordinate with China towards a common goal.
The BRI and Eurasia as a proto-liberal partnership order
The beginnings of China’s liberal partnership order can be monitored in 
Eurasia. This is mainly because the BRI has created conditions for China 
to become the guiding force for an initiative that shares aspects of liberal 
internationalism – such as openness, multilateralism and market econom-
ics. Although the analogy is supported neither by Chinese academics nor 
by China, the BRI has been described as ‘China’s Marshall Plan’.35 The 
1947 Marshall Plan is considered one of the foundations of the current 
liberal hegemonic order, because it brought multiple nations together to 
work collectively with the United States to rebuild a more prosperous 
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Europe.36 The BRI holds comparable potential for the countries of Eurasia. 
The region is the location of the BRI’s Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). 
Announced in 2013,37 the SREB is China’s effort to interlink Central Asia, 
Russia and Europe across the landmass of Eurasia – reminiscent of the 
ancient Silk Road. Most of the post-Soviet countries that span the vast 
distances of the SREB have low- or lower-middle income economies.38 
For countries in the region, participation in the SREB represents a poten-
tial future of greater trade, connections with the wider world, moderni-
sation and development. For China, relations in Eurasia are essential for 
the success of the SREB, the BRI’s flagship project.
Another reason China’s emerging alternative order can be observed 
in Eurasia is because China actively practises partnership diplomacy in 
the region. All post-Soviet Eurasian countries have MFA partnerships.39 
There are various levels of MFA partnerships; each level implies different 
expectations and significance to a bilateral relationship. Those with BRI-
related projects officially supported by China have been assigned high-
level partnerships. Those without BRI projects officially supported by 
China have lower-level partnerships. The higher-level partnerships have 
‘strategic’ in their title. Strategic partners are ‘ “closer friends” than other 
countries, and among the strategic partners, there is also an implicit hier-
archical structure’.40 Bilateral interactions with the higher-level strategic 
partnerships ‘include rather detailed agendas for bilateral collaboration 
and provide for the establishment of specific communication channels to 
facilitate regular exchanges between the heads of state and high-level 
representatives of different government units’.41 This is not to say non-
strategic partnerships are not valued by China. Strategic partners are 
seen to impact China’s security, while non-strategic partners are less 
likely to do so. For example, since the announcement of the BRI, Chinese 
military leaders have met with BRI participants on average almost twice 
a year.42 BRI non-participants met with military leaders on average once 
in four years, if at all. This suggests the BRI is an additional security con-
cern for China, and thus merits additional efforts on security with BRI 
participants.
Partnership diplomacy coupled with the BRI makes Eurasian diplo-
matic relations adhere to the principles of China’s liberal partnership 
order – openness, market economics, and economic and security coop-
eration. To begin with, despite the hierarchical nature of the MFA’s dif-
ferent levels of partnerships, the Chinese concept of partnership implies 
a relationship of collaboration, joint undertakings and shared risks.43 This 
equates openness and equality within a liberal partnership order. The BRI 
projects – whether transit or energy infrastructure – are meant to increase 
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connectivity, which means an increasing ‘trade’, ‘financial’, ‘infrastructure’, 
and ‘people-to-people’ interaction between all partners involved.44 This 
adheres to the market economy and economic cooperation within the 
order. So far, there is no formal security architecture for the BRI. This 
suggests existing multilateral security forums, such as the UN and SCO, 
are enough – at least at this early stage. For example, China has supported 
multilateral efforts within the United Nations to resolve the crisis in 
Ukraine.45 Multilateral organisations fit the liberal partnership order’s 
preference for collective approaches to security. Any political interaction 
consists of ‘exchanges between parliaments, political parties and non- 
governmental organisations of different countries’.46 That is, political 
interaction refers to increased encounters, but does not touch on human 
rights or political systems, such as liberal democracy.
Crucially, issues of human rights and political systems are private 
matters, rather than matters of principle. Two recent examples – one 
between Kazakhstan and China, and the other involving political devel-
opments in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine – demonstrate how China handles 
these types of issues with its partners. In late May 2018, after months of 
reported disappearances, the Kazakh government confronted Chinese 
authorities about rumours of Kazakh citizens being detained against their 
will in anti-Muslim, ‘re-education’ camps in neighbouring Xinjiang prov-
ince.47 Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the two sides discussed the ‘pro-
tection of the rights and interests of the citizens of the two countries, and 
also the mutual trips of residents of Kazakhstan and China’.48 China 
responded that any detentions resulted from ethnic Kazakhs that had tried 
to revoke their Chinese citizenship without the proper documentation. 
The key takeaway is that China is dealing with Kazakhstan via diplomatic 
channels to carefully and quietly resolve the issue.49 Above all, the issue 
is China’s sovereignty – that China can conduct whatever policy it sees fit 
within its western territory of Xinjiang. Therefore, the problem is being 
solved quietly via diplomatic exchange, rather than adherence to a set of 
agreements on human rights.
The second example shows differences of political regime are unim-
portant to China. Instead, stability is what matters. When a regime 
change took place in Ukraine against an increasingly authoritarian regime, 
China did not degrade its strategic partnership with Ukraine.50 In addi-
tion, Ukraine lost its main investment project with China, because it 
was located in Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, so China chose to 
scrap the project.51 All the same, China did not downgrade its strategic 
partnership with Ukraine. The two sides continue to search for areas of 
co operation, including within the BRI.52 Another example relates to regime 
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change in Kyrgyzstan. Violent protests took place in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 
and 2010. However, China did not alter its relations with Kyrgyzstan. 
Instead, China waited for stability to return, and continued to develop its 
relations. Kyrgyzstan received its first strategic partnership in 2013 and 
its higher-level comprehensive strategic partnership in June 2018.53 The 
principles of openness in economic matters and trade, equality among 
partners, sovereignty, and non-interference are what China seeks to 
uphold.
The BRI and China’s partnership diplomacy in Eurasia, therefore, 
can be viewed as a proto-liberal partnership order. The BRI is a collective 
action project that exemplifies aspects of liberal internationalism, such 
as openness, multilateralism and market economics. In the region, China 
practises partnership diplomacy, which seeks to enhance cooperative rela-
tions among partners, instead of making binding agreements among 
allies. Together, partnership diplomacy and the BRI combine as a basic 
form of China’s liberal partnership order. Importantly, aspects of the US-
led liberal hegemonic order that China dislikes  –  principles of human 
rights and democracy  –  are not requirements to participate in China’s 
alternative order.
Reactions to a changing international order
How are Russia and the United States responding to China’s rise and a 
potential alternative international order? The following two sections, ‘Rus-
sia’s reaction: Desire and risk’ and ‘The United States’ reaction: Liberal 
hegemonic disorder’, argue that the two countries’ foreign policies in Eur-
asia can be analysed to show contemporary reactions to and potential 
future trajectories of the shifting international order.
russia’s reaction: Desire and risk
Russia desires to take advantage of changes to the international order as 
China rises. To balance against the United States and Western Europe 
(the West), and to maintain its identity as a great power, Russia is seek-
ing to become an essential element of a new, multipolar order. In doing 
so, Russia runs the risk of becoming a less important member of an alter-
native order. While there is a broad range of scholarship characterising 
Russia-China relations, there is general agreement that Russia’s margin-
alised position within the current world order is driving it to deepen its 
cooperation with China. An example of Russia’s strategy to keep itself an 
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important member of the international order is its attempt to make itself 
a political arbiter of trade in Eurasia as the BRI grows. Only time will tell 
if this risky strategy will bring the desired results.
The study of Russia-China relations can be divided into four 
schools.54 The mainstream, limitationist school stresses the differences 
and problematic tensions between Russia and China.55 The alarmist school 
warns that China and Russia are natural allies against the West, and fore-
sees the smooth development of a Sino-Russian security alliance.56 
Adherents of the identity literature school compare national identity and 
domestic society to understand how this affects Sino-Russian foreign pol-
icy. They tend to argue there is a growing convergence in Russia and 
China’s foreign policy preferences.57 The normalcy school argues that 
while Russia-China relations have fault lines, relations are founded on 
shared interests and are largely pragmatic.58 Despite their differing views, 
these schools agree that Russia and China both seek a multipolar world. 
After various high-profile scandals (such as the Magnitsky affair, the 
Olympic doping programme), outcry against the 2014 Russian annexa-
tion of Crimea, and the implementation of Western sanctions, Russia feels 
increasingly ostracised. Russia has grown closer to China in a relation-
ship of ‘asymmetric interdependence’.59 This is where China sees Russia 
as a supplier of military technology and resources, and junior partner. 
Russia needs China as an alternative market and lender, because of 
strained relations with the West.
An alternate international order challenges Russia to remain a rel-
evant world power. At the same time, it presents an opportunity for Russia 
to rise from its apparent ostracisation in the current liberal hegemonic 
order. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the new Russian state under 
Putin has looked to replicate the pre-eminence of the Soviet period. As 
early as his 1999 millennium message,60 Putin advocated that during his 
tenure he would place Russia among the great world powers. Putin’s 
regime fears becoming what former US presidential advisor and diplo-
mat Zbigniew Brzezinski called a ‘black hole’,61 outshone by Europe (the 
EU and its allies) in the west and China in the east. For Russia, the rise of 
China is perceived as both a threat and an opportunity. Russia risks becom-
ing China’s junior partner for the long term. But at the same time, China 
could become the eastern balancer to Russia’s over-reliance on Europe.
Thus, Russia has been developing a Eurasia strategy to remain rel-
evant. The Kremlin has sought an independent policy in Eurasia, which 
supports China, but keeps the region under Russian influence. The first 
step has been to harmonise Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) trade regu-
lations with the BRI. Inaugurated on 1 January 2015, the EAEU is  Russia’s 
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union building project for the post-Soviet space. The goal of the EAEU 
is to lead to ‘a Russia-led political–economic bloc that would become a 
political–economic pole in the multipolar international order’, a Eura-
sian Union.62 The EAEU has five members: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. It is Russia’s tactic to remain a leader among 
Eurasian states.63 But harmonising the EAEU with the BRI is an attempt 
to dilute Chinese influence, because Russia is more widely included in 
the details of trade as the initiative develops.64 The Kremlin’s China policy 
is a fine balance, summed up as ‘never against each other, but not always 
with each other’.65
In a further step to make the best of the BRI and China’s growing 
presence in Eurasia, in 2016 the EAEU launched the Greater Eurasia Pro-
ject.66 It is essentially a framework of treaties to develop Eurasia into a 
common economic and security space.67 The Kremlin perceives that with 
the integration of the EAEU and the BRI, Russia gains some control over 
the process and can act as a bridge to help the project reach across and 
into the EU.68 This gives Russia influence both with China and Europe.69
In this way, Russia seeks to become an indispensable player – a vital 
middleman as Bobo Lo argues –  for China.70 This is the essence of the 
Greater Eurasia Project: to create a regulatory treaty framework to lock 
Russia into a ‘comprehensive trade and economic partnership in Eurasia 
with the participation of the European Union states and China’.71 It is 
intended to complement the BRI – a superstructure above the SREB to 
help facilitate the initiative. This strategy serves two purposes. First, to 
reduce pressure from the West for the short term. Second, to aid the con-
struction of a new world order in Eurasia.72 Combining the EAEU and the 
Greater Eurasia Project, Russia becomes a necessary partner for China 
and one of the permanent arbiters of Eurasian politics and trade. In such 
a scenario, Eurasian regimes get to participate in BRI trade, because Rus-
sia, the EU, and China say so. Taking advantage of China’s pre-eminent 
economic strength, Russia maintains its status as a great power in world 
politics.
Chinese officials are offering their cautious support for the Greater 
Eurasia Project. They think the project is a short-term improvisation, 
rather than a long-term plan. Chinese scholars are negative about the 
project. They argue that the Greater Eurasian Project has vague motives 
and unclear boundaries. Chinese officials currently refer to the Greater 
Eurasia Project as the ‘Eurasian Economic Partnership Agreement’ instead 
of the ‘Eurasian Comprehensive Partnership’ used previously.73 The word 
choice emphasises China’s preference for economic interaction. This sug-
gests they are anxious to distance themselves from anything that may be 
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binding for project members in the future. Some Chinese experts believe 
the Greater Eurasian project ‘is a short-term strategic shift rather than a 
long-term grand strategy . . .  [They] foresee Russia abandoning the 
Greater Eurasian [project] following the rapprochement with the West’.74
Overall, it remains to be seen how the Sino-Russian partnership will 
pan out. China is after all the dominant partner, so it is possible Russia 
will become a junior partner without all the benefits Russian policymak-
ers hope for. It is likely the partnership is one of mutual convenience, 
with both offering each other support in certain areas, but remaining inde-
pendent in others.
the united States’ reaction: Liberal hegemonic disorder
The United States has responded to a potentially changing liberal hegem-
onic order with a mix of grudging acceptance, combined with attempts 
to keep China in established international structures, thereby restricting 
China’s ability to manoeuvre. It is important to note that the current Trump 
administration views China’s rise and the BRI as threats to the existing 
order, carrying an alternative order with them. In a speech at the Rhode 
Island Naval War College in June 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mat-
tis alerted listeners to ‘China harbouring long-term designs to rewrite the 
existing global order’.75 He said of China’s strategy:
The Ming Dynasty appears to be their model, albeit in a more mus-
cular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states, 
kowtowing to Beijing; espousing One Belt, One Road, when this 
diverse world has many belts and many roads; and attempting to 
replicate on the international stage their authoritarian domestic 
model, militarizing South China Sea features while using predatory 
economics of piling massive debt on others.
Regardless of Chinese efforts to downplay the potential changes it will 
bring to the current international order, the United States is on the 
lookout.
This section begins with a look at academic debate on how the 
United States should respond to pressures placed upon the liberal hegem-
onic order by China’s rise. Next, there is a review of the actual policy path 
the United States has taken in response to these pressures. This section 
shows the United States’ response to China has been ineffective and is 
increasingly becoming disordered. The United States’ policy has fluctu-
ated between engagement and containment, leaning closer to the latter 
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in recent years. The Trump administration has thrown this approach into 
disarray. This ineffectiveness and inconsistency are reflected in the United 
States’ policy in Eurasia. The United States has developed a response nei-
ther to China’s rise nor to the alternative system that comes with it.
In general, scholars have argued for two opposing strategies in 
response to Chinese pressures upon the contemporary international order. 
The first is hard-line containment. Realist scholars argue that the United 
States needs to use internal balancing (a military build-up near China) 
and external balancing (military alliances with China’s neighbours) to 
counter China.76 In the summer of 2018, US Secretary of Defense Mattis 
voiced his support for a strategy of internal and external balancing against 
China.77 The second strategy is a compromise approach. Institutional-
ists have suggested a policy of ‘wary interdependence’,78 also called ‘con-
gagement’ (a combination of ‘containment’ and ‘engagement’).79 This is 
where the United States accepts China as a great-power partner for the 
twenty-first century. The strategy is to include and engage China as much 
as possible within existing international institutions (such as the World 
Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]), so it 
gradually accepts the prevailing rules and norms of the contemporary 
order. At the same time, the United States works to contain any Chinese 
military build-up or aggression. On balance, it is hoped that advocates 
for the second strategy prevail.
In practice, the United States’ response has been an attempt at con-
gagement. Over time, this seemed to produce few meaningful results. 
The latter Bush administration copied much of the Clinton administra-
tion’s congagement policies towards China.80 The Obama administration 
began by continuing this approach. The administration stressed engage-
ment with China through mutual cooperation and increased communi-
cation, but this strategy was mired in mutual mistrust and deemed 
ineffective.81 Chinese authorities had not opened China’s economy to 
equal competition, and a Chinese military presence continued to develop 
in the South China Sea.82
The Obama administration shifted its strategy closer towards con-
tainment. The United States increased its naval presence in the South 
China Sea, transferring some of its most technologically advanced naval 
and air force systems to the Pacific theatre.83 Obama also inserted the 
United States into the Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan and 
China, siding with Japan.84 These actions are not indicative of the Obama 
administration taking steps to improve cooperation and transparency 
with China. In tandem, the Obama administration promoted the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 states from East Asia, South and North 
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 America, and Oceania. This was an attempt to bolster US dominance in 
Asia while forcing China to make economic reforms.85 Obama’s China 
policy began by promoting cooperation, but rapidly became a disjointed 
mixture ‘of highly mixed emotions and anxieties’, leading to increased 
disapproval ‘against China’, which resembles a policy of containment.86 
The Obama administration’s shift from congagement towards contain-
ment highlights a transition (and the decay) in US-Chinese relations.
The deterioration in relations has continued under Trump. The 
Trump administration’s policy is incoherent – in part because it failed to 
hire enough China specialists at the State Department. More US naval 
vessels are now stationed in the South China Sea to uphold rights of naval 
passage.87 A growing trade war has further strained cooperation.88 Accu-
sations of Chinese interference in the 2018 US elections have not helped 
either.89 Despite these recent developments, in 2017 Trump met with Xi 
Jinping to discuss cooperation.90 Counter-intuitively, one of Trump’s first 
actions as president was to renege on the TPP. Many viewed this action as 
a US own-goal and a win for China.91
While the United States is not deeply involved in much of Eurasia, 
its approach to the region still reflects its ineffective and disordered 
response to China. The baseline of US foreign policy in Eurasia was estab-
lished after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.92 At that time, the main 
issues for the United States were stability and supporting transitions to 
market democracies. The United States then shifted to a policy of milita-
risation in Eurasia under the Bush administration. Focus was lost on much 
of the region, as Afghanistan dominated foreign policy. The Obama admin-
istration was faced with a double problem – to reduce military commit-
ments in Eurasia as the Iraq and Afghan wars wound down, but also to 
address concerns about China’s growing presence in the region. Policy 
under Trump has been erratic. It has failed to address the breadth of 
change in the region and has not allocated appropriate policy tools to 
protect US interests.
The clearest example of the failure to engage with or to counter 
China’s growing presence in Eurasia is the fruitless Modern Silk Road 
Strategy (MRS), which became the New Silk Road Vision.93 The MRS 
began in 2009 as an Obama-era plan to develop post-war Afghanistan. 
The strategy was for Afghanistan to engage in political and economic 
cooperation with all six of its bordering neighbours. It would promote 
the idea that Afghanistan was a major transit hub at the centre of Eura-
sia. In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a highly trun-
cated version of the MRS, the New Silk Road Vision (NSR). The NSR is a 
collection of projects to build economic connectivity between the Central 
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Asian states, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.94 The aspirations outlined 
by Secretary Clinton have not been matched by action. But it is likely the 
MRS and NSR ideas sped up Beijing’s BRI plans and increased its roll-out 
to more states and continents. Without resources paralleling China, the 
United States’ NSR policy is unworkable.95 Thus, the NSR highlights the 
disjointed nature of US foreign policy in responding to the rise of China. 
Secretary Clinton made a statement that could not be backed up by tan-
gible actions.
In addition, the removal of US troops from Afghanistan and the with-
drawal from the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan have hampered the image of 
the United States as an important player in Central Asia.96 The reduction of 
financial support for Central Asian states by the State Department only 
enhanced this perception.97
From around the time the SREB was announced in 2013, the United 
States’ Eurasia policies have lacked lucidity, commitment and reliability. 
‘US policy has been more note-worthy for its contradictions and muddled 
strategic framework’.98 One such example of a muddled strategic frame-
work by the United States occurred in August 2015, in which US Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Dan Feldman stated that 
‘We welcome China’s engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which we 
see not as competitive, but complementary to our own efforts’.99 Yet, earlier 
in 2015, the Obama administration was advising US allies and regional 
partners to not join China’s Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank 
(AIIB) – a China-led multilateral Asia-Pacific development institution with 
57 member countries formed in 2016. The AIIB is, in fact, the product of 
Chinese frustration with a lack of votes within the US-led development 
institutions, the IMF and World Bank.100
The Trump administration’s official response to the BRI ignores much 
of Eurasia. It was supposedly worked on for months before being unveiled 
by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The United States would only focus on 
the Indo-Pacific region – defined by Pompeo as stretching ‘from the United 
States west coast to the west coast of India’.101 Pompeo announced financ-
ing of US $113 million dollars for ‘new initiatives’. This minuscule sum 
pales in comparison to China’s US $40 billion Silk Road Fund.102
Another inconsistent jolt in policy is the Trump administration’s 
recent signal for a return to Central Asia. This comes after the Obama 
administration’s careful withdrawal. The decision occurred because of 
US perceptions that China and Russia were playing a new ‘Great Game’ 
and the United States had to react in some way.103 However, the United 
States is late to the game (some scholars say nearly a decade behind) and 
is now having to play catch-up.104
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The United States has not held a coherent policy about the rise of 
China since the late 2000s. The Obama and Trump administrations have 
been simultaneously conciliatory and oppressive. The begrudging accept-
ance of China’s rise by the United States has often been closer to one of 
intransigence. As China’s political and economic influence grow in 
 Eurasia, so will its ability to implement its alternative, liberal partnership 
order.
The United States has ignored Eurasia for too long. The United 
States’ stalled NSR, coupled with its withdrawal from Afghanistan, has 
decreased US influence in the region. By contrast, China’s BRI is in full 
flow, treating Eurasia as a pivotal region. If the United States is to truly 
engage in Eurasia, it will face stiff competition, either having to convince 
local states to refute Chinese and/or Russian advances, or alternatively 
match Chinese investment. If the United States chooses to match Chinese 
investment, it will lead to an astronomical sum of capital being pumped 
into the region. Under the disjointed foreign policy of the Trump admin-
istration  –  across the globe, not just Eurasia  –  it is highly unlikely the 
United States will develop a stance on China’s liberal partnership order 
apart from scattered containment and criticisms.
Conclusion
The international order faces change. It is shifting from a unipolar sys-
tem to one that, at the very least, will soon be bipolar. The contemporary 
order is evolving from a US-dominated system to an arrangement between 
the United States and China. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union led 
the Eastern bloc against the United States in a bipolar system. The devel-
opment of the next order remains in its infancy. How it develops in the 
future depends on how both actors collaborate.
Some have advocated that China’s gaining political and economic 
strength is detrimental and will lead to conflict. Others have maintained 
that China’s preferences will evolve to support prevailing norms and it 
will become a stakeholder in the current order. Still others have argued 
that China is labouring for major changes to the core values and practices 
of the international system. This chapter has argued that China, for the 
most part, is not trying to establish a new international order. Rather, it 
seeks to maintain certain features of the current liberal order, while 
adapting others to better suit its needs. It continues to promote the  liberal 
features of openness, multilateralism, market economics, and  economic 
and security cooperation. It places greater emphasis on multipolarity, 
SOCIAL ISM , CAPITALISM AND ALTERNATIVES146
 sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs. It works to demote 
the current liberal order’s hegemonic requirements for human rights and 
democracy. Chinese scholars have called this alternative system a liberal 
partnership international order.
This chapter has also argued that China’s rise has affected two other 
major powers – the United States and Russia. Each country reacted in dif-
ferent ways to this development. Russia views itself as a great power and 
wants the world to become multipolar, with itself as a distinct pole. Rus-
sia is motivated in part by the West’s (primarily the United States’) efforts 
to ostracise Russia within the existing international order. Russia has 
sought a partnership with China that both works to displace the United 
States and improve its own position. Yet it is unknown how far the Sino-
Russian relationship will last into the future. It is unlikely that China views 
Russia as anything but a regional power whose alignment may change if 
it becomes dissatisfied with its limited status. Russia has accepted Chi-
na’s rise. As pressure builds for an alternative order, Russia hopes to coun-
ter the United States’ dominance. Ideally, Russia would like to be treated 
as a major power with its privileges maintained in the post-Soviet region.
By contrast, the United States’ acceptance of China’s rise has at the 
very best been grudging. The Bush and Obama administrations instigated 
a policy of congagement, attempting to both engage and contain China. 
As congagement came to be seen as ineffective, there has been an increas-
ing emphasis on containment. The Trump administration views China’s 
growing international presence as a threat. It sees China’s rise as a direct 
challenge to the existing order. Nevertheless, the United States has failed 
to develop a coherent response.
Eurasia is a geopolitical theatre where China’s alternative liberal 
partnership order, Russia’s manoeuvring, and the United States’ disor-
dered policy are all visible. China uses partnership diplomacy in Eurasia 
to promote its brand of relations and to increase its connectivity to much 
of the globe. Russia views itself as the regional great power. While it has 
accepted Chinese economic pre-eminence, it is developing a strategy to 
be Eurasia’s political arbiter. Its Greater Eurasia Project is a clear indica-
tion of this opportunistic approach. In recent years, the United States’ 
policies in Eurasia have lacked clarity, commitment and reliability. Its 
erratic approach – ranging from support to subversion – has culminated 
in a lacklustre response to the BRI and estranged regional partners.
As China rises, it brings pressure for an alternative international 
order with it. How this order evolves remains to be seen. Russia seeks to 
remain a great power by making itself China’s vital partner. In the pro-
cess, Russia hopes to dislocate the United States’ hegemonic position and 
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to establish a multipolar order. The United States has begrudged China’s 
rise, yet it has failed to develop an effective response. The United States is 
failing to embrace and adjust to change, and this increases the fragility of 
the liberal hegemonic order it leads. Granted, the relationship between 
the United States and China is filled with mutual mistrust. A reduction of 
containment may be perceived by US allies as growing weakness. At the 
same time, a refusal to engage more with China appears petty – China is 
rising, and the United States needs to find ways to protect its interests 
and accept the inevitable.
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Neo-liberalism, Keynesianism 
and the current crisis
Geoffrey Hosking
When the Soviet Union fell, most of us in the West assumed that liberal 
democracy had proved itself the most successful form of political theory 
and practice. Yet, a quarter of a century later, we face a crisis which 
threatens to destroy liberal democracy. The established parties of gov-
ernment and opposition are being overshadowed by populist parties that 
preach an exclusive nationalism and exalt leaders claiming to represent 
the mass of ordinary, uncorrupt people against the corrupt elites. What 
has gone wrong?
In his recent book Why Liberalism Failed, Patrick Deneen asserts that 
liberalism has failed because it succeeded too well. As he variously puts it, 
‘Liberalism has failed because liberalism has succeeded.’ ‘As liberalism has 
become more fully itself, its inner logic has become more evident and its 
self-contradictions manifest.’1 The book is in many ways an interesting one, 
and makes a number of good points. But I do not accept Deneen’s basic 
premise. To my mind what has failed is not liberalism itself, but only one 
form of liberalism – one might call it a perversion of liberalism – that is, 
neo-liberalism. For as Deneen admits, the essence of liberalism is con-
tained in certain fundamental and universal human values, to which he 
does subscribe: freedom, self-realisation, certain basic rights such as free 
speech, freedom of association and of religious belief, and so forth. Neo-
liberalism has failed us by actually limiting these rights in the name of 
economic growth achieved by a free market economy within balanced 
state budgets. This is certainly an ideology, as Deneen asserts, but one 
which betrays the inner logic of liberalism, not manifests it. In fact, it 
begins to remind me of Soviet communism in its rigidity and in the way 
governments pursued it to its logical end, regardless of its effect on 
human suffering.
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It is ironic, then, that it was the Soviet Union’s collapse which con-
vinced so many theorists and policymakers that there really was ‘no alter-
native’ (to use Margaret Thatcher’s term) to neo-liberalism. It was widely 
believed in the 1990s that the state-dominated planned economy had 
utterly failed and had doomed the Soviet Union. Actually, other no less 
salient factors were involved – notably the fractious relationships between 
the nationalities and the radical reforms pursued by the Soviet leader, 
Mikhail Gorbachev.2
There was another modern form of liberalism –  in Britain that of 
Lloyd George, Keynes and Beveridge, all of them Liberals both with a capi-
tal and a small letter – but represented in most European countries by 
Social Democrats or Christian Democrats. In Britain, in fact, their ideas 
were most fully implemented by a Labour government, that of 1945–51 
under Attlee. Personal economic freedom was to be reconciled with social 
justice and strong government through a tacit or explicit socio-economic 
contract which aimed at ‘full employment’ (meaning minimum unem-
ployment) and guaranteed all citizens against absolute indigence by 
means of what I call the ‘fiscal covenant’ – the tacit agreement that, pro-
vided you pay your taxes, the state will look after you, or at least prevent 
you slipping into utter destitution if you suffer unemployment, a serious 
accident or illness, or when you reach old age. The fiscal covenant cre-
ated a way of making social solidarity real: the sharing of national wealth 
through progressive taxation proved a powerful factor in consolidat-
ing  the sense of nationhood engendered by war. The national treasury 
became the clearinghouse through which the whole nation shared the cost 
of providing mutual security and well-being: defence, communications, 
education, health services, pensions, welfare benefits and other forms of 
social good. The fiscal covenant became a major component of national 
identity.3 Taken together with the rule of law, it underpinned the basic 
trust which, in spite of individual crises, the population in general felt 
towards elites in general and governments in particular.
The fiscal covenant generated three decades of successful economic 
development, in which most of the British population became markedly 
wealthier, healthier, better housed and educated. This was effected by 
deliberate state policy to counteract the processes which during the 1930s 
had led to economic instability, unemployment and depression. Keynes 
had pointed out that classical free-market theory ignored crucial features 
of the economy and became especially misleading in times of depression. 
The defects he pointed out all turned on questions of trust and confidence. 
Theory posited that in investing and concluding contracts, all economic 
actors had good information about the state of the economy as a whole, 
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they could assess the risks with reasonable accuracy, and could therefore 
take decisions with confidence. But in the real world, information was 
often imperfect or worse, especially in the fast-changing circumstances 
of a serious market downturn; hence, most economic actors had little 
confidence in the future. Risk was replaced by uncertainty, which in 
Keynes’s view was a very different thing.
Classical theory supposed that in a depression prices would fall; 
money would then flow to where goods were available at favourable 
prices, or where investment held out good prospects, and in that way 
market equilibrium would be restored. Keynes countered that in uncer-
tainty or unfavourable conditions, people would lose overall confidence 
and hoard money as the best hedge against future risk. Thus, by provid-
ing individually against possible disaster, they would bring about real 
disaster in the economy as a whole. The individually rational would pre-
cipitate the socially ruinous: a market collapse.
Finally, theory prescribed that states should balance budgets in all 
circumstances, whereas Keynes recommended that, on the contrary, in 
an economic depression they should override short-term concerns about 
the budget and spend more heavily to inject both money and confidence 
into the economy. It is often forgotten that Keynes also believed that in 
good times governments should run a budget surplus and save up funds 
to inject into the economy in a downturn. In short, he favoured balanced 
budgets as a means of sustaining confidence, but only over long-term 
cycles. He knew capitalism was liable to cyclical crises, which at their height 
led to wasteful overproduction and at their depth to mass un employment 
and poverty. He therefore recommended that as an economy turned 
towards recession, the state should break normal budgetary rules by 
injecting extra spending, even at the cost of budget deficits. It would thus 
explicitly become the public risk manager, the upholder of generalised 
economic trust. In particular, it should keep up welfare payments, since 
they helped to preserve social peace and enabled the poor to make their 
contribution to the economy, at least as consumers. He did consider it 
important, though, that the surplus thus financed was spent on projects 
which would genuinely increase future wealth, since otherwise the result 
would eventually be uncontrolled inflation.4
During the 1970s, a serious economic crisis hit the UK and many 
countries of the European Economic Community (as it was then). It was 
caused partly by the end of the Bretton Woods currency system from 1971 
and partly by the steep rise in oil prices precipitated by OPEC. But it was 
also generated partly by inherent tensions in Keynesianism itself. His the-
ory recommended aiming at full employment (in practice, minimum 
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unemployment), and when put into practice, gave workers and their trade 
unions a permanent institutional position in the state-guided economy, 
which in circumstances of full or high employment, plus the price rises 
caused by higher oil prices, empowered them to seek a greater share of 
the national ‘cake’. That in turn provoked employers to seek higher levels 
of profit. Unless productivity also improved, the combined effect of those 
pressures was inflation. That is how in the 1970s the British economy 
moved into ‘stagflation’: a malign mixture of rising unemployment and 
rising prices. Keynes had imagined his economic recommendations being 
implemented by dispassionate and public-spirited bureaucrats, who would 
steer the economy according to the needs of the nation as a whole. He 
had not foreseen that they would become the tool of ambitious party poli-
ticians always tempted to expand the economy, however recklessly, in 
the approach to a general election in order to win the votes of a some-
what wealthier electorate. Nor had he anticipated that the decisive role 
he envisaged for the state would motivate public sector trade unions to 
make constant demands for their members, which were difficult to resist 
without plunging the country into chaos. In effect, Keynes had not linked 
his economics to the state practice which that economics required.5
The result of these developments was inflation – and Keynesianism 
offers little to an economy in an inflationary crisis. That is not to say that 
it could not be very helpful during a deflationary crisis, such as we have 
been experiencing since 2008: indeed, I shall argue that it could and 
should be.
In dealing with the 1970s crisis, Western governments, in different 
ways and at different tempos, have broken away from the ideals and prac-
tices of post-1945 liberalism. More and more the mainstream parties 
have gravitated towards an ideology which gives priority to the globalised 
and only lightly regulated capitalist market economy. According to this 
ideology, economic growth is to be stimulated by competition and the 
privatisation (or de-statisation) of economic resources, transferring them 
to companies which are structured to direct a large share of their profits 
to shareholders and directors. The role of the trade unions in the econ-
omy should be sharply reduced. To lubricate the finances of growth, clus-
ters of international banks, finance companies and shadow banks have 
proliferated, poised to extract their own generous revenues from the oper-
ations necessitated by these economic processes. The theoretical justifi-
cation of these policies has been that financial markets were rational and 
self-correcting and therefore trustworthy, that they brokered actors’ self-
interest to work for the benefit of all and that state intervention was 
therefore unnecessary and indeed harmful.6 Keynes had long ago pointed 
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out the deficiencies of this theory, but from the 1970s he had become so 
deeply unfashionable, especially after the Soviet collapse, that his objec-
tions were well off policymakers’ radar.
As a corollary, the ideal of personal freedom has won out over that 
of social solidarity. A misreading of Adam Smith’s ‘doctrine’ (actually an 
offhand remark) of the ‘invisible hand’ has one-sidedly reinterpreted per-
sonal freedom to mean above all the freedom to make money, where nec-
essary at others’ expense. The watchword is that ‘greed is right’ and that 
it will lead to the good of society as a whole.7
In the 1980s, many of the long-established industrial areas of 
Europe, including the UK, started to lose their industries, outbid by com-
petition from abroad, mainly from Asia. State planning having become 
unfashionable, under Thatcher and subsequent prime ministers, the Brit-
ish government made little or no provision for the establishment of new 
industries or for the research and development plus the massive retrain-
ing programmes which would have been required to make them viable. 
Instead the ‘market’ was left to provide, with mixed results: many work-
ers were in effect thrown on the rubbish heap, their skills gradually atro-
phying and their contribution to family and community devalued. Many 
of them were driven back on temporary or insecure service jobs in what 
became known as the ‘gig economy’, without sickness and holiday pay or 
pension entitlements. Deindustrialised communities soon had high con-
centrations of people on social security benefits and suffering mental or 
physical illness. The consequent degradation of many former workers’ 
lives was sharply further aggravated by the financial crisis of 2007–8, 
which left the UK, like many European states, with much higher 
 deficits – deficits which they dealt with in a panicked reversion to Keynes-
ianism by bailing out huge banks. To start tackling the resulting deficits, 
they applied ‘austerity’ to state budgets, cutting back on welfare benefits 
and curtailing or closing many public institutions.
At the roots of the crisis was the massively untrustworthy behaviour 
of banks, financial institutions and building societies. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, most of the legal restrictions which had previously kept them 
cautious and undynamic but trustworthy had been weakened or elimi-
nated by governments anxious to promote rapid economic growth. Brit-
ain experienced the ‘big bang’ of 1986, which weakened the regulation of 
British banks and opened them to full-scale international competition.
In pursuit of the break from Keynesian policy, both governments 
and local authorities began in the 1980s to privatise public functions or 
to outsource them to private corporations. In some cases, this process pro-
duced more efficient services, at least for a time; but in others it  simply 
SOCIAL ISM , CAPITALISM AND ALTERNATIVES166
replaced a state monopoly with a private monopoly. Hedge funds and pri-
vate equity funds, largely unregulated, swelled rapidly to acquire such 
enterprises, usually by amassing huge (lightly taxed) debts to do so. They 
then devoted a handsome share of the enterprises’ profits to paying off 
those debts and passed most of the rest to their investors and directors. 
Meanwhile the risks were borne by the taxpayer.
One example of the results must suffice. Carillion, a company to 
which numerous public functions had been outsourced, including the 
building of hospitals and schools, the provision of school meals and the 
maintenance of prisons, went bankrupt in January  2018. The collapse 
made more than 2,000 employees and subcontractors redundant or bank-
rupt, left its pension fund £800 million short, and abandoned public pro-
jects, including the construction of major hospitals in Birmingham and 
Liverpool. The parliamentary Committee on Work and Pensions later 
reported that Carillion’s business model was unsustainable, a ‘dash for 
cash . . .  with scant regard for the long-term sustainability or the impact 
on employers, pensioners or suppliers’. Its directors had been content to 
let the state and the Pension Protection Fund pick up the bill. In its final 
years, ‘The directors rewarded themselves and other shareholders by 
choosing to pay out more in dividends than the company generated in 
cash.’ The remuneration committee ‘paid substantially higher salaries and 
bonuses to senior staff while financial performance declined’. The com-
mittee concluded that Carillion was ‘not just the failure of a company, 
but a failure of a system of corporate accountability which too often leaves 
those responsible at the top – and the ever-present firms that surround 
them – as winners while everyone else loses out’. The committee criti-
cised successive governments too, asserting that they ‘have nurtured a 
business environment and pursued a model of service delivery which 
made such a collapse, if not inevitable, then at least a distinct  possibility’.8
A major reason for the mounting power and reach of financial ser-
vices was that the British public was increasingly having recourse to 
finance to cope with the ordinary risks of life. For the last 50 to 60 years, 
the middle class has been contributing enthusiastically to the financiali-
sation of society. Whereas previously people usually relied on family, 
friends, local community, charities, friendly societies or religious institu-
tions to help with facing risks, nowadays most put their trust at least to some 
extent in savings banks, insurance policies and pension funds. Those who 
were able to do so also purchased real estate, both as a reliable roof over 
one’s head and as a hedge against inflation. Many of us have, then, made 
our contribution to the financialisation of the economy, providing ample 
funds for financial institutions to use or misuse. In 1963, pension and 
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insurance funds owned 19 per cent of UK shares; by 1998 that was 65 per 
cent.9 In the USA, total pension fund assets rose astronomically, from 
$0.2 trillion in 1975, to $3 trillion in 1990, $8 trillion in 1998, and $16 
trillion in 2006 – growth by a factor of 80!10 With the deregulation of capi-
tal markets, between 1980 and 1995 investments from mutual funds, 
insurance funds and pension funds grew some tenfold. This growth played 
a major role in the globalisation of finance, since much of this investment 
was in foreign markets.11 This expansion, however, did not fully include 
those who have never had enough money to invest extensively in insur-
ance, pensions or real estate. Hence its tendency was to polarise society 
economically.
One of the results of this policy was a soaring increase in real estate 
prices, especially in the United States, where they grew by 105 per cent 
between 1997 and 2007; and in the UK, where they grew by 190 per 
cent  in the same period. This abrupt growth was largely fuelled by the 
reckless provision of mortgage debt. Banks would offer incautious 
loans – known as ‘sub-prime mortgages’ – to customers in the knowledge 
that they could reduce the risk involved by chopping up and reconfigur-
ing the loans into ‘securitised’ packages which they then sold on to other 
banks. The idea was that the spreading of risk would dilute its impact. 
During 2007–8 it suddenly became apparent that the mathematical 
risk models underpinning these packages were based on insufficient his-
torical data: they did not, for example, take account of the 1930s eco-
nomic crisis. Once one bank defaulted, then debts, like a cancer, rapidly 
 metastasised, till in September 2008 they climaxed with the collapse of 
three of the top five US investment banks, including that of Lehman 
 Brothers – the greatest corporate bankruptcy in history – and of the two 
institutions that provided 80 per cent of US mortgages. In Britain two 
major banks, Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank of Scotland, went 
bankrupt, as did all building societies which had demutualised – that is, 
had ceased to rely on depositors for their revenue, but allowed them-
selves to be quoted on the stock exchange.12
Stock markets around the world plunged, losing $600 billion in just 
36 hours. The immediate cause of the financial crisis was the collapse of 
the mutual trust without which banks can scarcely limp on from day to 
day. In some cases, they stopped even making each other overnight loans 
which normally smooth out the ups and downs of everyday financial busi-
ness. They also could not realise the assets in their portfolios, since the 
price of those assets plunged if they tried to sell them. This collapse was 
totally contrary to the theory of self-regulating markets. Alan Greenspan, 
former (and once much admired) chairman of the US Federal Reserve, 
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confessed to a congressional committee, ‘Those of us who have looked to 
the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity 
(myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.’13
In the United States, the UK and other western countries, govern-
ments rightly overrode decades of free-market dogma, and bailed out the 
bankrupt institutions, at the cost of enormously increasing the national 
debt. In the UK, the operation nearly doubled the debt, bringing it up to 
a level of 76 per cent of annual GDP in 2010–11.14
One might have thought that such a sensational collapse would have 
led to a profound reassessment of the way the market was operating and 
to radical changes in policy. On the contrary, the British government on 
the whole returned to slightly corrected versions of its pre-2008 policies. 
In the following decade, the annual deficit was gradually reduced, but 
the effect was too slow to affect state debt, which continued to grow inexo-
rably, until at the end of 2017 it reached 87.7 per cent. Meanwhile, to 
counteract the effects of austerity, household debt also started rising 
again, until by 2017 it was approaching the dangerous levels of 2008: 
133 per cent of household annual income, as against 148 per cent in 
2008.15 Such a level leaves households vulnerable to a deterioration of 
their own economic position, and also to either an improvement in the 
national economy (which would bring about higher interest rates) or a 
downturn in it (which could mean lower income).
The government did not reform economic and financial institutions; 
but instead, acting in the name of free-market ideology, they made seri-
ous cuts in welfare provision, debasing life for the poor, disabled and the 
disadvantaged generally, including many women in particular. As a result, 
liberalism has become degraded and detached from social democracy. 
Today, it no longer aims to secure the maximum personal freedom of all 
members of the population. Instead it has become an ideology of the 
establishment, offering support to the well-connected and wealthy, while 
reducing the resources, legal status and life chances available to the rest 
of the population. It is scarcely surprising that those whose lives have 
been blighted by the consequences have lost trust in established political 
parties and have turned to ‘populists’ instead.
‘Austerity’, the policy pursued by the British government in the 
2010s, aimed to pay off state debt through balancing the budget year-by-
year. Such a policy may have been necessary in the 1970s, but its effects 
have been slow and inconclusive. There is no reason why we should cling 
to it in a completely different kind of crisis. If generals fight the last war 
over again, it seems the same is true of politicians. Most of the politicians 
in Britain’s two major parties are stuck in the 1970s.
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The brunt of austerity was borne by the already disadvantaged – that is, 
by those who rent rather than own their dwellings, and who depend on 
welfare and social security systems. In the UK, for example, the costs have 
included funding cuts to hospitals and schools; the closure of numerous 
public libraries; extreme strain on the facilities of the National Health 
Service; repeated crises in the prison service caused at least partly by a 
shortage of prison officers; families forced out of their homes and com-
munities because their housing benefit has been cut, or because the local 
council or housing association has sold their home to a developer; reduc-
tions in invalidity benefits and tax credits, which have left many claimants 
with anxiety-creating forms to fill in and intimidating tests to undergo; the 
withdrawal of many youth services and careers advice centres; and reduc-
tions in legal aid which exclude many people from access to the law, espe-
cially women, recent immigrants and people newly dismissed from 
employment. One could go on. Cumulatively, these cuts impaired the fis-
cal covenant and undermined the rule of law. They deprived many peo-
ple, especially the poor and disadvantaged, of their confidence in the 
future, of their feeling of being citizens and belonging to a community. 
That is what has made them willing prey to populist parties which have 
pledged to restore welfare benefits and recreate the sense of community.
Globalised markets had other effects too: many people from poorer 
and/or strife-torn countries migrated to European countries, most of 
which were still relatively prosperous. Many indigenous Europeans were 
left with the feeling that they had become surrounded by alien inhabit-
ants whom they did not know and could not trust, and that they could no 
longer have confidence in the safety nets supplied by the state in case of 
disaster. Islamist terrorism then added extra impetus to their fears. The 
result was widespread exaggerated distrust of all immigrants and of inter-
national institutions generally.
National populations were rejecting the consequences of free-mar-
ket economic globalisation, which had curtailed the political power of 
nation-states and their parliaments, and placed it in the hands of EU 
bureaucrats and unelected international business tycoons who could 
transfer resources across frontiers at the click of a mouse, regardless of 
the needs and wishes of local communities.
There is, though, another reason for the government’s stubborn 
adherence to inappropriate remedies: that is because the neo-liberal mar-
ket doctrines are overwhelmingly in the interest of the already wealthy 
and powerful. This factor has given those doctrines a powerful grip on 
our national media and an almost invincible hold on the practices of gov-
ernment officials, corporations and financial institutions all over the 
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country. The result is an ideological syndrome which operates like Soviet 
Communist ideology, regardless of the implications for the welfare of ordi-
nary human beings.
A lurid symptom of the consequences was the Grenfell Tower fire of 
the night of 14–15 June  2017, in which 72 people died and a further 
70 were injured. Only five years earlier, during a refit, the Royal Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea, practising financial rectitude, had deliber-
ately rejected fireproof external cladding in favour of a somewhat cheaper 
non-fireproof version, something they were enabled to do by recent 
relaxations in building regulations. The risks of this decision were exac-
erbated by the fact that the tower’s only evacuation route was down a 
single central staircase. The tenants of the tower, mostly poorer and 
minority-ethnic people, had reacted by raising concerns about the fire 
dangers. They had considered taking legal action against the council, but 
reportedly were prevented from doing so by recent cuts in legal aid. It 
later transpired that some 600 high-rise blocks in the UK had similar 
cladding – 57 in Glasgow alone. In some of them residents, rather than 
the government, the local council or the construction firms, were asked 
to pay the considerable cost of refurbishment.
After the fire, the government promised that funds would be pro-
vided for those who had lost their homes in it, and that all would be 
rehoused as close as possible to Grenfell Tower within three weeks. In 
actual fact, nearly a year later only 74 out of 210 households had been 
permanently rehoused. The rest were still living in temporary accommo-
dation or in hotel rooms, mostly whole families to one room. Kensington 
and Chelsea, the richest borough in the UK, had not even taken the step 
of compulsorily purchasing premises that were unoccupied in order to 
rehouse families.16 The whole episode suggested that the government and 
the local authority had mentally assigned Grenfell tenants to the cate-
gory of second-class citizens, with inferior financial and legal status com-
pared to the more affluent property owners living in some cases only a 
few yards away from them. The effect was especially dramatic in Kens-
ington, where some of London’s poorest people lived in high-rise blocks 
of flats, almost around the corner from fabulously wealthy Russian oli-
garchs and the sumptuous embassies around Kensington Palace.
Even without such apocalyptic scenarios, the disruption to stable 
routines and to household budgets, the restriction of access to the law, 
the impoverishment of collectively provided facilities – all these depriva-
tions loosened the bonds of attachment and routine confidence in the 
future which most of us take for granted most of the time, and which are 
the underpinning of democracy and civil society. Not many families fol-
171nEo-L ibEraLiSm , kEynESianiSm anD thE CurrEnt CriS iS
low politics closely, but most have become aware of the gradually 
increasing disentitlements imposed on them by a national government 
yielding to the demands of global finance. They also notice that the 
already wealthy are actually augmenting their wealth at the same time, 
apparently at everyone else’s expense. By 2017, figures showed that 
FTSE chief executive officers were earning 386 times the national living 
wage, or more specifically 132 times more than the average police officer, 
140 times more than a schoolteacher, 165 times more than a nurse, and 
312 times more than a care worker.17 Moreover, inherited wealth had 
become a far better determinant of social and economic status than 
either exceptional talent or hard work.18 Those with inherited wealth 
could expect to have it protected and enhanced by dedicated, discreet 
and extremely confidential wealth managers, handpicked for their trust-
worthy qualities.19 Much of it would be placed in minimally regulated 
private equity funds, hedge funds or in tax havens (many of them in 
Switzerland or in British dependencies), where it would be concealed 
from the tax authorities.20
The victims of this process feel that the government has violated 
the tacit social contract that holds democracies together. The result has 
been summarised by a former staunch supporter of neo-liberal globalisa-
tion, the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf. In recent years he has 
modified his views and now diagnoses a serious mismatch between the 
current mode of free market capitalism and democracy:
In democratic societies, a tacit bargain exists between elites and the 
rest of society. The latter say to the former: we will accept your 
power, prestige and prosperity, but only if we prosper too. A huge 
crisis dissolves that bargain. The elites come to be seen as incompe-
tent, rapacious or, in this case, both.
He adds that globalised elites have
become ever more detached from the countries that produced them. 
In the process, the glue that binds democracy  –  the notion of 
 citizenship – has weakened. . . .  The loss of confidence in the com-
petence and probity of elites inevitably reduces trust in democratic 
legitimacy. People feel even more than before that the country is 
not being governed for them, but for a narrow segment of well- 
connected insiders who reap most of the gains and, when things go 
wrong, are not just shielded from loss but impose massive costs on 
everybody else.21
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This is a pretty good description of what has been happening to 
Western societies for several decades, and of what has propelled populist 
parties into the foreground of politics. Why in an era of increasing eco-
nomic globalisation and increased mobility around the world should so 
many people react by demanding the reassertion of national distinctive-
ness? At the heart of the explanation for this apparent anomaly lies social 
trust.22 I shall concentrate here on two forms of social trust in particular: 
trust in money and economic institutions, and trust derived from the 
norms of national culture and national institutions. I shall argue that the 
symbolic attraction of the nation is far stronger than that of the econ-
omy – which is why people will often vote in ways detrimental to their 
economic interests.
The divisions in society resulting from ‘austerity’ have been summed 
up by the German political economist, Wolfgang Streeck, who believes 
globalised free markets are incompatible with liberal democracy. He labels 
the two categories Staatsvolk and Marktvolk. The former are the demo-
cratic electorate who choose between the main parties’ manifestos and 
leaders and who depend on the safety nets provided by the state; the lat-
ter are the financial markets, who guarantee investors’ financial security 
by demanding from governments that they prove their reliability as bor-
rowers. Streeck lays out the main features, demands and expectations of 
the two categories as follows:
Staatsvolk Marktvolk
national international
citizens investors
civil rights contractual claims
voters creditors
elections (periodic) auctions (continual)
loyalty ‘confidence’
public opinion interest rates
public services debt service23
It is evident that the ongoing development and separation of these 
two categories will tend to generate increasing inequality, since the Staats-
volk, more dependent on public services and welfare benefits provided 
by the state or local government, will tend from the outset to be poorer 
and more disadvantaged than the Marktvolk, and will become progres-
sively more so.
The financial crash of 2007–8 intensified resentments which had 
been mounting for a decade or two already. The unjustifiable inequalities 
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it exacerbated severely undermined confidence in the political and eco-
nomic system as a whole and provided a perfect setting for the rise of 
populist parties. They stood both for the traditionally right-wing ideals 
of national greatness, restriction of immigration and resistance to inter-
national institutions, yet also for the traditionally left-wing cause of gen-
erous welfare benefits.
In the UK, the leading populist role was taken by the UK Independ-
ence Party. In a futile attempt to prevent them eating into the Conserva-
tive vote, Prime Minister Cameron called a referendum for June 2016 on 
Britain’s membership in the European Union. A majority of the electorate 
voted to leave it. This was the first time that any nation (with the partial 
exception of Greenland, a Danish federal territory) had opted to quit what 
had hitherto seemed an inexorably expanding supranational organisa-
tion. The margin of the Brexiteers’ victory was not huge (51.9 per cent 
against 48.1 per cent), but it was definite. Examination of the voting pat-
terns revealed that the vote for Remain was highest (57 per cent) in the 
two top social strata (As and Bs), lower (49 per cent) in the middle (C1s) 
and at its minimum (36 per cent) in the lowest strata (C2s, Ds and Es). 
The main fault lines, however, were not social class, but education and 
age. Sixty-eight per cent of voters with completed higher education voted 
Remain, while 70 per cent of those who never advanced beyond GCSE 
(basic secondary school graduation) voted Leave. Of people over 65 years 
of age, 64 per cent voted Leave, and 36 per cent Remain; while of those 
aged 18–24, 71 per cent voted Remain and only 29 per cent Leave.24 The 
greatest contrasts thus depended on level of education and on stage of 
life rather than on social class as such, though of course those with better 
education tend anyway to belong to a higher social class; furthermore, 
older people will tend to have been less well educated. It is noteworthy 
too that, while the Remain campaign concentrated on economic argu-
ments, the Leave campaign put questions of identity, national sovereignty 
and immigration at the forefront, claiming that Britain was losing con-
trol of its own frontiers, its nationhood and its political system. ‘Give us 
back our nation!’ summed up their campaign in a few words.25
Streeck’s Marktvolk/Staatsvolk dichotomy roughly corresponds to 
the dichotomy expounded by another thinker concerned with the condi-
tion of contemporary British democracy: in a recent book, David Good-
hart distinguishes between ‘Anywhere’ people and ‘Somewhere’ people.26
The people Goodhart classifies as Anywheres are animated by what 
he calls ‘progressive individualism’ – that is, they value individual free-
dom very highly and are prepared to accept its social corollaries. Their 
worldview ‘places a high value on autonomy, mobility and novelty, and a 
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much lower value on group identity, tradition and national social con-
tracts (faith, flag and family)’. They ‘are comfortable with immigration, 
European integration and the spread of human rights legislation, all of 
which tend to dilute the claims of national citizenship’. By contrast, the 
Somewheres hold a worldview which Goodhart calls ‘decent populism’ 
(though he notes that a small minority of ‘hard authoritarians’ among 
them do not qualify as ‘decent’). They ‘are more socially conservative and 
communitarian by instinct. . . .  They feel uncomfortable about many 
aspects of cultural and economic change – such as mass immigration, an 
achievement society in which they struggle to achieve, the reduced sta-
tus of non-graduate employment and more fluid gender roles.’27 They 
react against both forms of ‘double liberalism’.
Drawing on recent opinion polls, Goodhart observes that in recent 
years more than half of the British people have agreed with the state-
ment ‘Britain has changed in recent times beyond recognition. It some-
times feels like a foreign country, and this makes me feel uncomfortable.’28 
One cause of this feeling has been the recent steep growth in immigra-
tion: there were approximately 1 million immigrants from EU countries 
living in Britain in the late 1990s, whereas by 2016 there were 3.3 million.29 
Somewheres are not totally opposed to immigration, but feel there are too 
many immigrants in the country, that their ubiquity has changed the 
country beyond recognition, and that their presence has put unaccepta-
ble strains on the NHS, the education system, the social welfare budget 
and the stock of housing, especially in certain localities. More over, suc-
cessive governments have failed to identify the locations under particular 
strain and help them with extra resources. The perception takes root that 
immigrants have come to Britain only to claim welfare benefits without 
having paid their share into the system first. Their dress, their food, their 
music, their customs and their religion (often Islam) feel alien and even 
threatening to native Brits, especially in certain towns (usually economi-
cally disadvantaged ones) in which immigrants have clustered in large 
numbers, and in some cases have recreated Pakistani, Bangladeshi or 
Somali communities as distinct ghetto-like areas. Islamist terrorism has 
naturally exacerbated this hostile perception.30
The term ‘nation-state’ has two halves. The state underpins the fis-
cal covenant, while the nation offers a sense of community and the sym-
bolic links which promote generalised social trust. Consider for a moment 
what the nation symbolises. It is the largest collective –  typically many 
millions of people – with which the individual can feel a sense of commu-
nity solidarity. A nation is a huge aggregation, each of whose members 
can know personally only a tiny proportion of its other members. Imagin-
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ing the unknown members as people to whom one can extend at least a 
preliminary presumption of trust and with whom one can engage more 
readily than with those outside the nation’s borders requires a symbolic 
repertoire capable of summing up the nation’s identity and projecting it 
to all its members. A shared language greatly eases mutual understand-
ing and can facilitate the settling of conflicts. A nation can be symboli-
cally evoked through its various emblems: the national flag, the national 
anthem, a portrait of the head of state. Its ceremonies –  connected with 
anniversaries or occasions of rejoicing or mourning  –  give people an 
opportunity to mingle with each other in a heightened emotional setting, 
in some cases enhanced by the liturgy of a distinctive religion. A shared 
history or folklore provides points of reference for conversation or public 
discourse. A common culture in literature, music or the visual arts, com-
municates feelings connected with the shared experience of homeland.31
Symbols are more powerful and more motivating than self-interest. 
That is one reason why many people in the Brexit referendum voted 
against their own economic interest (though of course it is also true that 
calculating one’s own long-term economic interest is difficult). More-
over, symbols are especially suited to communication through social 
media, which as a result have provided further impetus to populist poli-
tics. The prevalence of social media in recent years has greatly reduced 
the incidence of public meetings as well as of membership of collective 
organisations such as political parties. While it is possible to organise col-
lective activities such as strikes and demonstrations through Twitter and 
Facebook, the prior communication of the individuals involved is mini-
mal. For these reasons, nowadays class identity has totally lost its con-
nection with political party voting.32
Social media also tend to act as an ‘echo chamber’. That is, individ-
uals receive the kind of news they want to hear, usually amplified for 
good measure, and the kind of political commentary whose lines of argu-
ment they already find congenial. Extremist content – chauvinist, racist, 
misogynist – is disseminated with minimal restriction, while moderate, 
nuanced or complex comments are drowned out. In a parody of Haber-
mas’s ‘public sphere’, public discussion tends to proceed in closed boxes 
of strongly held and often exaggerated opinions without differentiated 
mutual debate. This is the milieu in which ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ 
assertions become apparently valid currency. These are all symptoms of 
fragmented social trust.33
What then is to be done? We have seen that the application of Keynes-
ian theory can cause serious problems: it can provide impetus for an 
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 inflationary situation that it cannot deal with. However, the remedies 
launched in the 1970s and stubbornly adhered to up to the present gen-
erate even more serious problems –  indeed, threaten to destroy liberal 
democracy itself.
At the heart of any recovery must be massive investment in the exist-
ing strengths of our economy, to ensure its future place in the world, and 
in the facilities that the British people need – above all, housing  (applying 
new environment-friendly technology), infrastructure and green indus-
try. This investment should be handled not directly by the Treasury, but by 
a National Investment Bank, probably bolstered by Treasury guarantees 
of some kind. The bank would have no difficulty in attracting investment: 
there is a lot of money sloshing around in the British economy, some of it 
going to tax havens, and some into the overblown real estate market. 
Insurance companies and pension funds are desperate for investment 
opportunities offering a reliable and reasonably good return. But if yet 
more investment is needed, there is no reason why governments should 
not print new money, provided it goes into producing genuine new wealth, 
not simply increasing the price of existing assets – as was the main result of 
existing ‘quantitative easing’ programmes.
Such investment would need to be informed by a well-designed 
industrial policy, since misplaced investment would lead only to infla-
tion. Since the 1970s, state industrial policy has been more or less taboo, 
but there is no inherent reason why that should be so. There are many 
areas in which innovation offers prospects: artificial intelligence, biotech-
nology, nanotechnology, 3D printing, materials science, and so on. They 
will all require a serious research and development input which universi-
ties and leading companies should be well placed to provide. As far as 
possible, these new ventures should be sited outside the ‘golden triangle’ 
of London and south-east England, in the regions which have suffered 
worst in what for them has been a very long recession. The rail line HS2 
(if it is ultimately built) should be quickly succeeded  –  or better still 
replaced – by HS3 from Liverpool via Manchester to Sheffield and Leeds, 
with eventual extensions to Hull and York. This would link great cities 
at  present plagued by poor communications with everywhere except 
 London.
This kind of revival should be accompanied by a reform of the struc-
ture of British corporations. The history of corporations shows that lim-
ited liability was necessitated in order to encourage investment in 
innovative, high-risk enterprises, since investors could not be expected 
to chance their entire property in such investments. In the nineteenth 
century, railways would never have been built without limited liability.34 
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But much economic activity does not entail such risks. Health centres, 
public utilities, public transport, educational institutions and housing do 
not need daring innovation and seldom incur serious risks, so they do 
not need to be run as profit-maximising, share-value-driven companies. 
Rather, they need to be steady, reliable performers offering good service 
to the public. At the moment even corporations conducting such public 
functions are structured so as to maximise ‘shareholder value’ – that is, 
the products of their successes go to their directors and shareholders, 
while the costs of their failures are borne mainly by unsecured creditors, 
employees, customers, those who live in the surrounding areas and, when 
necessary, by the taxpayer. Corporations have a public purpose: that is 
why, when they entail risk, they are allowed the privilege of joint-stock 
ownership and limited liability. They should not abuse that privilege for 
rewards which go to the very few. They should be reformed to reflect 
their multifaceted public role. There are many proposals for doing this 
currently being discussed by communitarian associations, and they should 
be taken seriously.35
The restoration of social security benefits cannot be accomplished 
overnight but must be a declared aim of parliament from the outset. Invest-
ment will create new jobs, with the result that the unemployed and 
poorly paid will come off benefits and begin to pay taxes. Their product 
will also have its own value. This is the ‘multiplier’ of which Keynes spoke, 
and it tends to promote economic growth. Gradually, moreover, employ-
ees will begin to feel that they have a real place in the community and in 
the productive economy.
In addition, there is no reason other than unimaginative and selfish 
dogma why taxes should not be raised. The most productive tax would 
probably be a land value tax. This would be complex to set up, but it 
would bring enormous benefits. Land cannot be transferred to the Virgin 
Islands. Moreover, its equitable taxation would encourage better use of 
land, especially vacant land with planning permission for housing. Brit-
ain should cooperate with other countries, including those in the EU, in 
discovering the true beneficiary ownership of opaquely managed compa-
nies registered in tax havens and in requiring them to register their prof-
its on territories where they operate. They could then be taxed in the 
same way that indigenous companies are (and other countries would 
enjoy the same benefit). This is something that a single country cannot 
do on its own: targeted companies would simply smartly transfer their 
profits to a more compliant jurisdiction.
In short, the situation is extremely serious, but it is not hopeless. 
Keynesianism has its problems, but those generated by the globalised and 
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financialised free market are much more dangerous to liberal democracy. 
Intelligent and determined reform of our economic structures would ena-
ble the British state and society to deliver the kind of economic and com-
munity benefits which are promised by populist parties but cannot possibly 
be achieved by the methods they propose. One of the principal strengths 
of democracy, compared to authoritarianism, is its flexibility and its capac-
ity to respond  –  albeit often belatedly  –  to unforeseen challenges and 
dangers.36 It certainly needs that strength now.
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Political alternatives on the 
Western Left
Podemos, Syriza, Sanders and Corbyn
Peter J. S. Duncan
The combined economic, social and ideological crisis which struck the 
West in 2008 ought to have meant victory for the left. But instead, all 
over Europe and in the United States, the traditional centre-left in most 
countries has lost power and appears weak.
This chapter will focus on four of the most effective formations on 
the left which have emerged in the wake of the crisis, challenging the 
centre-left: Podemos and Syriza in continental Europe, and the movements 
behind Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn in the Democratic Party and 
the Labour Party.
In most of the main West European countries, the old socialist and 
social-democratic parties are out of office and losing influence.
In France, the Parti Socialiste, at the end of the presidency of the 
Socialist François Hollande, failed to make the runoff in the 2017 presi-
dential election, as the Front National (FN) took second place. In Ger-
many, the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) is the junior partner in the 
coalition led by Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and 
in opinion polls now comes third behind the CDU and the Greens. In 
Italy, the Partito Democratica (PD), which developed out of the Partito 
Comunista Italiano (PCI), lost office to a right-populist alliance in 
March  2018. In Greece, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, PASOK, 
has all but disappeared; while in Spain, the Spanish Socialist Workers 
Party, PSOE, has struggled to hold on as the largest force on the left, but 
managed to form a minority government. In Sweden, the Social Demo-
crats, who governed for most of the post-war period, won their lowest 
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level of support for a century in the September 2018 elections, although 
still remained the largest party.
Portugal is an exception, where the Partido Socialista remains the 
dominant force on the left and since 2015 has led a coalition including 
the Communists and the Bloco de Esqueirda (Left Bloc) of radical social-
ists. This coalition has been seeking to mitigate the effects of an EU 
austerity-oriented bailout programme while under IMF supervision.
In Britain, the Labour Party was voted out of government in 2010 
and lost two more elections in 2015 and 2017. The election of Corbyn as 
leader after the 2015 defeat has pushed the party sharply to the left and 
seriously frightened the wealthier sections of British society. The accept-
ability of socialist ideas in the United States has also grown significantly 
in the wake of Sanders’ unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic nomi-
nation in 2016.
The most successful groups on the radical left on the European con-
tinent have been Syriza and Podemos. Both arose outside the traditional 
socialist parties, under the impact of the crisis. Syriza has been the senior 
partner in the Greek government since 2015. Podemos has challenged 
PSOE for the leadership of the Spanish left, with successes for its associ-
ates in Madrid and Barcelona.
This chapter will examine the growth and development of these four 
movements – Podemos, Syriza, the Sanders campaign and the movement 
behind Corbyn – since they appear to be the most successful radical groups 
in Western Europe and North America. Why did some of the movements 
develop within existing parties, while others emerged as new organisa-
tions? How did they grow? How did they approach identity politics? Did 
the way they organised prefigure the sort of society they wanted to cre-
ate? How radical were their aims and programmes? Did they succeed in 
increasing support for a socialist society, as opposed to a capitalist soci-
ety with egalitarian policies and a welfare state? In other words, have 
they succeeded in what the English socialist William Morris called ‘mak-
ing socialists’, or, in Gramscian terms, in challenging the hegemony of 
capitalist ideology in their societies?
Valuable research has been done on how the radical left parties in Europe 
responded to the Western financial crisis. In particular, Luke March has 
written the monograph Radical Left Parties in Europe (2011) and coed-
ited with Daniel Keith Europe’s Radical Left: From Marginality to the Main-
stream? (2016).1 Both were written too early to analyse the important 
developments in and after 2015. A penetrating survey of three of the new 
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movements emerging from the crisis – Occupy Wall Street, Movimento 
Cinque Stella (Five Star Movement) and Podemos  –  is by Marco Brizi-
arelli and Susana Martinez Guillem. Entitled Reviving Gramsci: Crisis, 
Communication, and Change (2016), it locates these movements within 
what Antonio Gramsci described as an ‘organic crisis’ in which the hegem-
ony of the ruling capitalist class is challenged.2 The Socialist Challenge 
Today: Syriza, Sanders, Corbyn, by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2018), 
reviews three of the movements discussed in this chapter.3 Steve Rich-
ards’ The Rise of the Outsiders: How Mainstream Politics Lost its Way (2017) 
examines the new movements of left and right and the decline of the 
centre-left and centre-right.4
The most substantial study of Podemos in English is Ińigo Errejón 
and Chantal Mouffe’s Podemos: In the Name of the People (2016).5 The 
movement’s founder, Pablo Iglesias, has written Politics in a Time of Cri-
sis: Podemos and the Future of Democracy in Europe (2015).6 The most 
detailed study in English of Syriza is by Yanis Varoufakis, Adults in the 
Room: My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment (2017).7 This is a mem-
oir of his time as finance minister in 2015. An independent analysis of 
Syriza’s first months in power is Kevin Ovenden’s Syriza: Inside the Laby-
rinth (2015).8 Bernie Sanders’ own Our Revolution: A Future to Believe In 
(2017) combines autobiography and political manifestos.9 It is probably 
the most useful study of his presidential campaign. Heather Gautney’s 
Crashing the Party: From the Bernie Sanders Campaign to a Progressive 
Movement (2018) is somewhat uncritical.10 There is a substantial litera-
ture on Corbyn’s rise to the leadership of the Labour Party and his subse-
quent performance. Particularly noteworthy are two books with a 
sympathetic but critical approach: Richard Seymour’s Corbyn: The Strange 
Rebirth of Radical Politics (2016), and The Corbyn Effect, edited by Mark 
Perryman (2017).11
Debates about how to define socialism and new ways of getting 
there emerged after the 2008 Western financial crisis. The consequences of 
the crisis presented a new situation and new opportunities. Concerning the 
historical memory of the new movements, it was important that both Pablo 
Iglesias, the leader of Podemos (born in 1978), and Alexis Tsipras (born in 
1974), who became the leader of Syriza, began their political careers 
within the Moscow-oriented communist movement, in the youth organisa-
tions of the Eurocommunist Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the more 
traditional, vanguardist Greek Communist Party (KKE), respectively.12 This 
trajectory equipped them with some understanding of historical debates 
about the relationship between the working class, its party and the state.
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The 2008 crisis revived social struggles. They first evolved around 
single issues or particular economic sectors. Young people were especially 
involved, not least because many had not found a place in the labour mar-
ket and were hit disproportionately around the globe. Within the EU, 
young people in southern member countries – Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal – suffered most.
The year 2011 may be considered the beginning of the coalescence 
of these struggles into more general movements. The Arab Spring devel-
oped from the beginning of the year as popular movements against 
repressive regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Bahrain. On 15 May, 
over 100,000 people demonstrated in 54 Spanish cities against politicians, 
bankers and what they termed el Sistema. This was the movement which 
became known as the Indignados (the outraged or indignant), based par-
ticularly on young, educated people.13 A few days later appeared the aga-
naktismenoi (indignant citizens’ movement), also known as the ‘Squares’ 
movement’, in Greece. From September, the Occupy Wall Street campaign 
developed in the United States, further strengthened by campus protests 
against increased tuition fees. This movement, directed against the heart 
of finance capital, inspired ‘Occupy the City’ in London, in which scores 
of people lived for several weeks in tents outside St Paul’s Cathedral. In 
Russia, hundreds of thousands demonstrated in the major cities in pro-
test against fraud perpetrated on behalf of Vladimir Putin’s United Russia 
party in the State Duma elections in December. Common to these pro-
tests was the new factor of the use of Internet platforms such as Twitter 
and Facebook, both to spread information about abuses in government 
and business and to organise and publicise protest actions.
These movements of political protest across different parts of the 
globe formed the background to the emergence of the four parties and 
movements which will be considered here. They appear in the order in 
which they became important.
Podemos: Left populism and centralisation
This section will show how a movement based on protests in the streets 
rose to become a major influence in Spanish national politics, able in con-
cert with others to sack governments.
The background to the emergence of the Indignados in 2011 was 
anger at corruption in the Spanish political system, which extended even 
to the royal family. The two parties that alternated in power after the 
death of dictator General Francisco Franco in 1975, the conservative Par-
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tido Popular (PP) and the socialist PSOE, were losing support. The Euro-
communist PCE had already begun to decline with the transition to 
democracy and as far back as 1986 had created an alliance with other 
groups, the United Left (IU). A new centre-right group, Ciudadanos (Citi-
zens), was gaining strength.
the rise of Podemos
Seeking to turn the Indignados into an electoral force, a number of left-
wing groups, including the Trotskyist Anti-Capitalist Left, and intellectu-
als formed Podemos (‘We can’) in January  2014. From the start, the 
leader was the young, pony-tailed, charismatic Pablo Iglesias Turrión, one 
of a group of political scientists at Complutense University of Madrid who, 
following Ernesto Laclau,14 were seeking to build a movement on the basis 
of populist rather than explicitly socialist or class-based appeals. Some of 
the group, such as Ińigo Errejón, also at Complutense and arguably the 
group’s principal theoretician, had studied the experience of populism in 
Bolivia and Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.
In populist fashion, Podemos presented society as divided between 
‘us’, the people, la gente, against ‘them’, the political and economic 
establishment, referred to as ‘La Casta’.15 Iglesias argued that the Spanish 
elites were, in Gramscian terms, facing an organic crisis of the loss of 
hegemony and that this had led to a regime crisis.16 Podemos also opposed 
the Lisbon Treaty, increasing the powers of the EU, and Spain’s member-
ship of NATO. It argued, unlike the established parties, that political 
activity could be fun. Helped by Iglesias’s status as a popular television 
presenter, Podemos succeeded in winning 8 per cent of the votes in the 
May 2014 elections to the European Parliament, doing especially well 
among the youth voters.
In the course of the first year of its existence, it grew to have the 
second largest membership of any party in Spain, behind the PP and over-
taking PSOE. In November 2014, Podemos organised a ‘Citizens’ Assem-
bly’ to convert itself into a political party. This marked a turning point 
away from a more open, horizontal approach to organisation to a more 
centralised, vertical one and was achieved through the adoption of the 
structures by online voting; the leadership’s proposals prevailed over those 
of a more horizontalist faction. This was followed by the adoption of the 
party executive by choice between slates rather than voting for individ-
ual candidates. The leadership’s slate won, and the impression of a return 
to communist norms seemed reinforced by the election of Iglesias to the 
new post of general secretary. Alexandros Kioupkiolis, from the Aristotle 
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University of Thessaloniki, has argued that the stagnation which Podemos 
suffered after 2015 began with the introduction of the centralist prac-
tices within the party, at odds with its proclaimed aims for society.17
In its campaigning, however, Podemos retained an open attitude. 
In the elections in Spain’s two largest cities, Madrid and Barcelona, in 
May and June 2015, it supported anti-austerity coalitions, Barcelona en 
Comú and Ahora Madrid, rather than standing in its own right. These 
coalitions had built support in particular by opposing the eviction of ten-
ants who could not afford to pay their rent and mortgage-holders who 
could not keep up their payments. Neither won outright control of the 
city councils but formed majorities together with PSOE; and both their 
candidates for mayor were victorious.
Symbolically, both new mayors were women. Manuela Carmena in 
Madrid had been active in the communist underground under Franco’s 
dictatorship. Ada Colau, 30 years her junior, was a founder of an anti-
eviction group, Mortgage Victims’ Platform, in Barcelona; she had once 
been arrested for occupying a bank in a protest. She spoke of ‘feminine 
values’ being applied to ‘a deepening of democracy’.18 Both Carmena and 
Colau lost office in the May 2019 elections, in Madrid to the resurgent 
right and in Barcelona to the Catalan Republican Left.
Ahead of the elections to the Cortes (lower house of parliament) of 
December 2015, Podemos aimed to overtake PSOE. On the way, it sug-
gested joint primaries with the other left parties to agree on candidates; 
the other parties, including United Left, were unresponsive.19 Youth unem-
ployment reached 55 per cent in Spain in 2015.20 Jobless young gradu-
ates and others had time to campaign for Podemos. In the elections, 
Podemos became the third largest party, with 20.65 per cent, behind the 
PP with 28.71 per cent and PSOE with 22.02 per cent. This effectively 
ended the two-party system and inaugurated a period of government 
instability. Another election was called for June 2016. Podemos formed an 
alliance of left-wing groups, Unidos Podemos (‘United we can’), this time 
including United Left, but their combined vote rose only to 21.2 per cent, 
still behind PSOE.
Changing the government
Following this election, the PSOE leader, Pedro Sánchez, sought to form 
a government with the support of Podemos. In October 2016, however, 
the PSOE right wing overthrew Sánchez. They preferred to support a con-
servative PP government under Mariano Rojay than allow Podemos into 
power.
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Podemos had to take a position on the issue of Catalonia when the 
Catalan government held a referendum on 1 October 2017 on the inde-
pendence of the region from Spain. Barcelona, which with a high proportion 
of immigrants from other parts of Spain was broadly against independ-
ence, was also a centre of support for Podemos. The PP, PSOE and Ciudada-
nos declared the referendum illegal, and the PP government sent police to 
beat citizens peacefully queuing to take part in the vote. Podemos took a 
principled position, avoiding the national-populist temptation of support-
ing the government, while also refusing to support independence. Instead 
it urged both sides to find a peaceful compromise.
The PP government lasted until June 2018, when a court found the 
Popular Party guilty of a major act of corruption. Meanwhile, Sánchez 
had regained the PSOE leadership. He proposed a no-confidence motion 
on Rajoy in the Cortes. With the support of Podemos it passed. Iglesias 
then called on Sánchez to include Podemos in a coalition government led 
by PSOE, but Sánchez refused and formed a minority government, 
depending on the support of Podemos.
This apparently influential position for Podemos concealed the fact 
that it was going through a period of splits, stagnation and decline. Igle-
sias himself had faced and defeated a leadership challenge in Febru-
ary 2017 from the theoretician Ińigo Errejón. In May 2018 Iglesias came 
under fresh criticism from within the party for supposedly ‘joining the 
bourgeoisie’ after buying together with his partner, the parliamentary 
spokesperson of the party, a €600,000 house with a swimming pool out-
side Madrid on a 30-year mortgage. They responded by putting their posi-
tions to a special confidence vote of the membership, winning easily. By 
then support for Podemos in the country was down to 18 per cent.21 The 
party was further weakened when Errejón left in January 2019. In the 
parliamentary elections held in the following April, the Unidos Podemos 
bloc won only 14 per cent of the vote, falling from 71 to 42 seats, while 
PSOE consolidated its leading position, winning 29 per cent of the vote.
The continuing refusal of Podemos to articulate an avowedly social-
ist position reinforces the view that it is a populist movement, although 
clearly oriented towards the left along the lines argued by Chantal Mouffe. 
It does not promote Spanish nationalism or anti-immigrant feeling, as 
right-wing populist movements do. It succeeds in attracting not only peo-
ple on the left, but also those without ideology, even though the leaders 
are strongly influenced by Marxism. The political scientist David Bailey 
suggests that the leaders ‘have become so focused on winning elections 
that their adherence to any particular set of political principles appears 
hard to discern’.22 A further concern, in the populist tradition of a strong 
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leader, is the high profile of the general secretary, Iglesias, and his appar-
ent invincibility in his position. While all political leaders today can 
expect to have their personal lives examined under a microscope, mis-
takes on his part might cause lasting damage to Podemos.
In the meantime, while attracting young, educated people into elec-
toral politics, its failure to analyse the class and systemic roots of the aus-
terity policy it opposes means that it is unable to pose an alternative to 
capitalist hegemony; or even, in Morris’s words, to ‘make socialists’.
Syriza: Three victories and a retreat
Like Podemos, Syriza gained support rapidly under the impact of crisis, 
but unlike Podemos, it succeeded in entering government. Elected in 
January 2015 on a programme of opposition to the austerity measures to 
deal with the Greek debt crisis proposed by the ‘troika’ – the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) –  it secured further support for its resistance in a national 
referendum in July 2015. Yet within a day of the referendum result, the 
Syriza government capitulated to the troika and embarked on the harsh 
austerity programme that they demanded.
Why did Syriza succeed so well in propagating its policies and val-
ues, and why did it capitulate? Its resistance to austerity policies was popu-
lar. It will be argued that, at the same time, Syriza’s commitment to 
Greece staying in the euro made it a hostage to the rules of the troika; 
and it failed to prepare the population for the sacrifices that a decisive 
clash with the Greek ruling class and the troika would entail.
the rise of Syriza
Unlike Podemos, Syriza was openly on the radical left. ‘Syriza’ is the Greek 
acronym for the Coalition of the Radical Left, formed in 2004 as an alli-
ance of various ecological, communist, Trotskyist, Maoist and other left 
groups. Tsipras was elected leader in 2008.
Similarly to the situation in Spain, two parties had alternated in 
power in Greece since the overthrow of the colonels’ dictatorship in 1974: 
the conservative New Democracy and the socialist PASOK. In May 2010, 
under the impact of the financial crisis, the PASOK government signed a 
bailout agreement with the troika. The loan was conditional on the appli-
cation of an austerity programme of spending cuts and tax rises, known 
as the ‘Memorandum’. In 2011, as austerity continued, and under the 
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impetus of the Indignados in Spain, the aganaktismenoi appeared and 
began to occupy public squares. The aganaktismenoi were not only oppos-
ing austerity but also making political demands for more accountable 
and direct democracy. Whereas Podemos evolved from the movement on 
the streets, Syriza already existed when the aganaktismenoi emerged, and 
was able to support and interact with them.
PASOK’s implementation of the Memorandum, first on its own and 
then from November 2011 in coalition with New Democracy, led to the 
haemorrhaging of its support. The communist party, the KKE, previously 
the largest party to the left of PASOK, was suspicious of the movement in 
the squares because it could not control them; it therefore lost influence. 
Syriza overtook both and became the largest opposition group in the elec-
tions of May and June 2012. Syriza’s Electoral Declaration proclaimed: ‘a 
socialism with freedom, a fully blossoming democracy where all citizens 
participate in decision making is the strategic aim’.23
Entrenched as the main opposition party, Syriza highlighted the 
struggles of different sectors of society against austerity, from employees 
of the broadcasting corporation which the government had closed down 
to the sacked cleaning ladies of the Ministry of Finance. It gave practical 
help to the victims of austerity too; it established food banks, known as 
Solidarity Clubs, all over Greece.
The majority of the Greek people strongly favoured remaining in 
the euro, despite the austerity policies, because of the association of the 
euro with political and economic stability and prosperity. Aware of this, 
Tsipras persuaded Syriza to abandon its opposition to the euro in 2012. 
Only in 2013 did Syriza transform itself from a coalition into a unitary 
party, but with an internal opposition, the Left Platform. They favoured 
leaving the euro and won 30 per cent of the Central Committee seats.
In September 2014 Tsipras unveiled the Thessaloniki Programme. 
It reflected pressure from the Left Platform. The programme prom-
ised the nationalisation of the banks, renegotiation of Greece’s debt 
including a substantial write-off, and the reversal of austerity policies 
imposed under the Memorandum. All this was, however, to be subject to 
a balanced budget. The economist Yanis Varoufakis, who had agreed to 
become finance minister in a Syriza government, denounced the pro-
gramme for promising more than could be achieved. He called on Syriza 
to face up to reality and promise, in the immediate term, only ‘blood, 
sweat and tears’ in the struggle to get the budget balanced. Tsipras’s col-
league Nikos Pappas explained to Varoufakis that in fact Varoufakis him-
self would author the real programme of action; Thessaloniki was only to 
rally the troops.24
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It would seem that Tsipras was consciously deceiving the Syriza 
members and the voters about what a Syriza government would be able 
to do. In order to ensure their election, they were making promises that 
could not be fulfilled without a confrontation with the troika.
Varoufakis himself had a broad understanding of the economic cri-
sis facing not only Greece but also European capitalism and the Euro-
pean Union as an institution. His fear was that capitalism might collapse 
in the crisis before an alternative had been prepared to replace it. Given 
the weakness of the left in Europe, as a self-styled ‘erratic Marxist’, he 
came to the conclusion that the left should seek to stabilise the situation. 
As he warned in an article written before entering politics:
Europe’s crisis is far less likely to give birth to a better alternative to 
capitalism than it is to unleash dangerously regressive forces that 
have the capacity to cause a humanitarian bloodbath, while extin-
guishing the hope for any progressive moves for generations to come.
[. . . ] we have a contradictory mission: to arrest the freefall of Euro-
pean capitalism in order to buy the time we need to formulate its 
alternative.25
resisting the troika
Syriza easily won the election held in January 2015 with 36.3 per cent of 
the vote and 149 out of 300 seats. The KKE refused to endorse the Syriza 
project and remained in opposition. Instead of allying with the left-wing 
parties, Tsipras decided to form a coalition with a small right-wing radi-
cal populist group, the Independent Greeks (ANEL). Their 13 seats gave 
the new coalition a stable majority.
Naturally, Tsipras was criticised for allowing this right-wing group 
into office. What made the Independent Greeks the right partner for 
Tsipras was their implacable resistance to austerity; and they promised 
not to interfere with Syriza’s strategy negotiating with the troika.26 The 
presence of the Independent Greeks in the coalition also indicated that 
Syriza was not intending to embark on specifically socialist policies, and 
could reassure the Greek ruling class of this. This failure to confront 
entrenched domestic interests weakened Syriza’s resistance to the troika.27
In the first week after the election, the government moved to stop 
privatisation, restore pensions, reintroduce the minimum wage, restore 
free prescriptions and hospital visits, and restore trade union rights. 
Greece’s debt bailout had reached €240 billion, with the final tranche of 
€7.2 billion due in February to keep the government going. Tsipras 
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appointed Varoufakis as finance minister. He announced that his minis-
try’s cleaning ladies would be among those public employees who would 
get their jobs back.28
The troika continued to insist on the application of the Memoran-
dum. Varoufakis made clear that he wanted to compromise with the troika. 
Ahead of his first meeting with the EU finance ministers’ Eurogroup on 
11 February, he said Syriza was willing to implement 70 per cent of the 
Memorandum. This provoked a sharp protest from the head of the Left 
Platform, Energy Minister Panagiotis Lafazanis. At the Eurogroup meet-
ing, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble announced, ‘Elections 
cannot be allowed to change economic policy.’29
The Syriza leadership believed that they held a valuable negotiat-
ing card: the threat to leave the euro if Brussels was too unreasonable. 
A key problem with this was that the population was wedded to the euro; 
and Tsipras was not willing to challenge this publicly. Moreover, as Var-
oufakis has argued, already in 2012 Schäuble had decided that Greece 
should be forced out of the euro as an example.30 Schäuble’s refusal to 
negotiate on the terms of the Memorandum meant deadlock; but this 
was broken the following day by the intervention of Angela Merkel. She 
wished Greece to remain in the eurozone, and therefore wanted an agree-
ment and overruled Schäuble.
The reform programme which Varoufakis submitted made a num-
ber of concessions to the troika. The raising of the minimum wage was 
postponed, early retirements would be halted and privatisations would 
not be reversed. Tsipras sought to maintain domestic support by intro-
ducing free electricity and food stamps to the poorest in Greece, further 
antagonising the creditors.31 The prime minister’s tactics seem to have 
been to make concessions to the troika formally, but delay their imple-
mentation in practice, while presenting himself domestically to have been 
more successful in the negotiations than he had been. At the same time, 
he sought to enlarge his negotiating freedom by threatening to default on 
the IMF debt, when in fact he had no intention of doing so.32
Trying to force Syriza to accept its programme, the troika threat-
ened to deny Greece the $7.2 billion of bailout money. Without this, 
Greece would be unable to meet its due payments and would be declared 
bankrupt.33 On 26 June the troika rejected the latest offer from Tsipras of 
substantial tax increases and presented an ultimatum. Greece had to 
implement the troika’s programme, with harsher tax increases and a rise 
in the retirement age to 67 by 2022, in exchange for a five-month exten-
sion to the bailout. If the prime minister did not agree, the bailout would 
end in four days.
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the referendum and after
Tsipras responded that night by calling a referendum on the bailout terms. 
The troika was joined by an alliance of German, French and Italian social-
democratic leaders, warning that a vote against the terms would mean 
that Greece would have to leave the euro. Tsipras, Varoufakis and the 
government nevertheless asked Greeks to vote ‘No’ to the troika’s terms, 
and Tsipras warned that the government would resign if the vote was 
‘Yes’.34
The referendum campaign split Greece, with right-wing politicians 
and business leaders accusing Syriza of wanting to bring back the drachma. 
Trade unions and the left organised demonstrations and strikes for a ‘No’ 
vote. Defying Germany and Brussels, Syriza at the referendum on 5 July 
won a crushing ‘No’ vote of 61.3 per cent, including 80 per cent of voters 
under 34. Tsipras now sought the backing of the opposition parties in his 
efforts to have the debts rescheduled. Varoufakis resigned, blaming pres-
sure from the creditors. Tsipras gave in to the political and economic 
pressure from Berlin and Brussels and offered a new programme of tough 
austerity measures to get another bailout and stay in the euro.35
Seeking to explain why his colleagues had capitulated to the credi-
tors so soon after winning an impressive victory at the referendum, Var-
oufakis has argued that Tsipras feared that if they persisted, the Greek 
right wing would organise a coup through the president and the security 
services. Instead, Tsipras wanted to continue the policy of pretending to 
cooperate with the troika while preparing resistance.36 Whether or not 
Tsipras really feared a coup, it is undeniable that he would have lost popu-
lar support if he had allowed Greece to be pushed out of the euro.
On 13 July, after another ultimatum, this time from Merkel and Hol-
lande, he signed up to the ‘Third Memorandum’ to gain access to €86 billion 
in bailout funds. This austerity programme was worse than what he had 
earlier rejected, and the government conceded control over whole areas of 
economic and social policy to the troika.37
The left wing of Syriza refused to support the deal; in August, with 
40 Syriza MPs including Varoufakis rebelling, the programme was passed 
with support from opposition parties. Varoufakis argued that the deal 
would make the economy worse and allow Greek oligarchs to maintain 
their control over it.38 Lafazanis led the Left Platform out of Syriza and 
formed Popular Unity. Having lost his majority, Tsipras resigned as prime 
minister; but the following month he led Syriza to victory in a general 
election, with 35.5 per cent, only slightly less than in January. Tsipras 
formed another coalition with the Independent Greeks. He had managed 
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to persuade sufficient numbers of voters that if austerity was the price of 
staying in the euro, he could be relied on to minimise the impact on ordi-
nary people.39
Over the following three years, Syriza presided over more economic 
decline and cutbacks. Finally, in June 2018 it reached another agreement 
with the troika, deferring some debt repayments and extending another 
€15 billion in credits, but marking the official end of the bailout. By then 
GDP had fallen 26 per cent since 2010, wages nearly 20 per cent and pen-
sions 70 per cent. Unemployment was at 20 per cent and youth unem-
ployment at 43 per cent. Greece promised to maintain a defined budget 
surplus, excluding debt repayment, until 2060. Syriza was trailing New 
Democracy in the opinion polls.40
The personality of Tsipras was an important factor in building up 
support for Syriza. Faith in Syriza and in Tsipras himself led to his elec-
tion victory even after his capitulation to the troika following the refer-
endum. The party’s strategy, however, had been flawed from the start. 
Instead of telling voters in 2012 that there was a choice between auster-
ity imposed from outside and leaving the euro, which at least in the short 
term would have made things worse, Tsipras made promises he knew he 
could not keep. He would not allow Greece to be forced out of the euro, 
although for negotiating purposes he was willing to pretend that he was. 
Varoufakis, on the other hand, was open about the depth of the crisis 
and the resulting dilemma, and he was prepared to leave the euro if it 
was the only way to escape the creditors’ dictates. But he was unwilling 
to seek to bring down the EU structures, which he considered worth 
defending against chaos and the threat from the right. Neither Tsipras 
nor Varoufakis were ready to use the Greek crisis to argue for a transition 
to  socialism.
In Spain and Greece, radical leftists believed that the main socialist par-
ties were too enmeshed in the existing system to be agents of social change, 
and were sufficiently discredited to make the new movements, Podemos 
and Syriza, serious contenders for power.
In the United States and Britain, on the other hand, the two major 
parties of right and left were well entrenched. The first-past-the-post elec-
toral systems tended to hinder the development of third parties. On the 
left, both the Labour Party and the Democratic Party could claim achieve-
ments in social reform, and both had strong links with the trade union 
movement. But the Labour Party’s commitment to creating a socialist soci-
ety was lukewarm, and under its leader Tony Blair removed the tradi-
tional aim of an economy based on ‘common ownership’ from the party 
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constitution in 1995. The Democratic Party never had a socialist orienta-
tion and had strong ties to American business. So in both countries, social-
ists have debated for more than a century about whether it was possible to 
work inside them, or to create a separate socialist party. In 2015, two 
white-haired men attempted to move both these parties to the left.41
Bernie Sanders and the Democratic Socialists of  
America: A political revolution?
The American left is still divided between those who fight for their ideas 
and for elective office through the Democratic Party, in some cases through 
the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), and those who maintain their 
purity in isolated groups or as independent individuals. It is therefore 
not surprising that Bernie Sanders, the self-described ‘democratic social-
ist’ Independent US senator from Vermont, has had an ambiguous rela-
tionship with the Democratic Party. As well as seeking to influence 
Democratic opinion, most obviously in his campaign for the 2016 Demo-
cratic presidential nomination, he has sought to appeal to campaigners 
and members of a variety of disadvantaged groups outside the party. This 
section will analyse Sanders’ campaign and ask whether, despite its ulti-
mate defeat, it had a more lasting impact. First, it will discuss the reasons 
why the campaign gained momentum but did not succeed. Then it will 
consider the impact on the DSA.
bernie Sanders’ campaign: victory in defeat
In 2008, the financial crisis helped bring Barack Obama to office. Although 
the first Black president was socially progressive, he tended to follow neo-
liberal economic policies. This was clear in his advocacy of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, which not only aimed to bring down trade barriers 
but also shifted power from states to corporations. Extra-parliamentary 
movements gained strength: in response to the crisis, Occupy Wall Street 
in 2011, campaigns in support of raising the minimum wage, and Black 
Lives Matter in opposition to police killings of African Americans. Obama 
was re-elected in 2012, but in the November 2014 midterm elections the 
Democrats suffered severe losses. Obama’s policies were not helping some 
of his core supporters and inequality was increasing.
The Democratic Party establishment settled on the former senator 
and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to be the 2016 presidential candi-
195PoLit iCaL aLtErnativES on thE wEStErn LEft
date, and to become the first woman president. While advocating public 
health insurance, she had generally favoured pro-business, neo-liberal 
economic policies, deregulation, and open trading. Socially she mixed 
with the wealthy.
On 26 May 2015, at the age of 73, Senator Sanders announced his 
candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination. His speech was 
entitled ‘Today we begin a political revolution’. Using the term ‘middle 
class’ in the American sense, to mean the big majority of the population 
between the wealthy and the very poor, Sanders outlined his programme. 
He declared it was time for ‘millions of working families to come together, 
to revitalize American democracy, to end the collapse of the American 
middle class’ and bring their descendants ‘health, prosperity, security and 
joy’. His speech promised to fight the domination of the political system 
by billionaires; income and wealth inequality; unemployment; trade 
agreements that allowed corporations to move their jobs from America 
to low-wage countries; and climate change. He advocated raising wages, 
breaking up the Wall Street finance houses, providing healthcare for all 
as a right, expanding social security benefits and abolishing tuition fees 
in public higher education institutions.42
Sanders later offered a more detailed exposition of his domestic pol-
icy in ‘An Agenda for a New America: How We Transform Our Country’. 
The section ‘Ending the Rigged Economy’ formed nearly half the docu-
ment; this was a series of measures aimed at using the power of the fed-
eral government to make the economy more efficient and humane, serving 
workers and consumers rather than the ‘oligarchy’, and making it easier 
to form trade unions.43
In November 2015, in a speech at Georgetown University in Wash-
ington, DC, he explained what he meant by ‘democratic socialism’. The 
text referred back to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Martin Luther King, Jr., 
not to Marx and Engels. Some of its language nevertheless was posed in 
terms of class, amended for the American context, and reflecting the slo-
gans of the new social movements.
If we are serious about transforming our country, if we are serious 
about rebuilding the middle class, if we are serious about reinvigor-
ating our democracy, we need to develop a political movement 
which, once again, is prepared to take on and defeat a ruling class 
whose greed is destroying our nation. The billionaire class cannot 
have it all. Our government belongs to all of us, not just the one 
per cent.
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As in the speech announcing his candidacy, the programme was sim-
ilar to what might be found in a manifesto of a mainstream socialist party 
in Western Europe which was moving away from neo-liberalism. ‘Demo-
cratic socialism means that we must create an economy that works for 
all, not just the very wealthy.’ But this was not traditional socialism.
I don’t believe the government should own the means of produc-
tion, but I do believe that the middle class and the working families 
who produce the wealth of America deserve a fair deal.
I believe in private companies that thrive and invest and grow in 
America instead of shipping jobs and profits overseas.44
Himself Jewish, Sanders understood the importance of identity 
issues alongside class. His equality agenda appealed to women and eth-
nic and sexual minorities. His championing of undocumented immigrants 
appealed particularly to Latino voters. He was aware, however, of his lack 
of appeal to Black voters, who were largely loyal to Hillary Clinton.45 Very 
early in the campaign it became clear that Sanders was the main opposi-
tion to Hillary Clinton for the nomination.
As well as appealing to experienced activists from a variety of pro-
gressive causes, Sanders’ campaign drew in hundreds of thousands of 
mainly young people who had not been involved in politics before. These 
provided the foot soldiers for knocking on doors and speaking directly to 
registered Democrats. Despite the candidate’s age, the campaign made 
extensive use of the Internet: Facebook and Twitter messages, online 
advertising, and live streaming of meetings. Lacking wealthy backers, the 
campaign received most of its income from small online donations. Sand-
ers gained backing from several trade unions. Most importantly, he suc-
ceeded in persuading the trade union umbrella body, the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO), 
who were expected to endorse Clinton as the establishment candidate, to 
postpone its decision until after the candidate had been chosen.
Some opinion polls showed that Sanders was more likely than Clin-
ton to beat any of the likely Republican candidates. In the primary elec-
tions and caucuses, Sanders succeeded in winning 22 states. In view of the 
historical suspicion of socialism in the United States, reinforced by the 
Cold War, this was a tremendous achievement for a socialist. He did badly 
in the southern states, reflecting his lack of support from Black Ameri-
cans, except for those under 30. At the national convention in Philadelphia in 
July, Sanders had a substantial minority of the elected pledged delegates, 
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while Clinton had a majority of these plus nearly all the ‘superdelegates’, 
establishment figures with ex officio voting rights.
Despite losing, Sanders opted to carry on working within the Dem-
ocratic Party to influence its electoral platform, moving it left in a num-
ber of areas, including free tuition in public universities and colleges, 
expanding community health centres and curbing Wall Street’s freedom 
to play havoc with the economy. He endorsed Hillary Clinton. Donald 
Trump’s victory in the presidential elections, despite Clinton winning 
the popular vote, reflected a resurgence of White racism in American 
 politics.
the Democratic Socialists of america (DSa)
The youth activism of 2015 and 2016, mobilised in support of Sanders, 
led to a huge boost in the fortunes of the DSA. Since its formation in 
1982, the promotion of socialist ideas and candidates within the Demo-
cratic Party has been its main activity.46 In June 2016 the DSA’s strategy 
document welcomed Sanders’ campaign and the rise of Podemos, Syriza 
and Corbyn with optimism. It put forward a ‘vision of democratic social-
ism’ involving ‘radical democracy’ and, instead of capitalism, ‘economic 
democracy’. The latter would include ‘the democratic management of all 
businesses by the workers who comprise them and by the communities 
in which they operate. Very large, strategically important sectors of the 
 economy – such as housing, utilities and heavy industry – would be sub-
ject to democratic planning outside the market’. This was to the left of 
Sanders’ platform. The document tried to reduce expectations: ‘a demo-
cratic socialist society cannot produce total social harmony’; it ‘will not be 
the utopia that many socialists of old imagined’.47
After Sanders’ presidential campaign, many of his supporters’ groups 
converted themselves into DSA chapters. President Trump’s Islamopho-
bic, anti-refugee and anti–immigrant attitudes, together with his tax cuts 
for Wall Street and his anti-environmentalist policies, galvanised the 
young activists. DSA membership rose from 6,000 before the campaign 
to 32,000 in late 2017 and 47,000 in July 2018. The median age fell dra-
matically, from 68 in 2013 to 33 in 2017. The membership is reported as 
being 75 per cent male and 90 per cent White – repeating Sanders’ fail-
ure to attract Black Americans.48
The focus has been on getting its members elected as Democratic 
Party candidates to public office, with some success. In 2018, the DSA 
attracted considerable attention by winning a number of primaries for the 
midterm elections to federal and state legislatures, defeating  established 
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Democratic incumbents. Among the successful was Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortes, a 28-year-old former cocktail waitress of Puerto Rican origin. She 
won the Democratic nomination and then the election to the House of 
Representatives from Queens, New York City. She campaigned on social 
issues and called for the abolition of the border control agency. Follow-
ing the primary, she declared: ‘I think a lot of working-class Americans 
and voters here have been waiting for an unapologetic champion for 
economic, social and racial dignity in the United States.’49 Her victory 
was part of a wider wave of some success for progressive, mainly young 
female candidates.
Bernie Sanders did not expect to win the presidency. Jan Rehmann 
has suggested that Sanders is creating a ‘ “historic bloc” of different 
subaltern classes and groups, and is particularly aiming at an alliance 
between working and middle classes’.50 Sanders does not use Gramsci’s 
terminology, but this description seems fair. The aim of Sanders and of 
the DSA has been to argue for an alternative way of organising society, 
‘making socialists’. The DSA has been clearer than Sanders about its 
desire to abolish the capitalist system. Both have embraced extra-par-
liamentary social movements and combined this with standing for 
office as candidates of the established party with its long-standing trade 
union links.
Jeremy Corbyn and Momentum: Transforming 
the Labour Party?
The election of Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party in 2015 was even 
more unexpected than the success of Sanders. He started his campaign 
with bookmakers’ odds of 100-to-1 against him.51 This section will ana-
lyse why he was elected, how he has dealt with challenges from inside 
the Labour Party and the problems impeding his path to office.
In the general election of May 2015, Labour under its centre-left 
leader Ed Miliband had reasonable expectations of defeating the Con-
servative-Liberal Democrat coalition, which had imposed five years of 
austerity. Instead the Labour vote fell, the Liberal Democrats collapsed 
and Prime Minister David Cameron was able to form a purely Conserva-
tive government. Labour’s defeat was due, at least in part, to its inabil-
ity to tell a convincing story on the economy. It was divided as to 
whether to address the government deficit with austerity policies, as 
the majority of MPs seemed to wish; or to make a decisive break and 
oppose austerity.
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Corbyn elected leader, 2015
Ed Miliband resigned after his defeat and a leadership election was called. 
A handful of Labour MPs agreed that Corbyn, aged 66, would carry the 
left-wing, anti-austerity standard on this occasion. Within the Parliamen-
tary Labour Party (PLP), he had little support outside the far left. Cor-
byn’s strength was his consistency and the widespread perception that he 
was honest. He was seen as not like other MPs, but someone who stuck 
rigidly to his socialist and internationalist principles. He always opposed 
the ‘New Labour’ philosophy of Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown, and argued for more democracy and accountability within the 
party. The other three candidates were united in claiming that Corbyn’s 
left-wing policies made him incapable of leading the party to an election 
victory.
Corbyn was helped by change in the leadership election rules. This 
allowed Labour supporters, who were not members, to pay £3 and have a 
vote of equal value to that of individual party members and affiliated indi-
vidual trade unionists. Trade unionists, students, environmental activists 
and young people who had been active in anti-cuts campaigns flocked to 
register as supporters, and to staff the Corbyn campaign offices.
Much older people, who had supported the left-wing Labour min-
ister Tony Benn in the 1970s but since dropped out of party activity 
because of outrage at Blair’s policies, came back into the party in order 
to back Corbyn. Trotskyist and Communist organisations which had 
written off the Labour Party as irretrievably bourgeois also tried to join 
in. Almost 300,000 people, including nearly 100,000 trade unionists, 
joined the party, doubling its individual membership. Armed with the 
support of important trade unions, activists embarked on creating 
phone banks around the country to contact party members and recruit 
more  supporters.52
In September  2015, Corbyn was elected on the first ballot, with 
59.5 per cent of first-preference votes. Since then he has faced the suspi-
cion of him held by a majority of Labour MPs, and at least for the first two 
years, the opposition of the Party apparatus. Corbyn appointed his old 
far-left comrade John McDonnell to the key post of Shadow Chancellor 
of the Exchequer but sought to create a shadow cabinet representing the 
whole parliamentary party.
In October  2015, Corbyn’s leadership campaign team began to 
transform their supporters’ groups into a national organisation, Momen-
tum, independent of the parliamentary leadership. The veteran activist 
Jon Lansman was the founder and leader of Momentum. The aim was to 
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maintain a strong left grouping within the Labour Party, to protect Cor-
byn from attacks from Labour’s right and centre, and build up the Labour 
Party as a grassroots, campaigning mass organisation.
An early Momentum statement spoke of the need to make the party 
more democratic, and for ‘real progressive change’, without explicitly call-
ing for ‘socialist’ policies. It further declared: ‘Momentum is the succes-
sor entity to the Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader campaign but it is 
independent of the Labour Party’s leadership. It will work with everyone 
who supports Jeremy’s aim of creating a more fair, equal and democratic 
society’.53 In the constituency Labour parties (CLPs) and party branches, 
Momentum sought to enthuse the new and reborn activists, overwhelm-
ingly Corbyn supporters, encouraging them to participate in local cam-
paigns and stand for office and committees within the party. In response, 
the old guard of the party fought back; several hundred party members 
were suspended, mainly Corbyn supporters. They were accused of hav-
ing supported other parties in earlier elections, or retweeting speeches 
by Green Party members or, most controversially, of anti-Semitism.
Challenge and consolidation: from the brexit  
referendum to the 2017 general election
Sharp divisions in the Conservative Party over Britain’s membership of 
the EU should have created opportunities for Labour to make gains in the 
May 2016 local election. In England and Wales, however, Labour made a 
small net loss and in Scotland, traditionally a bastion for Labour, fell to 
third place behind the Scottish National Party and the Conservatives. Ten-
sions between the leader’s office and party headquarters impeded the 
effectiveness of Labour’s campaign.
It was the result of the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, how-
ever, which led to the PLP rebellion against Corbyn. Since 1975, the 
Labour Party had supported Britain’s membership of what became the 
EU. During the referendum campaign, Corbyn spoke and made videos 
opposing Brexit. After the referendum vote by a small majority to leave 
the EU, many Labour MPs accused Corbyn of campaigning ineffectually 
and even privately supporting Brexit. Corbyn himself gave some currency 
to this view by calling on the morning after the referendum for Article 50 
of the Treaty on European Union, announcing the intention of a member 
to leave the EU, to be activated at once.
Several resignations from the Labour front bench followed. On 
28 June, the PLP passed a motion of no confidence in Corbyn’s leadership 
by an overwhelming majority, 172 to 40. Corbyn had to fight another 
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leadership campaign, this time against a single candidate, Owen Smith. As 
well as the issues of the elections and the referendum, Corbyn was attacked 
over his attitude towards women; over 40 female Labour MPs accused him 
of inattention to the online abuse of women. But the Momentum machine 
swung into action with its phone calls, emails and social media, and 
ensured a vote for Corbyn of 61.8 per cent, slightly higher than in the previ-
ous year.
Corbyn’s victory consolidated his position in the party outside par-
liament, but the majority of MPs were not reconciled. In January 2017, 
the new Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May introduced into the 
House of Commons a measure allowing the government to activate 
 Article 50. Corbyn imposed a three-line whip, forcing Labour MPs to vote 
in favour of this. Additionally, MPs feared that Momentum was trying to 
take over CLPs and replace them as Labour candidates with Corbyn sup-
porters. They likened Momentum to Trotskyist groups who had entered 
the party in the 1970s–80s.
Lansman and his allies on Momentum’s Steering Committee 
responded by abolishing the organisation’s National Committee and 
pushed through a new Momentum constitution. This required all Momen-
tum members to be or become Labour Party members; thus, the leaders 
hoped, banning Trotskyists. The constitution broadened Momentum’s 
aims to include not only the ‘election of a Labour government’ but also ‘to 
broaden support for a transformative, socialist programme’.54
With Labour divided, and well behind the Tories in opinion polls, 
Theresa May called a general election for 8 June. Labour was expected to 
make losses, and the party apparatus based its strategy on protecting exist-
ing MPs in marginal constituencies. Corbyn and McDonnell, however, 
had control of the manifesto, ‘For the Many, not the Few’. This was a phrase 
of Tony Blair’s; the content, however, was a decisive rejection of neo- 
liberalism in favour of economic intervention, which recalled the Labour 
governments between 1945 and 1979. A National Transformation Fund 
of £250 billion would be established for infrastructural investment. 
A National Investment Bank would fund economic projects which the 
finance houses rejected. Water, the railways, energy and the Royal Mail 
would be renationalised. Workers’ rights would be increased substantially, 
and some benefit cuts would be restored. A National Education Service 
would be established. Reflecting the experience of Bernie Sanders’ cam-
paign, university tuition fees would be abolished, and maintenance grants 
reintroduced.
Most of these were not, in reality, innovations, but a return to 
the situation before Margaret Thatcher’s government. Indeed, not all the 
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 Conservatives’ privatisations were to be reversed, and there was no 
return to the relatively high rates of income tax accepted by Labour and 
Conservative governments before 1979. Brexit would go ahead, since 
‘Labour accepts the referendum result’.55
McDonnell produced a companion document costing the policies 
and outlining the source of funds, and a further paper explaining how 
Labour would crack down on tax avoidance.56 At the same time, the 
Labour leaders tore into the Conservative manifesto, which was poorly 
costed and included a proposal to make elderly people pay more for their 
care. Labour dubbed this ‘the dementia tax’. The prime minister proved 
an ineffective campaigner, unable to engage the voters and offering 
unhelpful, robotic responses.
Corbyn toured the country addressing overflowing meetings and, 
as the campaign progressed, narrowed the gap with the Tories. Mean-
while, Momentum members were fighting a campaign separately from 
that of the party apparatus. Advised by some activists from Bernie Sand-
ers’ team, they applied what McDonnell called ‘the cutting edge use of 
targeted Facebook advertising’.57 Momentum branches organised canvass-
ing visits to marginal constituencies. More optimistic than the party 
apparatus, Momentum targeted marginal seats which might be won for 
Labour from sitting MPs from other parties.
The Conservatives remained in power as the largest party after the 
election but lost their majority. Labour increased its share of the vote by 
the largest amount since the war, from 30.4 per cent in 2015 to 40.0 per 
cent in 2017, with a net gain of 30 seats.58 The turn of young people to 
Labour was most dramatic. Among the 18–24 age group, it reached 
62 per cent. Age seemed to replace class as the best predictor of voting.59 
The promise to abolish tuition fees undoubtedly attracted many young 
people and probably their parents. Corbyn had proved himself as a cam-
paigner among the electorate, not only the party. Momentum’s strategy 
had been validated. Labour MPs, not only the new intake, began to take a 
more favourable attitude to Corbyn. But with the government’s public 
divisions over Brexit, Labour should have done much better.
towards a Corbyn government?
On several specific issues, Corbyn’s approach was criticised both outside 
and inside the party. Corbyn was particularly active in solidarity with Pal-
estinian groups and Latin American socialists. He was unfairly accused of 
sympathy for terrorism or for Venezuela’s repressive policies. Corbyn laid 
himself open to accusations that he was not sufficiently critical of Putin’s 
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regime in Russia, or when he was, he tended to balance any criticism by 
attacking some aspect of Western policy. Parts of the Labour left had tra-
ditionally been sympathetic to the Soviet Union, but now communism 
had fallen and Russia was ruled by an authoritarian kleptocracy which 
had removed territory from two of its neighbours. It had nothing in com-
mon with socialism.
After Russia annexed Crimea, Corbyn wrote in April  2014: ‘On 
Ukraine, I would not condone Russian behaviour or expansion. But it is 
not unprovoked, and the right of people to seek a federal structure or 
independence should not be denied. And there are huge questions around 
the West’s intentions in Ukraine.’60 Such equivocation became harmful 
in a party leader. In March 2018, when two Russians, Sergei and Yulia 
Skripal, were poisoned in Salisbury in South West England, not only the 
British government but also all competent experts were convinced that 
the action had been ordered by the Russian authorities. In parliament, 
Corbyn cast doubt on this explanation. Two days later, he repeated his 
doubts. ‘To rush way ahead of the evidence being gathered by the police, 
in a fevered parliamentary atmosphere, serves neither justice nor our 
national security.’
At the same time, he distanced the Labour Party from the Putin 
regime, with ‘its conservative authoritarianism, abuse of human rights 
[and] political and economic corruption’.61 Corbyn supported proposals 
from McDonnell to crack down on the use of the City of London by Rus-
sian oligarchs for money laundering. But Corbyn’s equivocation allowed 
the Conservatives and his Labour opponents to portray him as soft on 
Putin. It was only at the Labour Party Conference in September 2018 that 
Corbyn announced that he now accepted that the Russian state was 
responsible for the poisonings.62
Corbyn and his allies failed to take seriously accusations of anti-
Semitism made against them or their supporters. Corbyn was found to 
have defended a mural depicting ugly capitalists with Jewish features and 
had to apologise. Against this background, Labour failed to make expected 
gains in the May 2018 local elections. Some Jewish members of the party 
demonstrated at Westminster against anti-Semitism inside Labour. By the 
end of summer 2018, Corbyn acknowledged that the Party had not done 
enough to fight anti-Semitism in its ranks.
A still larger problem for Corbyn was Brexit. At the 2017 party con-
ference, Momentum helped Corbyn by preventing a debate on the issue. 
Corbyn was still committed to Brexit, and this had been enshrined in the 
election manifesto. In 2018, however, as the possible results of Brexit 
appeared more unfavourable, if not frightening, the new young generation 
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of Labour activists, including many Momentum members, became disen-
chanted with Corbyn’s policy. A YouGov poll in September showed that 
90 per cent of party members wanted Britain to remain in the EU.63 At the 
party conference at the end of the month, the leadership partially relented. 
It agreed to allow the possibility of a second referendum; and that the 
option to remain was not ruled out. This was far, though, from agreeing to 
campaign against Brexit, as party members seemed to want.
The accusation of populism levelled against Corbyn seems unjusti-
fied. He avoids an appeal to ‘the people’; he attacks the Tories rather than 
the establishment or a ruling class; and while he allowed a cult of fan-
dom to develop around him, his personal modesty and political style are 
the opposite of a strong populist leader.64 Richard Seymour suggests that, 
far from the danger of populism, ‘Corbynism will struggle to outrun the 
limits of Labourism’.65 It is true that much of the 2017 election manifesto 
would not have seemed out of place as a product of the party mainstream 
in the 1970s. But Momentum has grown steadily, claiming 40,000 mem-
bers by April 2018, with increasing influence in the constituencies and 
seeming willing to hold the leadership to a more radical direction.
Corbyn, McDonnell and Lansman had all battled since the 1970s at 
‘making socialists’ rather than seeking political office. Now they had 
turned from the fight within the party to the struggle for state power. If 
they won an election, would they, in the face of adverse circumstances, 
possibly a post-Brexit crash, and a hostile ruling class, back down, as Syriza 
did after the referendum, and return to austerity? Unlike Greece, Britain 
remained a major European power, better able to withstand international 
pressure. Could a Corbyn government mobilise its supporters outside par-
liament to carry through its policies?
Conclusion
In order to understand the reasons behind the success of the four move-
ments considered, it should be asked, albeit briefly, why groups in other 
large West European countries did not achieve the same level of success. 
Perhaps the most significant other new movement following the crisis 
was Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), which 
achieved third position and nearly 20 per cent of the vote in the 2017 
French presidential election. The French left has long been divided, with 
three rival trade union federations. Now it is politically split between 
Mélenchon’s supporters; the Parti Socialiste, hammered by Hollande’s 
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policy reversals; the communists; and those who moved to back the cen-
trist Emmanuel Macron. In Germany, the left is split between the SPD; 
the well-established Greens who have become more of a centrist force in 
recent years; and Die Linke, whose roots lie in the former East German 
ruling party but which has picked up some radical support in the former 
West Germany. After it leaves federal office, the SPD is likely to reconnect 
with its trade union base and move to the left. The most disappointing of 
the post-crisis radical movements has been Movimento Cinque Stella. This 
Italian populist movement seemed to express grassroots protest. Unlike 
Podemos, however, it was led by a charismatic comedian, and then by 
centrist politicians who were prepared to share power with right-wing 
populists.
Returning to the questions posed at the start of the chapter, why did the 
four movements discussed here grow, and why did some develop inside 
existing parties? Podemos and Syriza, as new parties, were able to grow 
because of the discrediting of the existing socialist parties and the rela-
tive fluidity of southern European party systems. The Democratic Party 
and the Labour Party, on the other hand, are embedded in the political 
systems of their states, and protected by the electoral systems. A key fac-
tor facilitating the spread of socialist ideas in both parties, despite the 
conservative political cultures in both states, is the traditional link between 
the trade union movement and the two parties. This was especially the 
case with the Labour Party, which was created primarily by the trade 
unions and remains dependent on them financially.
All four movements discussed here had an open attitude towards 
cooperating with groups outside their control, including to some extent 
with other parties. The Democratic Socialists of America allowed its mem-
bers to oppose Democratic Party candidates, while Momentum decided 
only in 2017 to require its members to be Labour Party members and 
work only for Labour candidates.
What of identity politics? All were aware of the importance of identity 
issues in building support. All sought to promote women. Syriza worked 
within the strongly pro-European political culture in Greece, while still 
using anti-German tropes. Sanders and the DSA were both aware of the 
lack of their support among Black people but did not find much success 
here. The issue of Britain’s European identity was potentially problematic 
for Corbyn; his adherence to Brexit after the referendum was at odds with 
the pro-EU feelings of most of his young supporters. Still more problematic 
was the need to retain Labour’s support among Jewish voters.
SOCIAL ISM , CAPITALISM AND ALTERNATIVES206
Did the means pursued by these movements prefigure the sort of 
society they wanted to create? The record is mixed. Sanders, as candi-
date, kept control of his own campaign. The DSA remains a decentralised 
body where the initiative of the local branches is decisive. Iglesias and 
Tsipras were both accused of limiting democracy within the party in 
order to ensure their control. Corbyn’s three-line whips in favour of 
Brexit were resented, but he was unable to prevent Labour MPs from vot-
ing as they wished. Momentum in early 2017 may have gone beyond its 
rules in changing the constitution in order to exclude people from Trot-
skyist organisations. In 2017 it acted to prevent a debate on Brexit at the 
Labour Party conference. Generally, though, it has acted to build up Labour 
Party branches and introduce the concept of civilised political debate 
inside them.
How radical were these movements, and did they succeed in ‘mak-
ing socialists’? They all succeeded in mobilising large numbers of young 
people, previously uninvolved in politics, and achieving widespread sup-
port among the general population. All used the financial crisis to chal-
lenge the hegemony of capitalist ideas. While Podemos was not explicitly 
socialist, the other three all widened support for socialist ideas among 
the voters. Podemos did not replace PSOE as the main party of the left, 
but people close to it became mayors of Madrid and Barcelona. Syriza 
was the only one to form a government, but it was forced to implement 
austerity policies. Bernie Sanders did not become the presidential candi-
date, but he spread the concept of socialism among Democratic Party 
voters and laid the basis for further gains by the DSA. Corbyn became 
Labour leader but has not yet won an election. Even if he does not, 
Momentum has potential to keep pushing the Labour Party to the left. All 
four movements have grown because they have appealed to the real 
grievances of millions of people and pointed the way to an alternative. 
Politics in their countries have changed beyond recognition.
What is clear is that the fact that avowedly socialist systems have 
collapsed in Europe does not mean that the idea of socialism has died. It 
might even be argued that the collapse of the USSR makes it easier to 
separate socialism from Russian totalitarianism. It was only the model of 
one-party rule, combined with central planning, which was discredited. 
China’s hybrid system is as likely to find friends on the right as on the 
left; few hold it up as an example of socialism to be emulated. The way 
has become clear for new concepts of socialism to be articulated, draw-
ing not only on class but on issues of race, ethnicity, sex and gender, involv-
ing a multiplicity of movements as well as parties, and focussing on the 
needs of the individual rather than the state.
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Conclusion
Peter J. S. Duncan and Elisabeth Schimpfössl
Articulating alternatives to capitalism and socialism remains stubbornly 
difficult. This is a problem because the existing systems of socialism and 
capitalism are now often seen as hardly appropriate for solving any of the 
novel, and often unsettling, political developments we are confronted with 
across the globe. It is clear, however, that both these terms – socialism 
and capitalism – embrace a wide variety of existing models and potential 
models. Moreover, looking at a given existing system as in the case of 
China, it is by no means obvious whether the system is either capitalist or 
socialist or, as it appears, a hybrid of both. If it is a hybrid, it is not clear 
which elements, capitalist or socialist, are dominant; and it is not clear in 
which direction the system is moving. Russia is clearly now a capitalist 
society, but its capitalism is highly dependent on the state. Although dif-
ferent from China, Russia also has hybrid features.
The book demonstrates clearly that the transition from socialism to 
capitalism has not delivered what many had promised. In Russia, privati-
sation has benefitted only a small minority of society. Wealth inequality is 
one of the world’s largest and poverty is again on the rise. The chapters 
also documented the power and patronage exercised by the wealthy in 
Russia and China, most of whom are closely tied to the state apparatus. A 
phenomenon that has accompanied the rise of the rich is ever greater cor-
ruption. Attempts by the state to get this under control have been fruitless.
Such practices are replicated on lower levels in society, albeit on a 
much smaller scale, and yet they are essential for survival. As such, the 
failure of neo-liberalism to allow ordinary people of the former Soviet 
states to develop decent living standards has meant that they have main-
tained their informal practices. An example of this is the birzha in Geor-
gia, used by the excluded as a tool to navigate through daily life. Attempts 
by the authorities to undermine these have had little success.
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Yet the issues raised here are only a small selection of the troubles 
the world is facing today. Revolving around China and the West, the alter-
natives raised in Parts Two and Three of the book also have relevance for 
the rest of the world, including the former Soviet bloc and the global South.
Whether China is socialist or capitalist, or a hybrid of the two, 
undoubtedly it has become a pole of attraction for policymakers in less 
developed countries around the world. In the tradition of area studies, 
the book has shown that the Belt and Road Initiative has deep historical 
and cultural roots. Already before the birth of Christ, products were trans-
ported across Eurasia along forerunners of the Silk Road. Today, the 
image of the Silk Road is powerfully symbolic both in East and West, 
alarming to some and engaging to others. The appeal of China’s role in 
the world is strengthened by the movement from a unipolar to a bipolar 
(or multipolar) international system.
More relevant for our topic than the issue of world dominance is 
the question of what drives China’s expansion. While the Belt and Road 
Initiative may appear perfectly compatible with the current world order 
and hence with a capitalist mode of production, the mechanism behind it 
has surprisingly little to do with market-economy stimuli. Instead, the 
whole project is very much under the control of the Chinese Communist 
Party, rather than being pushed by private enterprise. Xi Jinping’s plans 
for China’s foreign economic policy are closely tied to the enlargement of 
the party’s power inside the country, particularly in relation to develop-
ing its western regions.
China’s development under the Deng Xiaoping model greatly 
favoured the coastal east and south of the country and Xi now wishes to 
reduce the geographical inequalities. This reflects his desire to manage the 
increasing level of discontent, both among the urban working class and the 
peasants. While the capitalist policies pursued after Mao’s death brought 
hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, Xi very clearly understands 
that the system today needs rebalancing, with a greater role for the state to 
prevent the cycle of capitalist crises from which the West suffers.
With regards to the West, the pathways discussed in this book were 
either tried and tested previously in contemporary history, such as Keynes-
ianism, or are slowly emerging and trying to find a voice, such as the new 
left-wing movements. Although sustainable for several decades under 
favourable conditions, Keynesian policies were abandoned not least 
because, ultimately, they led to frequent strikes by strong trade unions, high 
taxation and inflation. Under the pressures of the world market from the 
late 1970s onwards, capitalism could no longer afford luxuries such as job 
security and an expensive welfare state.
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By now, however, the policies of austerity, promoted by neo- 
liberalism, have fallen into disfavour with European voters. Despite being 
the pioneers of European neo-liberalism, the British Conservatives have 
proclaimed an end to austerity (which does not mean they would not 
simultaneously proceed with cuts in welfare spending and public ser-
vices generally). A true return to Keynesian expansionary policies to over-
come stagnation should, for a start, require corporations to become what 
they were meant to be initially: namely accountable to the public rather 
than just enriching a few shareholders. For society to live and prosper, a 
clean environment is essential. Hence, any Keynesian policies would have 
to be linked with investment orientated towards solving global and 
regional environmental problems, from urban traffic congestion to global 
climate change.
In the 1970s, Keynesian policies, which were originally intended to 
preserve the capitalist system, began to threaten it. Decades of full employ-
ment had led to stronger and stronger trade unions, which were not 
afraid to exert their industrial muscle. Strikes disrupted whole industries 
and many firms became unprofitable. Faced with the cruel competition 
of the global market, the corporations demanded shackles on trade unions 
and major cuts in corporate taxation. The labour movements were not 
willing or able to use their industrial strength to protect their jobs and 
the welfare state as they had done. Nor were they willing to challenge 
the existence of the capitalist system. In different parts of the world the 
Thatcherite slogan ‘There is no alternative!’ took hold. This implied revers-
ing the gains of the post-war period, a return to large-scale unemploy-
ment and the gradual withering away of the welfare state.
Many today, therefore, consider that capitalism can no longer afford 
to return to measures it previously employed and, as some have argued, 
can only continue to exist by taking away democratic rights.1 When social-
democratic parties ceased to defend their main achievements, such as 
the welfare state, and instead adopted austerity measures, they began to 
lose their support. As a result, especially since the onset of the 2008 cri-
sis, we have seen the mood become more radical, including a return of 
socialist ideas. The book has shown that the strategy taken by socialists 
in different countries necessarily reflects differences in their histories and 
institutions. Where the labour movement has traditionally been associ-
ated with one particular party, as in much of the English-speaking world, 
the socialist movements have focused on gaining influence within these 
parties. Elsewhere, when existing parties lack such links with the trade 
unions or have been thoroughly compromised, new movements are likely 
to develop. As these develop in strength, however, and as the allure of 
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electoral power grows, pressures develop to compromise on policy and 
principle. Thus, for example, Syriza failed to prepare the Greeks for a 
clash with international lenders and had to back down. Such dangers 
will threaten other socialist movements if they are elected to office.
Even among the four movements considered here, there is little una-
nimity or even clarity as to what sort of socialism they are trying to cre-
ate. It seems, for example, that Bernie Sanders (at least in the immediate 
term) is aiming at a mixed economy with a strong social orientation. The 
Democratic Socialists of America clearly have a more radical direction. 
There is agreement that there can be no return to the totalitarian, cen-
trally planned societies of the Soviet bloc. For Western socialists the con-
temporary Chinese model, with its single party rule, suppression of 
intellectual freedom and massive repression of some ethnic minorities, 
also has no attraction.
An increasing number of people sense that if capitalism is not guar-
anteeing economic and social security, then it might well have outlived 
its usefulness. The most sustainable models to date seem to be those which 
want to see the power of private corporations severely constrained, 
through a large-scale extension of democratic control in society, over pub-
lic services and within the corporations themselves through the involve-
ment of their employees in managerial decisions. On this basis, housing, 
education and healthcare can be made accessible to all and care for the 
weakest parts of society can be assured. More radical ideas such as 
undermining private enterprise itself find little favour today. Instead, 
there is talk of state ownership existing alongside cooperatives, munici-
pal ownership and private enterprise.2
Some advocates of neo-liberalism seem to believe the old adage, 
‘the worse, the better’. As Naomi Klein has argued, neo-liberals use disas-
ters, whether man-made or natural, to push through changes that they 
want. They do not even shy away from instrumentalising tragedies such 
as the war in Iraq and the tsunami in the Pacific to boost private business 
interests. The disorientation reigning in Eastern European countries after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall allowed for Western private business and capi-
tal to gain a stronghold and influence the privatisation policies to come. 
They intensively propagated the use of shock therapy, with little concern 
that this would drive millions of people into poverty.3
In Britain, after the Brexit referendum many neo-liberals appeared 
to believe that the best outcome would be if Britain left the European 
Union without making a deal with it. In the ensuing chaos, there would 
be a bonfire of regulations and unbridled capitalism let loose to rage with-
out constraints. This would allow money laundering to reach unseen 
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heights and turn the United Kingdom into a tax paradise similar to those 
in existing offshore havens. There has been speculation that a pending 
EU anti-tax avoidance directive, to be implemented from the beginning 
of 2019, might have been an additional motive to go ahead with Brexit as 
rapidly as possible.4
In the neo-liberals’ dream world, which may be in their grasp, there 
would no longer be any hindrance to breaking up the National Health 
Service, privatising it further and selling it in bits and pieces to private 
service providers. Trade unions would lose their remaining protection 
and Britain would become a low-wage economy. Life expectancy is 
already now going down in many parts of Britain and infant mortality 
rose twice in a row from 2016. The last time the latter happened was in 
1939–41.5
In reaction against the policies of neo-liberalism of the current radi-
calised shade, the far right has re-emerged across Europe. In classic pop-
ulist style, while they pretend to represent the interests of the people 
against the elite and the establishment, in reality they seek to stir up con-
flict and splits within the population on the basis of identity and ethnic-
ity. Strikingly, Francis Fukuyama’s view has evolved from the triumph of 
liberal democracy to a gloomy awareness of the consequences of identity 
politics. He sees the rise of the populist right all over the globe as posing 
fundamental threats to existing liberal-democratic institutions.6
Already during the Brexit referendum, violence inspired by the far 
right increased, with the murder of the Labour MP Jo Cox. After the ref-
erendum, there were physical attacks on mosques, Muslims, and ethnic 
minorities, and a Polish man was murdered for speaking his native lan-
guage. Trump has justified xenophobic feeling with his rhetoric against 
Muslim and Latin American immigrants. In Italy, the right-wing-populist 
coalition has launched criminal charges against the charity Médecins sans 
frontiers for helping refugees. Across Europe, immigrant populations are 
feeling intimidated, and anti-Semitism is on the rise.
In the former Soviet bloc, there has been a backlash against the con-
sequences of globalisation, privatisation and inequality. This is reflected 
in the authoritarian and nationalist regimes of Law and Justice in Poland, 
FIDESZ in Hungary and Vladimir Putin in Russia.
FIDESZ, the ruling party in Hungary, has for some years used anti-
Semitic tropes in its attacks on its opponents in the Hungarian intelli-
gentsia. Interfering with academic freedom, the government has forced 
the Central European University to leave the country, and FIDESZ has 
openly portrayed the university’s founder, George Soros, as an evil Jew. 
The far right across Europe and in America has repeated these attacks. 
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In Russia, President Obama was mocked for his race on television. The 
Kremlin has been financing, indirectly and sometimes covertly, far-right 
groups in Europe, including France and Britain. Its interference in sup-
port of Trump and Brexit in the US elections and British referendum in 
2016 shows the danger to democracy posed by right-wing populism 
backed by Moscow. Indeed, the Russian model of neo-liberal economics 
combined with authoritarianism may represent the future of Western 
capitalist societies.
Whether ascribed to the right wing as in most cases, or to the left 
wing in some exceptional ones such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, pop-
ulism is usually understood as opposing progressive politics. Some con-
ceptualise things differently. Over the last decades, Ernest Laclau together 
with Chantal Mouffe have attempted to rehabilitate the concept of pop-
ulism as a democratic movement rather than one with primarily ethnic 
or cultural undertones. They argue for a new politics, mobilising the peo-
ple against the establishment.7
These socialist and democratic aims are so different from those of 
the right-wing populists, however, that adoption of the term may lead to 
great confusion. Unlike some commentators,8 Jan-Werner Muller is rightly 
critical of ascribing the populist label to Corbyn’s Labour Party, Podemos 
or Syriza.9 Crucially for him, neither do these movements claim to repre-
sent ‘the people’ nor do any of them have xenophobic ambitions. When-
ever left-wing movements gave in to opportunistic ideas and made 
xenophobic ideas their own, as did most notoriously the leadership of 
Die Linke in Germany in the mid-2010s, it backfired in no time.
Left-wing parties all over Europe have a lot to answer for about how 
history developed throughout the twentieth century. Repeating such mis-
takes would be a tragedy – and yet it is the kind of tragedy that would 
save capitalism yet another time. So far, the left has shown little capacity 
to learn from history. Too often, social-democratic parties have accom-
modated the demands and needs of those higher up in society instead of 
those of their own traditional supporters. Along the way, they buried their 
founding emancipatory ideas and instead surrendered (almost too 
eagerly) to the fashionable ideas of the ruling class. New Labour was a 
classic case of this surrender (both ideological and practical), as was 
in due course almost every social-democratic party in Europe. Almost 
every where, they have failed to challenge the hegemony of dominant 
ideas, even when those ideas have long been discredited and people have 
become restless because their representatives are incapable of articulat-
ing any alternatives, or unwilling to do so.
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As for the more recent alternative social movements, things are very 
different. Instead of talking their supporters into compromise, they make 
bold promises of social reform which they cannot possibly keep under 
the economic circumstances we live in today. Even worse, they tend to 
fail to prepare their supporters for the resistance their promises will inevi-
tably encounter. The result is predictable: voters will become disillu-
sioned and may turn to unsavoury alternatives.
In order to gain theoretical clarity about aims and methods, we 
require empirical and conceptual inputs from the most different situa-
tions in all their historical, cultural, political and economic aspects.10 This 
is what justifies the present volume. The analysis of recent developments 
offers fresh insight into how capitalism has impacted on society and social 
structure in countries which, not long ago, moved partly or fully towards 
market economies. Investigations into models whose systemic nature is 
not clear-cut provides us with inspirations as to where alternatives might 
appear. Do we need to ponder over new potential options from scratch, 
or can we try to combine the best features of both socialism and capital-
ism in a new way?
Area studies is one of many lenses through which to approach such 
global questions and these lenses are good at sharpening the eye. This 
volume is a multidisciplinary contribution to the development of both 
global theories and area studies. Traditionally, area studies took the Anglo-
Saxon world as the norm and regarded the rest as exotic. Not too far off 
from an approach advocated by Edward Said, we have broken with such 
outlived ideas and tried to treat any region of the world on its own terms. 
Today it is the societies of the West which are threatened by the disinte-
grative forces of protectionism, nationalism and right-wing populism.
Russia and China, in turn, are little-appealing alternatives, given 
their dismal record in human rights and democracy. And yet, Russia’s 
population has a history of standing up to both the imperialist world and 
their own elite. China today, gruesome as it is in many aspects, runs social 
projects on a scale which is beyond our imagination. Revolution started a 
process where industrialisation followed, and the Soviet Union turned 
into a superpower. China is following in its footsteps. Both historically 
(in the case of Russia) and contemporarily (in the case of China), there 
must be elements which we should not dismiss from the outset. Area stud-
ies is meant to identify and critically reflect upon them. If Western Europe 
and North America are to emerge from the crisis which is threatening 
them, then they must learn from the experience of the rest of the world. 
Area studies must come home.
SOCIAL ISM , CAPITALISM AND ALTERNATIVES220
Notes
 1 Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System (London: Verso, 
2016).
 2 See, for example, Alternative Models of Ownership, which is a report published by the Labour 
Party as a discussion document in early 2018, accessed 24 November 2018, labour . org . uk / wp 
- content / uploads / 2017 / 10 / Alternative - Models - of - Ownership . pdf.
 3 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: Rise of Disaster Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2008).
 4 European Union Council, The Anti Tax Avoidance Directive 2016/1164, accessed 24 November, 
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package/anti-tax 
-avoidance-directive_en. For a discussion see Chevan Ilangaratne and Dami Olatuy, ‘Is This 
the Real Reason Why Farage and Rees-Mogg Want a Speedy Brexit?’, The New European, 
28 August 2018, accessed 24 November 2018, www . theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/is-
the-anti-tax-avoidance-directive-the-reason-the-rich-want-out-of-eu-1-5669763.
 5 Danny Dorling, Peak Inequality: Britain’s Ticking Time Bomb (Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2018), 
273.
 6 Francis Fukuyama, Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition 
(London: Profile Books, 2018).
 7 Chantal Mouffe, For A Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018).
 8 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2017).
 9 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (London: Penguin, 2017), 1, 12.
 10 The need for the new movements to develop firm ideological clarity if they are to succeed is 
argued in Rafal Soborski, Ideology and the Future of Progressive Social Movements (London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
Bibliography
Dorling, Danny. Peak Inequality: Britain’s Ticking Time Bomb. Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2018.
European Union Council. The Anti Tax Avoidance Directive 2016/1164. Accessed 25 November 
2018, ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance- package 
/anti-tax-avoidance-directive_en.
Fukuyama, Francis. Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition. 
London: Profile Books, 2018.
Ilangaratne, Chevan, and Dami Olatuy. ‘Is This the Real Reason why Farage and Rees-Mogg Want 
a Speedy Brexit?’ The New European, 28 August 2018. Accessed 24 November, www 
. theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/is-the-anti-tax-avoidance-directive-the-reason-the-rich-
want-out-of-eu-1-5669763.
Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: Rise of Disaster Capitalism. London: Penguin, 2008.
Mouffe, Chantal. For A Left Populism. London: Verso, 2018.
Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2017.
Müller, Jan-Werner. What Is Populism? London: Penguin, 2017.
Soborski, Rafal. Ideology and the Future of Progressive Social Movements. London: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2017.
Streeck, Wolfgang. How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System. London, New York: Verso, 
2016.
221
Index
Note: Page numbers in italics are figures; with ‘t’ are tables.
Abkhazia, 26
accountability, 68, 75, 77, 166, 189, 199, 215
adult care, 202
Adults in the Room: My Battle with Europe’s 
Deep Establishment (Varoufakis), 183
advertising, online, 196, 202
Afghanistan, 4, 143, 144, 145
Agalarov, Aras, 39, 40
Agalarov, Emin, 40
aganaktismenoi (indignant citizens’ 
movement), 184, 189
age, 97, 103t, 104t, 173, 202
‘An Agenda for a New America: How we 
Transform our Country’, 195
agriculture, collectivised, 90
Ahora Madrid, 186
aid, international, 58
Akhmedov, Farkhad, 38t
alarmist school, 139
Alekperov, Vagit, 35, 39, 40, 42
Alekperova, Nelli, 40
Alfa Group, 42
Alibaba, 101
All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), 121
almsgiving, 60
ambition, as value, 79
America, 4, 10
See also United States (US)
American elites, 59
American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO), 196
American universities, 96
anti-austerity coalitions, 186
Anti-Capitalist Left, 185
anti-corruption campaign, 110, 122, 125
anti-market backlash, 91, 92
anti-Semitism, 6, 200, 203, 217
anti-tax avoidance directive, 217
‘Anywhere’ people, 173–4
apparat, 73
‘appropriating class’, 16
Arab Spring, 5, 184
arbitration, 120–1
area studies, 6–10, 219
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, 
200, 201
arts sector, 59
Asia, 26, 136, 142, 143, 144, 165
See also Eurasia
Asian financial crisis, 4
Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank 
(AIIB), 144
Asian tigers, 91
Association of Muslim Businessmen of the 
Russian Federation (AMBRF), 39
asymmetrical interdependence, 101, 139
Atlantic integrationists, 25
Attlee, Clement, 162
austerity, 3, 4–5, 49, 165, 172, 188, 215
in Greece, 189, 190, 192, 193, 206
in the UK, 168–9, 198
Australia, 28
authoritarianism, 22–3, 178, 218
authoritarian state, 19, 21, 22–3, 29, 217
Bahrain, 184
Bailey, David, 187
bailout, 168, 182, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193
Baisarov, Ruslan, 35, 41
balanced budgets, 163, 168
Bank Avers, 40
inDEx222
banking
China, 115, 118
Russia, 36
state, 90, 100
bankruptcy, 167
banks, 5, 164, 165, 167, 176, 189
Barcelona, 186, 187
Barcelona en Comu, 186
Bazhaev, Deni, 39
Bazhaev, Musa, 39, 41
beer, 73
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 115, 132, 
135–7, 138, 139, 145, 214
and Russia, 140
and the US, 133, 141, 144, 146
Berlin Wall, fall of, 3
Beveridge, William Henry, 162
Big Bang, 1986, 57, 165
Bilalov, Akhmed, 36
bilateral relations, 135, 136
billionaires, 93–5, 100, 101
bipolar international system, 133, 145, 214
birzha, 66, 67, 68–80, 213
Black Americans, 196, 197
Black Lives Matter, 194
black-market entrepreneurs, 16
Black people, 205
Blair, Tony, 193–4, 199, 201
Bloco de Esqueirda (Left Bloc), 182
Bolivia, 185
bourgeoisie, 22
Breeze, Beth, 51, 55–6
Bretton Woods currency system, 163
Brexit, 5, 202, 203–4, 205, 206
Brexiteers, 173
Brexit referendum, 173, 175, 176, 200, 
216–17, 218
bribery, 22, 75
Britain, 3, 10, 176–7, 178, 182, 193–4, 216–17
and European identity, 205
and liberalism, 162–7
and ‘Occupy the City’, 184
and philanthropy, 49, 50, 52, 55–9, 60
and Russia, 218
See also United Kingdom (UK)
Briziarelli, Marco, 183
brotherhood, 71
Brown, Gordon, 5, 199
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 139
Buddhism, 42
budgets, 163
deficit, 24
surplus, 193
building regulations, 170
building societies, 165, 167
bureaucracy, 15, 115, 124
bureaucratic authority, 117
bureaucratic economic coordination, 112, 
116, 123
bureaucratic networks, 4
bureaucratic planning, 117
bureaucratic power, 117, 118–19
bureaucratic socialism, 109–10
bureaucratisation, 117
Bush, George W., 4
Bush administration, 142, 146
business deals, 72
business elite, 33, 35, 37, 38–9, 39, 40–3
Cadbury, George, 56
cadres, 100, 122, 125
Cameron, David, 5, 173, 198
Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty), 8
capital investment, 91
capitalism, 10, 113, 117, 171, 190, 215, 
216, 219
and cyclical crises, 163
and inequality, 8
semi-dependent, 15, 29
semi-peripheral, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28
varieties, 7
capitalist elite, 17
Carillion, 166
Carmena, Manuela, 186
Catalonia, 187
Central and Eastern Europe, 3–4
Central Asia, 136, 143–4
Central Bank Law (Russia), 36
Central China, 98
Central European University, 217
centre-left, 181
charities, 50, 56
charity giving, 40–2, 49–54, 55, 56–7, 58, 
59–60
Chavez, Hugo, 185, 218
Chechnya, 41
checks and balances, 6
Chen Yun, 94
children, support for, 55, 58
China, 4, 28, 89–104, 206, 213, 214, 219
and Marxism, 108–26
rise of, 131–47
Chinese Dream, 101–2
Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), 95
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 181
Christian Democrats, 162
churches, 42, 55
cigarettes, 36, 43
citizens
alienation from political institutions, 76, 78
protests, 5, 120, 184
City of London, 5
Ciudadanos (Citizens), 185, 187
civil conflict, 68
civil society organisations, 6, 58
cladding, 170
class, 21, 22, 23, 110, 112, 125, 173, 196, 202
223inDEx
classical free-market theory, 162–3
classical socialism, 116, 117, 123, 125
The Class Struggles in France (Marx), 7
climate change, 195, 215
Clinton, Hillary, 25, 143, 144, 194–5, 197
Clinton administration, 142
Colau, Ada, 186
Cold War, 16, 145
collaboration, bilateral, 136
collective enterprises, 124
coloured revolutions, 26, 28
command economy, 90, 100
Commercial Banking Law (Russia), 36
commercial lobbying, 37–9
Committee on Work and Pensions (UK), 166
common ownership, 193–4
communism, 114
See also China
Communist Manifesto, 2
Communist Party of China (CPC), 94–5, 96, 
100, 102t, 108, 110, 125
and Marxism, 113, 114–15
communist party rule, exclusive, 117
Communists (Portugal), 182
community art, 59
community giving, 53–4
See also charity giving
community health centres, 197
comparative advantage, 110
competition, 92, 164
compliance, 60, 71
comprehensive strategic partnership, 138
confidence, 163, 173
congagement, 142, 143, 146
conglomerates, 60
conservative governments, 3
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition (UK), 5
Conservative Party, 200
Conservatives, 202, 215
conspicuous consumption, 92, 95, 100, 101
constituency Labour parties (CLPs), 200,  
201
consumer goods, 36
consumerism, 95
containment, 132, 141–2, 143, 145, 147
control, infrastructure of, 17, 19, 21, 22
cooperation, 135, 136, 137, 142, 143
cooperative banks, 36
cooperative movement, 7
cooperatives, 35–6, 216
cooperative socialism, 7
coordinated market economy, 7
Corbyn, Jeremy, 5, 10, 183, 198, 199–201, 
206, 218
criticism of, 202–3
and DSA, 197
and identity politics, 205
pushed Labour Party to left, 182
The Corbyn Effect (Perryman), 183
Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics 
(Seymour), 183
corporate governance, 17, 18
corporate social responsibility, 42
corporate taxation, 215
corporations, 176–7, 215
corruption, 4, 22, 67, 68, 75, 213
in China, 101, 122
Coutts, 59
Cox, Jo, 217
Crashing the Party: From the Bernie Sanders 
Campaign to a Progressive Movement 
(Gautney), 183
crime, 67, 68, 73, 74–5, 78
Crimea, 28, 137, 139, 203
Criminal Code, Georgian, 77
criminal hierarchy, 71–2
criminal structures, 17
criminal world, 75
crises, cyclical, 163
Crocus Group, 40
Cui Zhiyuan, 92
Cultural Revolution, 117
currency bonds, 36–7
Dagestan, 41
Dagestani pilgrims, 41
Day of the Oprichnik (Sorokin), 131
debt, 166, 167, 168, 189
debt bailout, 190, 191, 192, 193
debt crisis (Greece), 188
dedication, 73
defence, 162
deficits, 24, 165
deflationary crisis, 164
deindustrialised communities, 165
‘the dementia tax’, 202
democracy, 134, 138, 146, 170, 171,  
178, 206
Democratic Party, 193, 194, 205, 206
democratic socialism, 195–6
Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), 194, 
197–8, 205, 206, 216
Deng Xiaoping, 89, 90, 94, 115, 118,  
134, 214
depression, 2, 162, 163
deregulation, 76, 78, 167, 195
development, 110, 111, 112, 117, 136
Die Linke, 205, 218
diplomacy, 135, 136, 138, 146
domestic affairs, non-interference in, 135, 
138, 146
domestic consumption, 91
domestic realm/society, 73, 139
donations, 58, 196
See also charity giving
Donbas uprising, 28
drachma, 192
dual-track approach, 92
inDEx224
Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy: 
Two Essays on the Nature of Capitalism 
(Kornai), 117
dzmak’atsoba, 72
dzveli bich’i, 71–2
Eastern bloc, 145
Eastern Europe, 3–4, 7
Eastern region, China, 98
economic change, 99–100
economic cooperation, 136, 137, 145
economic crisis, 1970s, 163–4
economic democracy, 197
economic development, 110, 111, 112
economic efficiency, 123
economic elites, 101
economic freedom, 116, 162
economic goals, 135
economic growth, 4, 101, 117, 164, 177
China, 89, 91, 92, 94, 100
economic interest, 175
economic intervention, 201
economic planning, 115
economic policy, 24
economic reforms, 91, 92
economic stimulus programme, 115
education, 96–7, 98, 101, 103t, 104t, 162, 
173, 216
educational causes, 59
educational institutions, 177
efficiency, 123
Egypt, 184
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
(Marx), 7
eight-point regulation, 95
electorate, 172
elite, 16, 21, 23, 50, 57, 58, 73
American, 59
business, 33, 35, 37, 38–9, 40–3
capitalist, 17
globalised, 171
Jewish business, 39, 41–2
political, 78, 92, 95, 101
Russian, 24
and trust, 162
Western, 16, 25
See also wealthy elite
elite philanthropy studies, 50
elite universities, 59
embedded practices, 80
employers, 120, 121, 164, 166
employment, 96, 162, 163–4, 215
engagement, 132, 141
Engels, Friedrich, 2
entrepreneurs, 16, 94, 100
environmental problems, 215
equality, 136, 138
equitable development, 110
equity funds, 166, 171
Errejón, Ińigo, 183, 185, 187
Ertiani Natsionaluri Modzraoba (ENM), 68
Estonia, 19
ethnic conflict, 68
ethnicity, 103t, 104t
EU (European Union), 169, 173, 184, 185, 
204, 216
anti-tax avoidance directive, 217
Eurasia, 132, 135, 136, 138, 139–40, 146, 214
and US, 133, 142, 143, 144, 145
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 27,  
139–40
Eurasian integrationists, 25
euro, 189, 191, 192, 193
Eurogroup, finance ministers, 191
Europe, and Marshall Plan, 135–6
European Central Bank, 188
European Commission, 188
European identity, 205
European universities, 96
Europe’s Radical Left: From Marginality to the 
Mainstream? (Luke and Keith), 182
eurozone, 5
everyday practices, importance and strength 
of, 79
exploitation, 29, 108, 114
export-led growth, 91
export of private capital, 18
exports, 92
external balancing, 142
Facebook, 184, 196, 202
family, 39–40, 43, 73, 74
fandom, cult of, 204
far right, 5, 217–18
fascist movements, 2
Feldman, Dan, 144
FIDESZ, 217
finance, 36, 167
financial capital, 57
financial crisis, 2007–8, 4–5, 115, 165, 167, 
182–3, 194, 206
and inequality, 8, 172–3
and social struggles, 184
financial institutions, 5, 16, 164, 165, 169–70
financialisation, 166–7
financial markets, 164, 172
financial services, 166
‘financial stabilisation’ approach, 17
fiscal covenant, 162–3, 169
five-year plans, 91, 100, 115
food banks, 189
Forbes, 93
‘Golden hundred’ of Russians, 22
Forbes Russia, 33, 35, 39, 40, 43, 51, 60
foreign direct investment, 91, 115–16
foreign markets, 167
225inDEx
foreign policy, 24–8, 115, 139, 143, 144, 214
foreign trade, 27, 35–6, 90
foreign trade associations, 36–7
former Soviet republics, 4, 16, 19, 213, 217
foundations, 50, 53–4, 59, 60
fragmentation, 80
France, 5, 7, 181, 204
La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), 204
freedom, 116, 165, 173
free-market capitalism, 171
free-market economic globalisation, 169
free markets, 172, 178
free-market theory, 162
free trade, 100
free tuition, 195, 197, 201, 202
Fridman, Mikhail, 41–2
friendship, 73, 74, 79
Front National (FN), 181
frugality, 101
fuerdai, 95
Fukuyama, Francis, 217
full employment, 162, 163–4, 215
funding cuts, 169
Gan Yang, 92
gas prices, 4
Gautney, Heather, 183
GDP (gross domestic product), 17, 27, 193
per capita, 19
gender, 102t, 104t
geographical inequality, 214
geographical mobility, 79
Georgia, 26–7, 66–80, 213
Georgian Criminal Code, 77
Germany, 2, 3, 5, 7, 181, 218
gifts, 56
gig economy, 165
Gindin, Sam, 183
Gini coefficient, 93
global collective security, 134
The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, 8
globalisation, 167, 169, 217
globalised elites, 171
globalised hyper-rich, 60
globalised markets, 169, 172
global wealth, 8, 29
GNI, per capita, 20
Goldman, Marshall, 23
Goodhart, David, 173–4
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 35–6, 116
government policies, 110, 111, 115
Gramsci, Antonio, 19, 183
grants, university, 201
Greater Eurasia Project, 132, 138, 140–1
Great Stagnation, 29
Greece, 5, 10, 182, 188–93, 205, 206, 216
aganaktismenoi, 184
PASOK, 181, 188, 189
Greek Communist Party (KKE), 183
green industry, 176
Green Party, 200, 205
Greenspan, Alan, 167–8
Grenfell Tower fire, 170
grey zones, 74, 76, 79
growth, 9, 91, 94, 100, 102, 164, 177
and inequality, 101
and wealth, 92
and working class, 110
guanxi, 101
Guillem, Susana Martinez, 183
Gutseriev, Mikhail, 36, 37–8, 38t, 39, 40, 41, 
42, 43
Gutseriev, Sait-Salam, 38t, 39, 40
Habermas, Jürgen, 175
Hajj pilgrimages, 41, 42
Halifax Bank of Scotland, 167
Hall, Peter A., 7
hangouts, 66, 67, 68, 69
hard budget constraint, 123
HDI rank, 20
health care, 162, 195, 216
health centres, 177, 197
heavy industry, 90, 110–11
hedge funds, 166, 171
hegemony, theory of, 19
Hezbollah, 28
higher education, 59
historical memory, 183
Hollande, François, 192, 204–5
honesty, 73
Hong Kong, 91
hospitals, 169, 190
household debt, 168
household income, 96, 97, 102t, 168
housing, 176, 177, 216
housing benefit, 169
HS2, 176
HS3, 176
Hu Jintao, 91
Human Development Index (HDI), 19
human rights, 21, 29, 58, 134, 137, 138, 146
Hungary, 7, 116, 217
Hurun, 93, 95
hyper-rich/wealthy elite, 50, 51, 53–4, 57, 60
identity, 55, 162, 173, 176, 196, 205
identity literature school, 139
identity politics, 205, 217
Iglesias, Pablo, 183, 185, 187, 188, 206
illegal activities, 70
illness, 165
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 3, 144, 
188, 191
immigrant populations, 217
immigrants, 169, 196
inDEx226
immigration, 173, 174, 187
income, 18–19, 92, 96, 98, 99, 102t, 136
and education, 101
household, 97, 168
income inequality, 93, 96, 102, 195
income tax, 202
Independent Greeks (ANEL), 190, 192
India, 144
Indignados, 184, 185, 189
individualism, progressive, 173
Indo-Pacific region, 144
industrial policy, state, 176
industrial production, 27
Industrial Revolution, 56
industry, 90, 110–11, 165
inequality, 4, 9, 49, 57, 125, 172–3
in China, 92, 101, 108
in former Soviet republics, 217
geographical, 214
in Georgia, 78, 79
income, 93, 96, 102, 195
in Russia, 213
social, 8, 50, 59
in the US, 194
infant mortality, 217
inflation, 17, 163, 164, 166
informal control, 17, 18
informality, culture of, 76
informal networks, 74, 101
informal practices, 8, 213
infrastructural investment, 176, 201
infrastructure of control, 17, 19, 21, 22
Ingushetia, 36
inheritance tax, 95
inherited wealth, 51, 171
institutionalist theory, 133–4
institutional ties, 101
insurance companies, 176
insurance funds, 167
insurance policies, 4, 166
intellectual freedom, 116
intellectuals, 185
intelligentsia, 15–16, 54, 55, 217
Interfinance Company, 36
intergenerational mobility, 99, 100
internal balancing, 142
international aid, 58
international banks, 164
international competition, 92
international cooperation, 135
international institutions, 169, 173
internationalism, liberal, 135, 138
international order, 133, 145, 146
Internet, 196
platforms, 184
interstices, 71
intimacy networks, 74
invalidity benefits, 169
investment, 135, 176, 177
investment banks, 167
investment hunger, 119
Iran, 28
Iraq, 4
Islam, 41, 42–3
Islamist terrorism, 169, 174
Israel, pilgrimages, 41–2
Italy, 181, 184, 205, 217
Japan, 142
Jewish business elite, 39, 41–2
Jewish voters, 205
Jiang Zemin, 94
Jianlong Steel Holding Company, 121
Jilin State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), 121
Jin, Yongai, 96
jobs, 91, 100, 177
job security, 214
joint-stock ownership, 177
joint ventures, 115–16
Judaism, 42
Kabardino-Balkaria, 41, 42
Kanokov, Arsen, 35, 38t, 41, 42
k’anonieri kurdi, 72
Kazakhstan, 137
Keith, Daniel, 182
Kendall, Diana E., 50
Kensington and Chelsea, borough, 170
Kerimov, Said, 40
Kerimov, Suleiman, 33, 38t, 40, 41, 42, 43
Keynes, John Maynard, 9, 162–5, 177
Keynesianism, 9, 10, 162–4, 177, 214, 215
Keynesian theory, 175–6
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 52–3
Khodorkovsky Affair, 53
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 195
kinship ties, 74
Kioupkiolis, Alexandros, 185–6
KKE, 189, 190
Klein, Naomi, 216
Komsomol, 74
Konstantinovsky Palace, 41
Kornai, Janos, 7, 108, 109–10, 111, 112–13, 
116–19, 123–4, 125
on corruption of China’s officials, 122
Kremlin group, 24, 25, 28
Kyrgyzstan, 138, 144
labour, 19, 21, 29, 92, 120
Labour government, 5, 162
labour laws, 120
Labour Party, 5, 182, 183, 193–4, 198–204, 
206, 218
Laclau, Ernesto, 185, 218
Lafazanis, Panagiotis, 191, 192
227inDEx
land sale, 4
land value tax, 177
Lane, David, 15–16
Lansman, Jon, 199, 201, 204
Latin American immigrants, 217
Latin American socialists, 202
Law and Justice party, 217
law enforcement agencies, 17, 25
law of value, 119
Law on Cooperatives (Russia), 35–6
layoffs, 92
Ledeneva, Alena, 43
the left, 10, 181, 190, 192
Left Opposition, 118, 119
Left Platform, 189, 192
left-wing parties, 218
legal aid, 169, 170
Lehman Brothers, 167
Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 2, 118
Lezgin language, 41
Lezgins, 41
liberal democracy, 172, 178
liberal-democratic institutions, 217
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 37
Liberal Democrats (UK), 198
liberal hegemonic order, 132, 133, 134, 145, 
146, 147
liberal internationalism, 135, 138
liberalism, 161, 162, 164
liberal market economy, 7
liberal partnership order, 134–5, 138, 145, 146
libraries, 169
Libya, 184
life expectancy, 217
liminal spaces, 71, 77
limitationist school, 139
limited liability, 176, 177
Lin, Justin Yifu, 110–11
Die Linke, 205, 218
Lisbon Treaty, 185
Lloyd, Theresa, 51
Lloyd George, David, 162
Lo, Bobo, 140
lobbying, 37–40
local authorities, 165, 170, 184
Lofland, I., 67
London, 5, 184
loyalty, 23, 72, 74, 172
LUKoil, 42
Lukoil charity fund, 40
Ma, Jack, 101
Macron, Emmanuel, 5, 205
Madrid, 186
Magomedov, Magomed, 36, 39
Magomedov, Ziyavudin, 36–7, 39, 41, 42
Maidan uprising, 27
maintenance grants, university, 201
Makhmudov, Iskander, 36, 38, 42
male street socialisation, 66
Manas airbase, 144
‘manual management’, 24, 28
manufacturing output, 91
Maoist era, 115
Mao Yushi, 92
Mao Zedong, 89, 90, 92, 115, 117
March, Luke, 182
marginalisation, 80
market competition, 109
market-driven decisions, 123
market economics, 135, 136, 138, 145
market economy, 3, 118, 137
marketisation, 91, 92
market reforms, 21, 29, 92, 94
markets
gradualist evolution of, 110
open, 135
market socialism, 7
market system, 100
Marktvolk, 172, 173
Marshall Plan, 115, 135–6
Marx, Karl, 2, 7, 113, 114
Marxism, 110, 112, 113, 114
Marxist development theory, 111
Marxist-Leninist ideology, 117
masculinity, 71, 75
Mattis, James, 141, 142
May, Theresa, 201
McDonnell, John, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204
Mearsheimer, John J., 131
Mecca, 41
Médecins sans frontiers, 217
media, 6, 169–70
medical research, 54
Melenchon, Jon-Luc, 204
the Memorandum, 188, 189, 191
memory, historical, 183
mental illness, 165
meritocracy, 79, 101
Merkel, Angela, 5, 191, 192
MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)/China, 135
MFA partnerships, 136
middle class, 195
Middle Kingdom, 90
migration, 95, 169
See also immigration
Miliband, Ed, 198, 199
minimum wage, 190, 194
mixed economy, 7, 9, 100, 102, 216
mobility, 79, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103t, 104t
modernisation, 77, 78, 136
Modern Silk Road Strategy (MRS), 143, 144
Momentum, 199–200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 
205, 206
monetary policy, 17, 23
money, 114
inDEx228
money laundering, 216–17
Morris, William, 182, 188
mortality, conceptions of, 50
mortgage debt, 167
Moscow Cathedral Mosque, 33, 43
mosques, 42
Mouffe, Chantal, 183, 187, 218
Movimento Cinque Stella (Five Star 
Movement), 183
Muller, Jan-Werner, 5, 218
multilateral governance/multilateralism, 134, 
135, 138, 145
multilateral organisations, 137
multipolar international system, 133, 134, 
139, 145, 147, 214
‘Munich speech’, 26
municipal ownership, 216
musharakah, 40, 43
Muslim Business Elite (MBE, Russia), 33, 34t, 
36, 37, 38, 39–40, 41, 42–3
Muslims, 33–43, 217
mutual funds, 167
mutual responsibility, 67
national debt, 168
National Education Service, 201
National Health Service (NHS)/UK, 169, 
174, 217
national identity, 55, 139, 162
National Investment Bank, 176, 201
nationalisation, 189
nationalism, 187
nationalist regimes, 217
national patriotism, 41
National People’s Congress (NPC)/China, 95
national rejuvenation, 101–2
national sovereignty, 173
National Transformation Fund, 201
national wealth, 162
nation-state, 174–5
NATO, 26, 185
neighbourhood, 79
(neo)institutionalist theory, 133
neo-liberal economic policies, 4, 5, 23, 194, 
195, 218
neo-liberalism, 9, 10, 67, 79, 110, 161, 162
and austerity, 215
and Brexit, 216–17
and crisis of credibility, 4–5
and former Soviet states, 213
in Georgia, 67–8, 76
rejection of, 201
and wealthy and powerful, 169–70
neo-liberal reforms, 68, 69
(neo)realist theory, 133
networks, 101
New Democracy, 188, 189, 193
New Economic Policy (NEP), 109, 110, 118, 
119, 125
New Labour, 3, 199, 218
New Left, 92
New Silk Road Vision (NSR), 143–4, 145
Nizhnekamenskneftekhim, 37
nomenklatura, 73
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
53–4, 58
normalcy school, 139
Nuland, Victoria, 27
Obama, Barack, 5, 194, 218
Obama administration, 142–3, 144, 145, 146
obedience, 53
Ocasio-Cortes, Alexandra, 198
Occupy movement, 5
‘Occupy the City’, 184
Occupy Wall Street, 183, 184, 194
Odendahl, Teresa, 50, 59
officialdom, 73
official institutions, 75
offshore firms, 17, 18
offshore tax havens, 51
oil, 3, 4, 23, 163, 164
oligarchs, 4, 21, 22, 24–5, 52–4, 192, 203
online advertising, 196, 202
online donations, 196
opening up (gaige kaifang), 90
openness, 135, 136, 138, 145
open trading, 195
organic crisis, 183
organised crime, 68, 73, 74–5
original socialist accumulation, 109, 110, 
119, 125
Ostrower, Francie, 50
Our Revolution: A Future to Believe In 
(Sanders), 183
outsourcing, 165–6
Ovenden, Kevin, 183
overproduction, 163
Owen, David, 57
ownership, 123, 125, 193–4
Pakistan, 144
Palestinian groups, 202
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 
181, 188, 189
Panitch, Leo, 183
Pappas, Nikos, 189
paramilitary squads, 74–5
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), 199, 200
Partido Popular (PP), 184–5, 186, 187
Partido Socialista, 182
Parti Socialiste, 181, 204
Partito Demcratica (PD), 181
partnership diplomacy, 135, 136, 138, 146
party affiliation, 96, 101
party cadres, 100, 122, 125
party membership, 96, 97, 98, 99
party-state, 101
229inDEx
party-state officials, 101
PASOK, 181, 188, 189
Passover, 41–2
paternalism, 53, 60
patriotism, 41
patronage, 43, 213
PCE, 183, 185
Peabody Trust, 56
peasants, 119, 125, 126
Peking University, 114
le Pen, Marine, 5
pension age, 4
pensions, 162, 166–7, 176, 190, 193
per capita GDP, 19
per capita GNI, 20
Perestroika, 16
peripheral capitalism, 19
Perryman, Mark, 183
personal economic freedom, 162, 165
personal politics, 38
personal ties, 74
petty crime, 77, 78
philanthrocapitalism, 49–50
philanthropy, 40–2, 43, 49–60
Piketty, Thomas, 8, 51, 59
pilgrimages, 41–2
plan-market relations, 116
planned economy, 90, 115, 116, 119
planning, state, 119, 125, 165
Podemos, 5, 10, 182, 183, 185–8, 193, 205, 218
and DSA, 197
mayors, 206
Podemos: In the Name of the People (Errejon 
and Mouffe), 183
Poland, 3, 116, 217
polarity, 133
police patrols, 77–8
political connections, 37
political discourse, openness in, 116
political diversity, 134
political elites, 78, 92, 95, 101
political influence, 43
political institutions, citizens’ alienation 
from, 76
political interaction, 137
political movements, 5
political party voting, 175
political protest, 184
political systems, 137
political ties, 96
Politics in a Time of Crisis: Podemos and the 
Future of Democracy in Europe (Iglesias), 
183
Politkovskaya, Anna, 42
Pompeo, Mike, 144
Popular Unity, 192
populism, 5–6, 174, 185, 204, 217–18
populist parties, 169, 172, 173, 178
Portugal, 182, 184
post-Soviet states, 4, 16, 19–20, 217
Potanin, Vladimir, 53
poverty, 68, 91, 101, 163, 213, 216
power, 21–2, 117, 125, 213
power relations, 17, 50
power transition, 133
Preobrazhensky, Evgeny, 108–9, 110, 111, 
112, 113, 118, 119, 125
prescriptions, free, 190
presidential power, 22
prices, 17, 90, 163, 164
prisons, 78, 169
the private
blurred boundaries with the public, 78, 79
clear-cut division with the public, 77
private business, 117
private capital, 18, 119
private economic enterprises, 115
private enterprises, 4, 90, 216
private foundations, 53–4
private insurance, 4
private investment, 115–16
private monopoly, 166
private ownership, 21, 36, 113, 116
private property, 16, 21, 75, 113
private relationships, 67
private sector, 16, 91, 94–5, 100, 109, 116, 
124, 125
private security firms, 17
private space, 66
private sphere, 74, 75, 79
private wealth, 93
privatisation, 164, 190, 217
in China, 92, 100, 120, 121
in Georgia, 76, 78
in Russia, 16–17, 21, 52, 213
in the UK, 165–6, 202
privatisation auctions, 37
privileges, 50
productivity, 91, 164
profits, 164, 166, 177
progressive individualism, 173
progressive taxation, 162
property redistribution, 18
property rights, 17, 22, 110, 123
property trading and holdings, 57
protest movements, 5, 184
protests, 120, 184
proto-liberal partnership order, 135, 138
PSOE, 185, 186, 187, 206
public discussion, 175
public health insurance, 195
public institutions, 68, 74–5, 76–7, 79, 165
public libraries, 169
public life, 75
public office, 101
public ownership, 3, 91, 108, 115, 116, 125
and socialism, 112, 117, 123
public places, 74
inDEx230
public sector bodies, 115
public sector enterprises., 118
public services, 172
public space, 67, 75, 77
public sphere, 74, 78, 79, 175
public transport, 177
Putin, Vladimir, 4, 5, 19, 22–3, 33, 217
and Corbyn, 202–3
discouraged business elite from engaging 
in politics, 38
and foreign policy, 25, 28, 139
and philanthropy, 52, 53
and religion, 43
and Syria, 28
racism, 5–6, 197
radical democracy, 197
radical left movements, 10
Radical Left Parties in Europe (March), 182
Rajoy, Mariano, 186, 187
Rappaport, Andrei, 42
Reaganomics, 3
real estate, 57, 166, 167
realist theory, 133, 142
recessions, 9, 163, 176
See also financial crisis, 2007–8
reciprocity, 60, 67, 79
referendum, 6
Brexit, 173, 175, 176, 200, 216–17, 218
Catalan government, 187
Greek, 188, 192
second on EU, 204
reform socialism, 113, 116, 117, 123, 125, 126
refugees, 217
regime change, 4, 137–8
regime type, 134
regional patriotism, 41
Rehmann, Jan, 198
Reich, Rob, 50
religions, 41, 42–3
religious causes, 41–2, 43, 55
religious festivals, 41, 42
Remain vote, 173
renationalisation, 201
rent, 18–19, 22, 25, 29
repression, 79, 114, 216
research and development, 165, 176
respect, 69, 79
retirement age, 191
Reviving Gramsci: Crisis, Communication, and 
Change (Briziarelli and Martinez 
Guillem), 183
revolutionary transitional era, 112, 113, 
116–17
The Revolution Betrayed (Trotsky), 15
the rich, 5, 50, 51, 55, 213
Richards, Steve, 183
richest 200 Russians, 54, 60
rich lists, 33, 43, 51
right-wing populism, 217–18
The Rise of the Outsiders: How Mainstream 
Politics Lost its Way (Richards), 183
risk, 163, 166, 167, 177
‘roofs’, 17, 22
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 195
Rose Revolution, 67, 76, 77, 78
Rowntree Foundation, 56
Royal Bank of Scotland, 167
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, 170
Rubin, Dominic, 35
rule of law, 4, 68, 162, 169
ruling class, 218
ruling elite, 73
Russia, 4, 5, 49, 131, 136, 144, 206, 213, 
217, 219
and China, 138–41, 146–7
and Corbyn, 202–3
and Crimea, 137
and Greater Eurasia Project, 132
and Obama, 218
and philanthropy, 50–1, 52–5, 58, 59, 60
and protests, 184
and semi-dependent capitalism, 15–29
and super-rich, 33–43
and support for Trump and Brexit, 218
and Washington Consensus, 3
Russian Central Bank, 18, 24
Russian Jewish Congress (RJC), 39, 41–2
Russian Orthodox Church, 42, 43, 55
Russian Revolution, 117
Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RUIE), 39
Saak’ashvili, Mikheil, 26, 67, 68, 69, 76, 77, 79
SAFMAR, 41, 42
Said, Edward, 219
Sakwa, Richard, 25
Salt, Titus, 56
Sanchez, Pedro, 186, 187
sanctions, 79, 139
Sanders, Bernie, 5, 10, 182, 183, 194, 195–8, 
202, 206
and Black people, 205
and mixed economy, 216
savings banks, 166
Scandinavia, 7
Schäuble, Wolfgang, 191
Schervish, Paul, 50
Schimpfössl, Elisabeth, 40
schools, 50, 169
science research, 54
Second World War, 2–3
security, 134, 135, 136, 137, 162
security cooperation, 136, 145
security firms, 17
self-interest, 176
231inDEx
self-management, 7, 112, 113, 117, 123–4, 126
semi-dependent capitalism, 15, 29
See also semi-peripheral capitalism
semi-peripheral capitalism, 19, 20, 22, 24,  
25, 28
Senkaku Islands dispute, 142
serfdom, 53
Seymour, Richard, 183, 204
shadow banks, 164
Shaimiev, Airat, 35, 37, 39
Shaimiev, Kamila, 40
Shaimiev, Mintimir, 37
Shaimiev, Radik, 35, 37, 39, 40
Shambaugh, David, 116
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
134–5
Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress, 124
shareholders, 177, 215
sharing, 72–3
Shigabutdinov, Albert, 37
Shishkhanov, Mikhail, 39
shock therapy, 4, 216
shortage, 109
shortage economy, 119
short-term rent, 18–19, 22
Silk Road, 214
Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), 136, 144
Singapore, 91
Sino-Russian relationship, 146
Sino-Russian security alliance, 139
Sino-Soviet split, 90
sistema, 43
el Sistema, 184
Skidelsky, Robert, 9
Skripal, Sergei, 203
Skripal, Yulia, 203
Smith, Owen, 201
social class, 22, 110, 173
social contract, 171
social democracy, 10
social-democratic governments, 3
social-democratic parties, 2, 215, 218
Social Democrats, 162, 181–2
social development, 41
social dominance, 50
social-economic rights, 19
social good, 162
social inequality, 8, 50, 59
social initiatives, 40–1
socialism, 7, 108–10, 111–26, 183, 193, 194, 
203, 206, 215
and birzha, 74
with Chinese characteristics, 89–90, 95
and Sanders, 182, 196, 197–8, 205
The Socialist Challenge Today: Syriza, Sanders, 
Corbyn (Panitch and Gindin), 183
socialist market economy, 90, 91
The Socialist System (Kornai), 109
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), 181, 182
social justice, 58, 162
social-market economy, 7
social media, 175
social mobility, 79, 96, 99
social movements, 5
social public space, 75
See also public space
social realm, 74
social reform, 193, 219
social responsibility, 51, 52
social security, 68, 165, 169, 177, 195
social solidarity, 162
social struggles, 120, 184
social system, 23
social trust, 172, 174, 175, 176
social unrest, 112, 121–2, 124, 125, 126
social welfare, 3, 19
socio-economic contract, 162
soft-budget constraint, 123–4
soft power, 27
solidarity, 79, 162
Solidarity Clubs, 189
‘Somewhere’ people, 173, 174
Sorokin, Vladimir, 131
Soskice, David, 7
Sotheby’s Russian auction, 41
South China Sea, 142, 143
South Korea, 91
South Ossetia, 26
sovereignty, 134, 135, 137, 138, 146, 173
Soviet republics, former, 4, 16, 19–20, 213, 217
Soviet Union, 90, 109, 111–12, 123, 203, 206
and birzha, 68
and Cold War, 145
collapse, 3, 52, 143, 161
intelligentsia, 54
system, 15–16
Spain, 5, 10, 181, 182, 184–8, 189, 193, 205
SPD (Social-Democratic Party), 3, 181, 205
special economic zones, 90
specialisation, 52, 55–9
spending, 4, 53, 95, 163
spiritual revival, 42
Squares’ movement, 184
Staatsvolk, 172, 173
stabilisation, 117
stability, 137, 138
Staff and Workers’ Representative Councils 
(SWRCs), 121, 124
stagflation, 164
stagnation, 215
Stalin, Joseph, 3, 112–13, 119, 125
the state
intervention, 9, 97, 99, 103t, 164
and mistrust by citizens, 76–7
patronage, 43
role of, 68, 97
inDEx232
the state (cont.)
support, 104t
taken over by criminal groups, 74
theory of, 7
wealth to private sector, 16
state banking, 90, 100
state capitalism, 118
state corporations, 18, 24, 100
State Duma, 37, 38
state economy, 119
state industrial policy, 176
state institutions, 95
state investment, 115
state law enforcement agencies, 17
state-led development, 91
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 92, 95, 115, 
120, 124, 135
state ownership, 116, 118, 216
state planning, 119, 125, 165
state-private ownership, 116
state sector, 124–5
statist beliefs, 97, 102
Stiglitz, Joseph, 110, 111
stock markets, 167
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 25
strategic partnership, 136, 137, 138
Streeck, Wolfgang, 172, 173
street communities, 73, 79
street hangouts, 66, 68, 69
street socialisation, 66
strikes, 214, 215
structural ties, 101
sub-prime mortgages, 167
Suleiman Kerimov Foundation, 41
Sulteev, Diana, 40
Sulteev, Rustem, 36, 37, 40
The Sunday Times, 51, 60
super-wealthy, 52
See also wealthy elite
Supreme Soviet, 21
surplus economy, 118
Sweden, 181–2
symbols, 175
Syria, 28, 184
Syriza, 10, 182, 183, 188–93, 205, 206, 
216, 218
and DSA, 197
and protest movements, 5
Syriza: Inside the Labyrinth (Ovenden), 183
systemic collapse, 117
Taiwan, 91
Talbott, Strobe, 21
Tatar American Investments and Finance 
(TAIF), 37, 40
Tatarstan, 36
Tatneft, 37
tax avoidance, 202
tax credits, 169
taxes, 4, 162, 177, 191, 202, 215
tax havens, 51, 171, 177, 217
taxpayer risk, 166
tax relief, 50
Tbilisi, 71
technical progress, 117
temporary jobs, 165
terrorism, 169, 174, 202
Thatcherism, 3
‘There is no alternative!’, 215
Thessaloniki Programme, 189
thief-in-law, 72, 77
‘Third Memorandum’, 192
‘Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era’, 89–90
Three Represents, 94
thrift violations, 95
Thucydides trap, 133
Tiananmen protests, 1989, 94
ties, 69, 72, 74, 79, 96, 101
Tolz, Stefan, 76
Tonghua Iron and Steel Company, 121
totalitarianism, 116, 206
trade, 27, 35–6, 90, 100, 136, 138
trade liberalisation, 92
trade unions, 6, 192, 193, 196, 199, 205, 217
lose industrial power, 3, 164
rights, 4, 190
strikes, 214, 215
trade war, 143
traffic congestion, 215
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 142–3, 194
transparency, 75–6, 78, 79
transport, 177
treasury bonds, US, 100
the troika, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193
Trotsky, Leon, 15, 108, 109, 111–12
Trump, Donald, 5, 143, 197, 217, 218
Trump administration, 133, 141, 142, 143, 
144, 145, 146
trust, 68, 69, 77, 78, 162, 168
and birzha, 67, 72, 73, 79
social, 172, 174, 175, 176
trusts, 56
Tsipras, Alexis, 183, 188, 189, 190–1, 192–3, 
206
tuition fees, 195, 201, 202
Tunisia, 184
Twitter, 184, 196
Two-Century Goals, 113
UGMK, 42
UK Independence Party, 173
Ukraine, 4, 26, 27, 28, 137, 203
uncertainty, 79, 163
unemployment, 162, 163, 164, 186, 193, 
195, 215
233inDEx
Unidos Podemos, 186, 187
unipolar system, 145, 214
United Kingdom (UK), 54, 173, 174, 175, 
176–7, 184, 216–17
and 2008 financial crisis, 4–5
elite, 55–9, 60
and Labour Party, 198–204, 205
and liberalism, 162–7, 168
and populism, 173
and Russia, 218
See also Britain
United Left (IU), 185, 186
United National Movement, 68, 79
United Nations, 137
United Russia party, 184
United States (US)
and bank bailout, 168
and China, 90, 93, 141–5, 146, 147
and democratic socialists, 194–8
and deregulation of capital markets, 167
electoral system, 193
and financial crisis, 2007–8, 5
and liberal hegemonic order, 132–3
and Marshall Plan, 115, 135–6
and Occupy Wall Street, 184
and philanthropy, 50
and Russia, 25–6, 27, 218
and Sanders, 10, 193–8
and socialist ideas, 182, 205
treasury bonds, 100
universities, 96
and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 4
universities, 59, 96, 217
tuition fees, 201
unrest, 125, 126
upward mobility, 97, 99, 102, 103t, 104t
urban-rural income gap, 97
urban spaces, 74
urban working class, 125
Usmanov, Alisher, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42–3
USSR, 206
See also Soviet Union
utilities, 177
value commitments, 74
varieties of capitalism, 7
varieties of socialism, 7
Varoufakis, Yanis, 183, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193
Vedomosti, 36
Venezuela, 185, 202, 218
violence, 75, 217
wages, 122, 193, 195
Wall Street Crash, 2, 197
Wang Hui, 92
Wang Shaoguang, 92
wars, 2–3, 4, 133
‘wary interdependence’, 142
Washington Consensus, 3, 16, 91
wealth, 8, 16, 29, 50, 51, 57, 100
in China, 92, 102, 125
household, 96
inequality, 49, 213
inherited, 171
national, 162
private, 93
transfer across generations, 50
in the US, 195
wealthy elite, 49, 52–4, 169–70, 171
in China, 89, 93–4, 95, 100, 101
Wedel, Janine, 16
welfare benefits, 162, 165, 168, 169, 172, 173
welfare rights, 120
welfare state, 3, 19, 99, 214, 215
well-being, 162
Wen Jiabao, 96
Western China, 98
Western Europe, 9, 138, 219
See also EU (European Union)
Western financial organisations, 16
See also financial institutions
Western influence, 16
Western political and economic models, 
importation of, 79
Western ruling elite, 16, 25
Western sanctions, 139
Western universities, 96
See also universities
White racism, 197
Why Liberalism Failed (Deneen), 161
Whyte, Martin King, 92
Wilson, Rodney, 40
Wolf, Martin, 171
women
Corbyn’s attitude towards, 201
promoting, 205
Work and Pensions, committee (UK), 166
worker-owned enterprises, 7
workers, 123–4, 125, 164
congress system, 124
representative councils, 124
rights, 4, 114, 201
unrest, 120–1
working class, 10, 110, 125, 126
World Bank, 91, 110, 144
WTO (World Trade Organization), 2, 92, 142
Wu Xinbo, 132, 134, 135
xenophobia, 217, 218
Xie, Yu, 96
Xi Jinping, 89–90, 96, 108, 110, 126, 131, 134
and anti-corruption campaign, 122, 125
and Belt and Road Initiative, 115
and Chinese Dream, 101
on communism, 114
and eight-point regulation, 95
inDEx234
Xi Jinping (cont.)
and foreign economic policy, 214
on Karl Marx, 113
and Trump, 143
‘Xi Jinping Thought’, 89
Xin, Meng, 96
Xinjiang, 137
Xu Chenggang, 117–18, 125
Yakovlev, Andrei, 38
Yeltsin, Boris, 16, 21–2, 52
YouGov poll, 204
young people, 196, 197, 202, 203–4, 205, 
206
Young Pioneers, 74
youth activism, 196, 197
youth association, 74
youth unemployment, 186, 193
Yugoslavia, 7, 123, 124
Yu Jianrong, 110, 119–20, 121–2
zero-tolerance approach, 77
Zhang Wangcheng, 121
Zhao Ziyang, 94

